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Chapter 1
Introduction
“[T]he explosion of interest in corporate governance is too easily interpreted as a
theme, even, a nuance, in Finance. Nomenclature aside, corporate governance is a
watershed, comparable to the reinvention of the field beginning in the late 1950’s
by Modigliani, Miller, Scholes, Merton, Jensen, Fama et al.”
(Greenbaum, 2006, p. 7).
The last decade has witnessed a rapidly growing body of academic research in cor-
porate governance. Furthermore, the popular press also developed a penchant for stories
about corporate malfeasance or what Jensen (2004) calls the “agency costs of overvalued
equity”. Apart from corporate misbehavior, Becht et al. (2005) attribute the reinforced
interest in corporate governance to five further underlying factors: world-wide privatiza-
tion, pension fund reform, the takeover wave in the eighties, deregulation and integration
of capital markets, and the East Asian crisis.
However, the foundations for the academic thinking on corporate governance and
finance were established as early as 1932. That year saw the publication of the deci-
sive book by Berle and Means. They pointed out that ownership is generally dispersed
in modern corporations, leading to the separation of ownership and control. Investors
(principals) employ managers (agents) to run the firm, thereby separating management
from finance or, put differently, ownership from control. The shareholders need the spe-
cialized knowledge of the manager for the firm to be run efficiently while managers need
the shareholders’ funds in order to finance the firm’s operations and their remuneration.
The agency problem arises as shareholders duly contribute their money, yet they are too
dispersed in order to monitor management efficiently, leaving managers with nearly un-
fettered control. This is problematic as the interests of the shareholders are often not in
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line with the interests of the managers.
Only in the seventies, formal economic modeling started to be applied to the study
of firm-level agency problems. In their seminal article, Jensen and Meckling (1976) apply
formal agency theory to the firm and model the agency costs of outside equity. They show
that a manager who has anything less than 100% of the cash flow rights has potentially
diverging interests from the owners. Or to put it in their words, “If both parties to the
relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not
always act in the best interest of the principal.” (ibid, p. 308). Managers may build
“empires”, buy perks for themselves, or divert resources to their own ends. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) see the firm as a “nexus of contracts”. This contractual view of the
firm dates back to Coase (1937) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Other early works of
the agency theory have been developed by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983).
Apart from agency theory, corporate governance could also be argued to originate from
the transaction costs literature (for a comparison of transaction costs economics versus
agency theory, see, especially, Williamson, 1988, 2002).
Yet how does corporate governance relate to the agency problem? One prominent
definition of corporate governance is contained in the survey article by Shleifer and Vishny
(1997). They define corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (ibid, p. 737).
Becht et al. (2005) take a wider perspective and argue that corporate governance encom-
passes various agents, that is creditors, suppliers, clients, and other stakeholders. At a
more general level, Hart (1995) argues that corporate governance aspects are determined
by two conditions. First, the existence of an agency problem or conflict of interest and
second, the difficulty of resolving these issues through a contract. This means that the
link between the agency problem and corporate governance is the failure to write complete
contracts contingent on all future states of the world and the corresponding managerial
action (see also, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The notion of incomplete contracts and con-
trol rights were pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).1
The latter concept defines the right to decide on actions that were not specified in the
original contract and clearly their importance is reinforced in an incomplete contracting
world.
Tirole (2001) argues that corporate governance addresses both an adverse selection
1 For early papers incorporating these ideas in the financial contracting literature, see Aghion and
Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). In these models cash flows are verifiable. For
models where cash flows and profits are either non-observable or non-verifiable, see the costly state
verification models by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) (profits are unobservable) or
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Fluck (1998) and Hart and Moore (1998) (profits are non-verifiable).
3as well as a moral hazard problem. At an abstract level, adverse selection means that
one party is better informed before signing the contract than the other party, a problem
usually referred to as “hidden type”. This is the general “lemons-problem” as defined
by Akerlof (1970). In the finance context, the pecking order model by Myers and Ma-
jluf (1984) is essentially build upon the premise of adverse selection. This means that
shareholders cannot distinguish between good or bad firms and hence there might be
situations where firms abstain from raising capital following their assessment that their
securities would likely be underpriced. Moral hazard refers to situations where one party
does not behave as stipulated in the contract, which is usually referred to as “hidden
action”. Jensen (1986) argues that managers are reluctant to pay out free cash flow
to shareholders, but instead prefer to waste free cash on acquisitions or their own pet
projects. This situation boils down to moral hazard on the part of managers. The com-
mon thread underlying these two concepts is the existence of information asymmetry. The
theoretical and practical importance of the latter topic was acknowledged in 2001 with
the Nobel Prize being jointly awarded to Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz for their seminal
work on markets with asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Rothschild
and Stigliz, 1976). Early treaties in the field of corporate finance which applied these
seminal insights are Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), and Bhattacharya (1979).
At the core, this thesis is about potential problems in finance resulting from asym-
metric information. The first two chapters focus on a situation in corporate finance where
agency conflicts are thought to be potentially severe. This part of the dissertation ana-
lyzes firms’ cash holdings. This is important as Myers and Rajan (1998) observed that it
is easier to make cash holdings disappear than to divert, for example, a plant. Referring
to the above discussion, the second chapter and third chapter of this thesis focus on
adverse selection and moral hazard in the context of corporate liquidity. Yet, this thesis
does not confine itself to corporate finance issues, but takes a wider perspective and also
investigates agency relationships in a different environment, i.e. agency problems in the
mutual fund industry. This analysis is pursued in the last chapter. Generally, the last
chapter focuses on moral hazard in the case of investment companies. This conflict arises
as mutual fund owners typically employ a management company to invest their funds,
but the management company might not employ the funds in the best interest of the
fund holders. More specifically, Bogle (2005) argues that nowhere in corporate America
is the conflict induced through the separation of ownership and control more severe than
in the costs charged to mutual fund shareholders. This is due to the fact that the man-
agement company charges an advisory fee for its services which clearly represents income
for the management company, but expenses for mutual fund investors. The management
company might be tempted to maximize the management fee and thereby hurt its fund
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holders. The following discussion introduces the chapters more rigorously and provides a
short overview of the results.
The second chapter investigates the value of cash for a broad international sample
consisting of 7,474 firms from 45 countries over the 1995 to 2005 period. Importantly,
Brealey et al. (2005) enumerate the value of liquidity as one of the ten unsolved problems
in finance. The novelty in this study is that the value of cash is studied with respect to
firm-specific and time-varying information asymmetry. While the extant literature has
already studied the value of cash, the focus has always been on different corporate gover-
nance regimes. This chapter investigates two well-known but contradictory hypotheses in
corporate finance by studying the value of cash holdings in connection with information
asymmetry. The first hypothesis relates to the adverse selection problem and the under-
lying model dates back to Myers and Majluf (1984). To be specific, adverse selection
leads managers to abstain from raising external capital as they are not willing to issue
undervalued securities. In this sense, cash can be used as a buffer for management in or-
der to avoid having to tap financial markets. However, the other side of the story relates
to Jensen (1986). He analyzes the agency costs of free cash flow and this notion is based
on moral hazard. The argument is that managers do not want to disburse free cash flow
to shareholders and instead they waste the funds on inefficient investments or on their
own pet projects. The results in the second chapter find overriding support for the free
cash flow theory. This result holds for various econometric specifications, definitions of
cash, and splits that are applied to disentangle the two effects.
The third chapter also focuses on cash holdings, but with respect to a different set-
ting. It aims at determining the relation between cash holdings and governance in a
cross-country setting. Previous studies on cash holdings and governance were either laid
out as cross-country studies and focused on the level of shareholder protection as a gover-
nance element or they focused on one country and incorporated some firm-level corporate
governance score. Yet these two different empirical strains achieved opposing empirical
results. The contribution of this chapter is to integrate the effect of country-level share-
holder protection and firm-level governance in one combined regression framework in order
to provide for a richer perspective. The results suggest that both firm- and country-level
governance are important determinants of corporate liquidity holdings. However, by ex-
trapolating the country influence of the corporate governance index, this chapter reveals
that it is only the investor protection that influences cash holdings. This latter finding
is in line with previous papers that argue that country effects dominate firm effects (e.g.
Harford et al. (2006)). Furthermore, the results reveal a significant valuation discount
for firms being either located in poor shareholder protection countries or lacking sound
5corporate governance systems.
The fourth chapter analyzes a research avenue in governance that has hitherto been
given scant attention: It investigates the governance environment of mutual funds. Specif-
ically, this chapter analyzes a unique hand-collected data set of 2,230 Luxembourg-
domiciled equity funds and studies the relationship between fees charged to investors
and the governance characteristics of these funds. The study focuses on UCITS (“Under-
takings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities”), the European equivalent
of U.S. mutual funds. 90% of UCITS in Europe are sold out of Luxembourg (EFAMA,
2007). The results show that the majority of funds are vertically integrated with the man-
agement company and the custodian belonging to the same financial group as the fund’s
promoter. In addition, most boards are not independent, but the majority of directors
are employees of the management company. The analysis of governance characteristics
and fees reveals that both vertical integration and board dominance by the management
company lead to lower expense ratios. This finding is in stark contrast to similar anal-
yses for the U.S. mutual fund industry on independent directors. However, the result is
consistent with related evidence of cross-subsidization in financial conglomerates and is
also in line with the notion that fund governance is not the most important driver of fee
setting in the Luxembourg-based asset management industry.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. Chapter 2 considers the value
of cash under asymmetric information. Chapter 3 presents a cross-country study that
analyzes the importance of firm- versus country governance for determining the level and
value of cash holdings. Chapter 4 investigates the governance environment of mutual
funds. Chapter 5 draws the threads together by providing a short conclusion.

Chapter 2
Information Asymmetry and the
Value of Cash1
JP Morgan economists have calculated that savings by companies in rich countries in-
creased by more than $1 trillion from 2000 to 2004 and measured against the last 40 years
companies have never hoarded so much cash as they do today.2
By observing this corporate behavior, a natural question to ask is which factors lead
firms to accumulate such enormous amounts of funds. Finding possible answers to this
conundrum is especially enlightening as the benchmark textbook model would tell us
that under the assumption of perfect capital markets, cash holdings are irrelevant to
the firm. The reason is that in this idealized situation external finance can always be
obtained at fair terms. However, by looking at figures from the corporate landscape,
the irrelevancy of cash is not supported. For example, the U.S. software giant Microsoft
presented in its 2004 annual report a cash position amounting to $60.6 billion. However,
amid growing investor pressure, Microsoft announced in July 2004 that it would pay a
one-time dividend of $32 billion in 2004 and buy back up to $30 billion of the company’s
stock over the next four years. Upon the arrival of that news, Microsoft’s stock price rose
by 5.7% in the after-trading which exemplifies that cash can by no means be regarded as
irrelevant in investors’ eyes.3
Hence, in order to depict the current business setting some of the assumptions of
perfect capital markets have to be relaxed. First, if transaction costs are incorporated
into the model, an optimal cash balance will be determined and the irrelevancy of cash
1 This chapter is based on a study of the same title by Gru¨ninger and Hirschvogl (2007).
2 JPMorgan Research: Corporates are driving the global saving glut, June 24, 2005.
3 The Wall Street Journal, Microsoft to Dole Out its Cash Hoard, July 21, 2004, p. A.1.
8 CHAPTER 2: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE VALUE OF CASH
does not hold anymore. Second, if information asymmetry (henceforth referred to as
IA) is considered in the analysis, adverse selection and moral hazard problems result.
Focusing on adverse selection, the underlying model dates back to Myers and Majluf
(1984), who explicitly consider the role of cash holdings in the presence of IA. Adverse
selection leads managers to abstain from raising external capital as they are not willing
to issue undervalued securities. Therefore, a cash buffer can prevent the management
from being forced to pass up positive NPV projects. However, there are two sides to
everything. In this respect, Jensen (1986) analyzes the agency costs of free cash flow and
hence focuses on the dark side of cash holdings. His framework is based on moral hazard.
Instead of paying out free cash flow to the capital providers, managers waste the funds
on inefficient investments or on their own pet projects.
From the preceding discussion, it becomes obvious that cash holdings and IA are
interrelated. This means that studying corporate cash holdings with an emphasis on IA
could provide valuable insights into the firms’ motivation to hold cash. This is exactly
the novel path that our study takes and contributes to the literature. The existing cash
literature can loosely be divided into two different strands. The first category examines
the determinants of cash holdings and whether there exists an optimal amount from the
perspective of the shareholders. The second approach focuses on the impact of liquidity
on firm performance and firm valuation. Importantly, the empirical study presented in
this chapter belongs to the second category. Potentially, it would be interesting to follow
the first path and analyze how a firm’s cash reserve is influenced by the level of IA. Yet,
it is virtually impossible to derive clear predictions and to unambiguously interpret the
results from following this path: On the one hand, according to the pecking order theory
a firm should hold more money when the level of IA is higher, because financial slack is
valuable. On the other hand, this argument is especially important for firms with greater
investment opportunities and according to the pecking order firms should use cash in the
first place. Thus, depending on the stance one adopts completely opposite predictions
for the influence of IA on the level of cash can be derived. The free cash flow problem
leads to similar ambiguous predictions. One can argue that firms with a higher degree of
IA hold more cash, because the management is very reluctant to distribute excess cash
to shareholders. However, it also can be argued that IA results in lower cash holdings,
because the management can easily dissipate cash. These difficulties of formulating clear
predictions explain why we follow the second strand of literature and investigate the
influence of IA on the value of cash and not on the level of the liquidity. Specifically, we
study the value implications of cash holdings under consideration of firm-specific time-
varying IA.
9We consider this approach to be a novel path as we analyze the value implications
of cash holdings from a different angle. Although in the past researchers have already
investigated the value consequences of corporate cash holdings, they did so with respect to
corporate governance issues and not with an emphasis on IA. In this strand of literature,
most authors find that a low corporate governance regime has detrimental effects on the
value of corporate liquidity holdings (see, for example, Dittmar et al., 2003; Pinkowitz
et al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). However, we think it is very illuminating
to focus on IA as another channel where corporate cash holdings can have benefits in line
with the Myers and Majluf (1984) argument (as external capital is costly) and/or also
costs according to Jensen (1986) (as increased managerial discretion could lead managers
to squander corporate liquidity resources). We empirically test the two hypotheses and
investigate which effect outweighs the other. In this respect, our sample is very extensive
encompassing 7,474 firms from 45 countries for the period 1995 to 2005, which is equal to
42,476 firm-year observations. We also employ different estimation methods. Specifically,
the results are calculated via fixed effects estimation techniques and also with the Fama-
MacBeth procedure. We derive our results for the actual cash ratio and also with the
help of an estimated metric called ‘excess cash’.
Considering the actual cash ratio, our results reveal that the marginal value of cash
(without considering IA) is on average around one dollar. However, by incorporating IA
(dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts), the marginal value of cash incurs a substan-
tial valuation discount and is significantly decreased. This evidence provides an initial
corroboration of the free cash flow argument by Jensen (1986). For our data set it seems
to hold that the agency costs due to moral hazard tend to outweigh the benefits due to
the availability of internal funds. However, in order to distinguish more precisely between
our two opposing hypotheses, we split the sample according to governance and financing
constraints measures. In this respect, we find that the value of cash is higher if governance
is stronger which further emphasizes the free cash flow argument. On the other hand,
the results based on the financing constraints measures do not paint a clear picture and
hence no clear-cut conclusions can be drawn. As a robustness test of the results using
the actual cash-ratio we derive a measure for excess cash based on Opler et al. (1999).
Importantly, the results remain qualitatively the same for this different metric.
Taken together, the results have important implications and question generally ac-
cepted principles of the capital structure and the cash literature. We find no evidence
that financial slack is valuable as predicted by the pecking order theory. From this it
follows that it is not in the shareholders’ interest that firms hold cash reserves because of
IA. Hence, the precautionary motive to hold cash appears to be questionable. However,
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our findings do not contradict the pecking order theory in general. We do not argue that
firms should not use internal funds in the first place, but we argue that firms should not
accumulate cash with the intention to avoid external finance in the future.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical background,
puts forward our hypotheses and reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the
data as well as the methods we use in this study. Section 4 continues by reporting the
results from our empirical investigation and provides various robustness tests. Finally,
Section 5 provides the concluding remarks.
2.1 Theoretical Background, Hypotheses, and Re-
lated Literature
2.1.1 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
According to the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), firms
prefer internal to external financing. This theory is based on an information advantage
of the management. Due to IA, firms could be forced to forgo positive NPV projects if
internal funds are not sufficient to finance the project. If such a situation occurs, financial
slack is valuable. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), the only opportunity to issue
stock without any loss of market value occurs if IA is nonexistent or at least negligibly
small. This idea describes the notion of time-varying adverse selection costs.4 Based
on this observation there are periods in which firms are not restricted in their access to
external capital and periods in which external finance is prohibitively costly. In the latter
events financial slack, i.e., liquidity reserves, is especially important and should have a
higher value.
This reasoning boils down to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In periods with a higher degree of IA cash has more value for a firm
than in periods where the degree of IA is lower.
However, based on Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory the complete opposite could
be expected.5 Internal funds allow the management to shield themselves away from the
rigor of the capital market, hence they do not need the approval of the capital providers
4 The idea of varying IA is implemented in the models of Korajczyk et al. (1992) and Viswanath
(1993). They show that it can indeed be optimal for a firm to deviate from a strict pecking order
rule, i.e., to finance a new project with new equity even if there are other financial resources available.
5 See also Stulz (1990) and Jensen (1993).
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and they are free to decide according to their own discretion. As the management is very
reluctant to pay out funds to capital providers, the executives have the incentive to invest
even when there are no positive NPV projects available, hence financial slack can have
major disadvantages. Yet, this is not the end of the story. Even if there is more room
for the management to use funds for value-destroying and self-serving projects when cash
reserves are high, there are some limitations due to corporate governance mechanisms
(e.g., the markets for corporate control (Stulz, 1988)). Nevertheless, the higher the degree
of IA, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish between value-destroying and optimal
investments. Due to the information advantage of the management, shareholders, for
example, cannot always judge whether an investment has a positive NPV or, as another
example, whether high cash reserves are based on an optimal liquidity management or
whether they are the result of managerial risk aversion (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
This reasoning results in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: In periods with a higher degree of IA cash has less value for a firm
than in periods with a lower degree of IA.
Importantly, we acknowledge that empirically testing these two hypotheses involves
three major difficulties:
(i) How to disentangle the two supposed effects of the conflicting hypotheses? 6 The
two hypotheses result in the direct opposite expectation concerning the influence of IA
on the value of cash. If no relationship can be found, it cannot be ruled out that both
effects are at work and cancel each other out. Even if a relationship can be detected, it
still cannot be ruled out that the opposite effect is also existent, but to a lesser degree.
Given that we are ultimately interested in the overall effect, this does not pose a real
problem. Nevertheless, it can be attempted to disentangle these two effects to some
extent by splitting the sample into subgroups. The first hypothesis is strongly related
with the access to external financing. Firms that face tighter financial constraints can
be expected to suffer more, especially if the degree of IA is high. By splitting up the
sample according to the degree of financial constraints, it is expected that the value
of cash in conjunction with IA is higher in the subgroup encompassing the constrained
firms. This finding would support Hypothesis 1, regardless of the overall effect. For firms
with a weaker corporate governance structure Hypothesis 2 should be more relevant. By
splitting up the sample according to this criterion, it can be expected that the value of
cash in combination with IA is lower in the subgroup with a weaker governance structure.
6 This paper is similar to the paper by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) as they also study the value of
cash in relation with Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986). Yet in contrast to this paper,
they focus on the value of aggregate liquidity.
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This result would support Hypothesis 2, regardless of the overall effect.
(ii) How to measure firm-specific time-varying IA? To analyze the relation between
the value of cash and IA, a proxy for the latter is required. We have to rely on proxies
that were used in previous research and are meanwhile well established. Nevertheless, the
use of such a measurement is a crucial matter. The proxy we use is discussed in detail in
the data section (refer to Section 2.2.1.1).
(iii) How to measure the value of cash? While our study represents, to the best of
our knowledge, the first that investigates the influence of IA on the value of cash, it
is fortunately not the first study that analyzes the value of cash in some other settings.
Fama and French (1998) study the impact of debt and dividends on firm value. Pinkowitz
et al. (2006) modified the method of Fama and French (1998) to estimate the marginal
value of cash. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) also use such a modified version of
the method of Fama and French (1998) to estimate the impact of cash on firm value.
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) are interested in the value of liquidity in relation to a
firm’s corporate governance system. This approach can easily be adapted to the questions
analyzed in our study. For a comprehensive explanation of the methods employed in this
chapter refer to Section 2.2.2.
2.1.2 Related Literature
There is a growing literature that investigates the value of a (marginal) dollar (Pinkowitz
et al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Faulkeneder and Wang, 2006). These papers
are related to our work as they also study the value of cash and provide interesting and
important findings on this matter, however, their theoretical framework is different from
ours. They do not analyze the relation between the value of cash and firm-specific, time-
varying IA. Nevertheless, in the literature various empirical papers can be found that
are related to our research question and further motivate our two hypotheses. In the
following, we refer to a few studies that (i) find evidence for the pecking order theory
with time-varying adverse selection costs (background of Hypothesis 1), or (ii) empirically
test the free cash flow problem (back-ground of Hypothesis 2), or (iii) examine a related
question based on these two theoretical concepts.
Autore and Kovacs (2006) empirically show that firms prefer to access financial mar-
kets for issuing equity when the level of IA is lower. This evidence supports their hy-
pothesis and they show that including time-varying adverse selection costs in the pecking
order theory can explain violations of exactly that theory. Given this finding, it can be
expected that in periods with a higher degree of IA, cash is more important for firms and
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should have a higher market value. In contrast, Leary and Roberts (2007) do not confirm
the results of Autore and Kovacs (2006) and argue that the variation of IA cannot explain
the violation of the pecking order theory. The use of different measures of IA could be
an explanation for these contradictory findings. While Autore and Kovacs (2006) use a
firm-specific and time-varying proxy, Leary and Roberts (2007) estimations are based on
an aggregated proxy similar to the one used by Choe et al. (1993). At this point, we
would like to emphasize that we consider it of crucial importance to measure IA on a
firm-level basis because we do not believe that IA behaves in the same way over time for
all firms.
With respect to evidence for the free cash flow hypothesis, Nohel and Tarhan (1998)
investigate the consequences of share repurchases on operating performance. Their em-
pirical findings reveal that operating performance improves after share repurchases, but
only for firms that have low growth opportunities. Contrary to expectations, the rea-
son for the augmented performance is not associated with better growth opportunities
following share repurchases but results from the more efficient employment of assets. Ac-
cordingly, the authors argue that this evidence can best be explained by the free cash
flow hypothesis. Moreover, Shin and Stulz (1998) empirically show that segments of a
diversified firm depend on an internal capital market and that agency costs have an effect
on the efficient use of the internal capital market access. More direct evidence on the
agency costs of managerial discretion in connection with corporate cash holdings is pro-
vided by Dittmar et al. (2003). They study more than 11,000 firms from over 45 countries
and find that firms in countries with low investor protection hold double the amount of
cash when compared to their counterparts in countries with a high level of shareholder
rights. Their results become even more pronounced when they control for the capital
market development. They argue that their results are in line with the hypothesis that in
countries with a low level of shareholder protection, shareholders simply lack the means
for forcing managers to pay out cash to them. The authors interpret their results as
confirming the free cash flow hypothesis. Similarly, Kalcheva and Lins (2007) find that
firms with low corporate governance at the corporate level hold more cash and this effect
becomes stronger for firms in low investor protection countries. Moreover, Pinkowitz and
Williamson (2004) focus on the influence of country-level investor protection on the value
of cash holdings and their findings reveal that cash is worth less in countries where minor-
ity rights are weaker. Taken together, poor protection of investor rights at the company
level as well as at the country level make it easier for the executives to dissipate cash for
their own ends.
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The paper by Lundstrum (2003) is closely related to our study as it also focuses on
IA. Specifically, Lundstrum (2003) tests whether the benefits from accessing an inter-
nal capital market in order to avoid selling underpriced securities outweigh the agency
costs created by the availability of liquid resources. On the one hand, building on the
Williamson (1986) information cost theory, he argues that internal capital markets have
a positive effect on firm value for two reasons. First, firms do not have to sell undervalued
securities if IA masks the true value of the shares and, second, internal capital markets
allow managers to undergo investments that the capital market would be unwilling to
finance. The reason is that IA hinders managers in conveying their informational advan-
tage credibly to the market. On the other hand, the free cash flow theory predicts that
more liquid funds at the managers’ discretion lead to agency costs due to money squan-
dering. The reason for this stems from the fact that an internal capital market increases
liquid assets and hence amplifies those agency costs. His results reveal that although
access to an internal capital market exerts a positive effect on firm value, this result only
holds for firms with a low level of IA. In the case of high information problems, no gains
from the availability of an internal capital market can be realized. This corroborates the
free cash flow theory.
2.2 Data and Methods
Our regression specifications are primarily based on the method of Fama and French
(1998). These authors investigate how firm value is related to dividends and debt.
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), as well as Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) use a modified version of this approach to estimate the value of cash hold-
ings. We also employ this modified version for calculating our results. For this reason,
we require variables on firm characteristics. On the one hand, we need variables on firm
value and cash holdings and, on the other hand, various control variables have to be
collected. These variables are listed and described in Section 2.2.2, where the estimation
models are explained in detail. For the sake of investigating the influence of IA on the
value of cash, a measure for IA must be constructed. This metric is explained in Section
2.2.1.1. Furthermore, in Section 2.2.1.3 we present the splits that are used to test for the
influence of financial constraints and the corporate governance structure on the value of
cash in conjunction with IA.
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2.2.1 Data
2.2.1.1 How to Measure IA?
To this date, numerous studies have been published that use different proxies for IA.
Certainly, no perfect measure for the level of IA can be found, but at least scholars have
put forward different reasonable proxies.
Announcement effects can be captured to measure the level of IA (e.g. Choe et al.,
1993). The reason is that announcements reveal information to the market. On the one
hand, a lower price reaction indicates that the market participants are less surprised by
the news, i.e., the level of IA was relatively low. On the other hand, a lower reaction
could indicate a less important signaling role of corporate actions, which also means that
the level of IA was relatively low. The main disadvantage of this proxy is that it can
only be measured discretely at the time of an announcement and not continuously on a
firm-level basis. Therefore, it can only be used for aggregated estimations.
Many studies use size (e.g. Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) or the market-to-book ratio (e.g.
Frank and Goyal, 2003) as a proxy for IA. Large firms are better monitored and more
information is available. Growth opportunities entail more discretion and uncertainty
for the future. However, size and growth as proxies are useful in capturing variation
in the cross-section rather than the time-series variation (Autore and Kovacs, 2005).
Accordingly, the use of these variables as proxies for IA can nullify the advantages of
having panel data.
But there are also other proxies that can capture the time-series variation. Kr-
ishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) discuss five different proxies (errors in analysts’
forecasts, standard deviation of forecasts, normalized forecast error, volatility of abnor-
mal returns around earnings announcements, and volatility in daily stock return) that
are often used in corporate finance studies. The use of the volatility of returns around
earning announcements as proxy is not a feasible method to measure IA in a large cross-
country study. If we used the volatility in stock return as proxy, we would not be able to
distinguish between the effect of risk and the effect of IA. The errors in analysts’ forecasts
capture the difference between the mean analysts’ forecasts and the actual earnings per
share. By referring to a study by Elton et al. (1984), the authors argue that the errors
in analysts’ forecasts are an especially appropriate proxy for IA. Specifically, Elton et al.
(1984) find that the main part of the forecast error in the last month of the fiscal year
can be explained by misestimation of firm-specific factors rather than by misestimation
of economy or industry factors. Therefore, we will use this measure as one of our proxies
for IA. Since this variable can be influenced by risk, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam
16 CHAPTER 2: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE VALUE OF CASH
(1999) divide the errors in analysts’ forecasts by the volatility of the firm’s quarterly
earnings which results in the normalized forecast error. However, we are unable to apply
this correction for risk because we do not have quarterly data for most of the coun-
tries. Therefore, we use the errors in analysts’ forecasts (without normalization) only in
a robustness test. In our main specifications, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is our
proxy for IA. This variable measures the deviation of the forecasts of different analysts.
Greater disagreement among analysts indicates a higher level of IA. Importantly, Diether
et al. (2002) provide evidence that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is not a proxy for
risk.7 Moreover, different studies have confirmed the relationship between the dispersion
in the forecasts and the level of IA. Parkash et al. (1995) analyze the relationship between
firm-specific attributes and analysts’ uncertainty in predicting earnings. They show that
the amount and quality of information available about a firm significantly influence the
volatility of the earnings forecasts. D’Mello and Ferris (2000) present evidence in line
with a stronger announcement effect for firms whose forecasts exhibit lower dispersion.
Another important reason for using the dispersion as our proxy is that it is also used by
Autore and Kovacs (2006)8 who find evidence—as mentioned in the theoretical section—
that firms avoid accessing financial markets in periods with a high degree of IA.9
For the calculation of the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, we use the one-year con-
sensus forecasts of the earnings per share provided by I/B/E/S. Firm observations are
excluded if the standard deviation of the forecasts is not based on the estimates of at
least three analysts. The dispersion of the forecasts (defined as the firm-level standard
deviation of all forecasts of the various analysts) is not updated each month for every
firm. Accordingly, if we took the data only for one specific month, we would loose all
7 They argue that dispersion cannot be a proxy for risk, because they find a negative relation between
dispersion and the future stock returns. We control for the influence of such a relation on our results
in the robustness tests in Section 2.3.3.
8 The proxy for IA used by Autore and Kovacs (2006) is also based on dispersion, but they compute
the variable in a different way. They divide the dispersion in a given quarter by the average of the
dispersion in the prior four quarters. This is done in order to explicitly consider the time-variation
of dispersion and not the cross-sectional variation. Since we have no quarterly data for most of our
firms, we do not divide dispersion by the average of the prior dispersion. If we used the values of
the prior years instead of the prior quarters, we would lose too many observations. Nevertheless,
our estimations are also based on the time-variation of IA, because we estimate with fixed effects
(and not with OLS), and therefore we focus on the within dimension. In a robustness test Autore
and Kovacs (2006) also use the unscaled dispersion and estimate with fixed effects. They find the
same relationship for this variable as in their main specification.
9 Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use in their analysis two additional measures for IA which
are not used in our study. First, they look at the reaction to the announcement of quarterly earnings.
However, due to data limitations we cannot use this variable. Second, they use the residual volatility
in stock returns as a proxy. We are reluctant to use this proxy, as one cannot distinguish between
the effect of risk and the effect of IA. Another variable that is sometimes used in corporate finance
studies to proxy for IA is the number of analysts covering a firm (e.g. Lundstrum, 2003). We do
not use this variable, because we consider it rather as a proxy for the size of the firm.
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firm-year observations for which we would have no (updated) estimate for this particular
month. Therefore, we calculate for every year the average of the monthly dispersions.10
In order to make the measure comparable for different firms, the standard deviation of
the forecasts needs to be scaled. This is usually done by either dividing the standard de-
viation by the stock price, by the absolute value of the mean, or by the median forecast.
However, we abstain from using the stock price for scaling and use the median11 instead
because our dependent variable (firm value) is related to the stock price. We realize that
if we were to scale by the stock price, an endogeneity problem could occur. By adding
one to the measure and taking the natural logarithm, our measure approaches a normal
distribution. Thus, the measure equals:12
dispM = ln
(
1 +
standard deviation of analysts′forecasts
|median|
)
(2.2.1)
where the standard deviation is the mean of the standard deviations taken over the
entire year. The descriptive statistics of this variable is provided in Table 2.2 (refer to
Section 2.2.2.1).
2.2.1.2 The Sample
Our data set covers the period from 1995 to 2005. All firms from the different countries are
included for which I/B/E/S provides analysts’ forecasts13 and for which we can retrieve
company data from Worldscope. We use yearly data because for most countries quarterly
data are not available. Furthermore, because of their specific business environment,
financial firms and utilities are omitted from the sample. Additionally, in order to ensure
comparative data, firms whose fiscal year does not end with the calendar year have to
be excluded. Importantly, to reduce the impact of outliers, we trim all variables at
the 1% and the 99% tails. Finally, we exclude countries with fewer than 30 firm-year
observations. In the most basic specification, the (unbalanced) sample consists of 7,474
10 Towards the end of the year, the dispersion usually decreases because there is less room for un-
expected events and less uncertainty. Since we do not have the dispersion for each firm for every
month, this average could underestimate the dispersion of firms for which we have no observations
in the first month of the year. Thus, we tested another method to calculate the average. Specifi-
cally, we computed the average for only a few months. For January and February a forecast is only
available for a small portion of our sample firms and the dispersion varies widely. Therefore, we
decided to use the average of the dispersion in March, April and May. The results do not change
qualitatively.
11 The results do not qualitatively change if the mean is used instead of the median.
12 A more detailed version of this formula is presented in the appendix.
13 If for a firm the variable dispM cannot be calculated for at least one year, the firm is excluded from
the analysis.
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firms and 42,746 firm-year observations from 45 countries.
2.2.1.3 Variables Used to Divide the Sample into Subgroups
We divide the sample into subgroups in order to test whether this has an impact on the
way IA influences the value of cash.
The following variables are used to split the sample into subgroups (using median-
splits) to investigate the influence of corporate governance variables. Table 2.1 contains a
list of the countries contained in the sample and the descriptive statistics of the variables
(measured at the country level).
Rule of law index: This measurement is provided by the Worldbank. Among other
things, it captures—for the different countries—the extent to which agents have
confidence in the rules of society, the quality of contract enforcement and the courts.
It is assumed that firms in countries with a lower rule of law index generally have
a weaker corporate governance structure. We use the index for the year 2000 (the
year in the middle of the sample period).
Corruption index: This value is also provided by the Worldbank. It measures the
extent to which public power is used for private gains in different countries. Gener-
ally, firms in countries with a higher extent of corruption have a weaker corporate
governance structure. Again, we use the index for the year 2000.
Anti-director-rights index: This index is an aggregated measure for the level of share-
holder rights in a country. The index is taken from the data provided by the website
of Rafael La Porta.14 A detailed description of the construction of this index can
be found in La Porta et al. (1998). Again, we use the index for the year 2000.
Legal system: Countries can be classified broadly according to their different law tra-
ditions. While civil law is based on a series of written codes or laws, common law
is developed by custom. Importantly, La Porta et al. (1998) find that in common
law countries shareholders are better protected against expropriation by insiders
compared to civil law countries.
Closely held shares: While the previous measurements are only available at the coun-
try level, we additionally use a variable that can be derived at the firm level. This
item measures the percentage of shares held by insiders. For splits that are based
on this variable, we do not use median splits but apply different cut-off levels that
14 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html.
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are described later. The numbers are taken from the Worldscope database which
provides a time series for this measure.
The following variables are used to split the sample into subgroups to investigate the
influence of financing constraints.
Stock market capitalization to GDP: It is computed as the ratio of the value of
listed shares in a country to its GDP. We expect countries with a higher score
to have a higher developed capital market. Accordingly, firms in these countries
should have better access to capital, i.e., they are less constrained. This variable is
provided on the website of Ross Levine.15 We use the values for the year 2000.
Private bond market capitalization to GDP: It is equal to the ratio of a country’s
private domestic debt securities (issued by financial institutions and corporations)
to its GDP. The same argument applies as for the employment of the variable above.
The data is also provided on the website of Ross Levine. Again, we use the values
for the year 2000.
Firm size: The previous two measurements are only available at the country level. By
using firm size as a proxy for the extent of financial constraints, the sample can be
analyzed at the firm level basis. According to Almeida et al. (2004) small firms are
rather constrained. Firm size is measured by the firm’s market capitalization and
is derived as a time series from the Worldscope database.
Payout ratio: Additionally, we use the payout ratio to proxy for financial constraints. It
is defined as the ratio of total dividends and share repurchases to operating income.
Almeida et al. (2004) put forward that firms with a small payout ratio are rather
constrained. We obtain the variable as a time series from the Worldscope database.
Admittedly, there is not always a clear-cut distinction between the variables that are
used to divide the sample according to the governance structure and those that are used
for splitting according to financial constraints. For instance, the legal system is used as a
proxy for the strength of the governance structure. At the same time, civil law countries
generally have smaller and narrower capital markets (La Porta et al., 1998), i.e., the legal
system could also be associated with financial constraints. For a careful interpretation of
the results, this caveat has to be kept in mind.
15 www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Ross_Levine/Publications.htm.
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Table 2.1: Observations per Country and Index Values
country N N corrupt. rule anti-dir. stock- bond- com. civil
method method index of law right gdp gdp law law
1 2 index index ratio ratio
Argentina 151 141 -0.40 0.07 4 0.44 0.05 0 1
Belgium 428 370 1.32 1.53 0 0.81 0.46 0 1
Brazil 515 356 -0.01 -0.21 3 0.38 0.09 0 1
Canada 1551 1023 2.25 1.87 5 1.16 0.22 1 0
Chile 395 78 1.50 1.23 5 0.86 0.17 0 1
China 816 0 -0.38 -0.42 . 0.42 0.09 0 1
Colombia 42 0 -0.51 -0.73 3 0.13 0.00 0 1
Czech Republic 51 0 0.39 0.51 . 0.21 0.07 0 1
Denmark 452 69 2.31 1.87 2 0.68 1.03 0 1
Finland 671 608 2.49 2.02 3 2.70 0.24 0 1
France 2090 1842 1.41 1.36 3 1.13 0.40 0 1
Germany 2005 1727 1.67 1.84 1 0.73 0.62 0 1
Greece 694 168 0.84 0.66 2 1.42 0.00 0 1
Hong Kong 941 64 1.43 1.44 5 3.76 0.18 1 0
Hungary 101 0 0.71 0.77 . 0.31 0.02 0 1
India 121 0 -0.31 0.15 5 0.37 0.00 1 0
Indonesia 572 0 -1.05 -1.03 2 0.28 0.01 0 1
Ireland 217 208 1.50 1.71 4 0.80 0.08 1 0
Israel 153 83 1.11 0.96 3 0.56 . 1 0
Italy 891 786 0.79 0.88 1 0.70 0.33 0 1
Japan 846 0 1.28 1.66 4 0.82 0.47 0 1
Korea, South 2100 0 0.33 0.52 2 0.56 0.40 0 1
Malaysia 891 312 0.21 0.39 4 1.46 0.49 1 0
Mexico 628 177 -0.49 -0.45 1 0.24 0.02 0 1
Netherlands 1036 919 2.30 1.89 2 1.81 0.47 0 1
Norway 580 73 2.07 1.90 4 0.39 0.20 0 1
Pakistan 40 0 -0.94 -0.75 5 0.09 . 1 0
Peru 104 77 -0.16 -0.60 3 0.23 0.04 0 1
Philippines 268 0 -0.53 -0.55 3 0.66 0.00 0 1
Poland 217 63 0.48 0.54 . 0.18 . 0 1
Portugal 227 211 1.37 1.07 3 0.60 0.25 0 1
Russia 54 0 -1.04 -0.99 . 0.22 . 0 1
Singapore 750 578 2.44 1.91 4 1.93 0.18 1 0
South Africa 168 51 0.49 0.15 5 1.77 0.09 1 0
Spain 619 542 1.62 1.29 4 0.84 0.15 0 1
Sweden 964 93 2.43 1.87 3 1.47 0.43 0 1
Switzerland 871 796 2.17 2.11 2 3.03 0.43 0 1
Taiwan 2057 0 0.63 0.76 3 1.02 0.26 0 1
Thailand 888 0 -0.37 0.30 2 0.36 0.12 1 0
Turkey 265 227 -0.36 -0.07 2 0.46 . 0 1
United Kingdom 2571 2316 2.10 1.80 5 1.93 0.20 1 0
United States 13102 11270 1.73 1.79 5 1.64 1.02 1 0
This table shows the number of observations (N meth. 1, N meth. 2) of the countries that are included in the two
regression specifications and it presents the values of the indices that are used to split the firms into subgroups by country
characteristics. The definitions of the indices are provided in Section 2.2.1.3. A point indicates that for a country the index
value is not defined.
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2.2.2 Methods
In the cash literature, three distinctly different approaches to estimate the value of cash
are pursued. For a higher reliability of our results, we use not only one but two of these
methods. We focus on the approach by Pinkowitz et al. (2006) as our main regression
specification and consider the approach by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) as our main
robustness test.16 The following sections describe these two methods in detail.
2.2.2.1 The Approach by Pinkowitz, Stulz and
Williamson (2006)
This estimation method is based on the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998).
Whereas Fama and French (1998) study the influence of debt and dividends on firm value,
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) modify their approach to estimate the value of cash. The basic
regression specification of Fama and French (1998) is:
(Vt −At) = α+ β1Et + β2dEt + β3dEt+2 + β4dAt + β5dAt+2 + β6RDt
+ β7dRDt + β8dRDt+2 + β9It + β10dIt + β11dIt+2 + β12Dt
+ β13dDt + β14dDt+2 + β15dVt+2 + εt
(2.2.2)
with:
Vt: Total market value of the firm
At: Book value of total assets
Et: Earnings before interest and extraordinary items but after depreciation
and taxes
RDt: R&D expenditures
It: Interest expenses
Dt: Total dividends paid
dXt: Past two-year change of the variable X, i.e., Xt−2 −Xt
dXt+2: Future two-year change of the variable X, i.e Xt −Xt+2
All variables are scaled by total assets (At). The dependent variable is the spread of
value over cost. The control variables (levels and differences) are included in the model to
capture expectations about future earnings and other effects that could influence the value
of the firm. To estimate the value of cash, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) modify this regression
in some aspects. As a main difference, they split up the change in assets into its cash
and non-cash component. Furthermore, they use Vt (scaled by At) as the dependent
16 The approach that is not used in this study is the method of Faulkeneder and Wang (2006). They
regress the cash ratio (levels and differences) on the excess stock return.
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variable, so that the coefficient of the cash variable can be interpreted as the value of one
dollar. Additionally, they use one-year differences instead of two-year differences with
the consequence that fewer observations are lost. Taken together, Pinkowitz et al. (2006)
use the following regression specification:
Vt = α+ β1Et + β2dEt + β3dEt+1 + β4dNAt + β5dNAt+1 + β6RDt
+ β7dRDt + β8dRDt+1 + β9It + β10dIt + β11dIt+1 + β12Dt + β13dDt
+ β14dDt+1 + β15dVt+1 + β16dCt + β17dCt+1 + εt
(2.2.3)
with:
NAt: Net assets (book value of total assets minus cash)
Ct: Cash
dXt: Past one-year change of the variable Xt, i.e., Xt−1 −Xt
dXt+1: Future one-year change of the variable X, i.e., Xt −Xt+1
The model of Fama and French (1998) includes the leads and lags as proxies for
expectations. An increase in cash holdings may also change expectations about future
growth. Therefore, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) additionally use another estimation approach
where they include the level of cash instead of the differences:
Vt = α+ β1Et + β2dEt + β3dEt+1 + β4dNAt + β5dNAt+1 + β6RDt
+ β7dRDt + β8dRDt+1 + β9It + β10dIt + β11dIt+1 + β12Dt + β13dDt
+ β14dDt+1 + β15dVt+1 + β16Ct + εt
(2.2.4)
Since we appreciate this argumentation, we use the second approach as our main
regression specification. Nevertheless, we also employ the first method as a robustness
check to our results. The descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Table 2.2
(Panel A).17 The values are very similar to those presented in Pinkowitz and Williamson
(2004).
17 The dividend payments include share repurchases as this is done in Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004)
but not in Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and in Fama and French (1998).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A
variable N p10 mean p50 p90 sd
V 42,746 0.515 1.280 0.962 2.370 1.030
dV(t+1) 42,746 -0.399 0.163 0.045 0.806 0.892
RD 42,746 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.053 0.041
dRD(t) 42,746 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.012
dRD(t+1) 42,746 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.012
E 42,746 -0.035 0.056 0.062 0.155 0.101
dE(t) 42,746 -0.051 0.007 0.008 0.064 0.064
dE(t+1) 42,746 -0.053 0.010 0.008 0.075 0.069
dNA(t) 42,746 -0.115 0.064 0.054 0.283 0.184
dNA(t+1) 42,746 -0.120 0.095 0.047 0.344 0.255
D 42,746 0.000 0.018 0.009 0.049 0.027
dD(t) 42,746 -0.010 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.020
dD(t+1) 42,746 -0.011 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.023
I 42,746 0.002 0.020 0.016 0.043 0.019
dI(t) 42,746 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.010
dI(t+1) 42,746 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.011
C 42,746 0.009 0.125 0.073 0.310 0.147
dC(t) 42,519 -0.063 0.006 0.002 0.082 0.080
dC(t+1) 42,587 -0.063 0.012 0.002 0.090 0.093
dispM 29,963 0.023 0.193 0.109 0.458 0.249
V2 25,777 0.937 2.050 1.470 3.630 1.910
dV2(t+1) 25,777 -0.498 0.275 0.083 1.170 1.570
RD 25,777 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.091 0.089
dRD(t) 25,777 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.023
dRD(t+1) 25,777 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.009 0.024
E 25,777 -0.042 0.065 0.076 0.189 0.155
dE(t) 25,777 -0.059 0.010 0.010 0.080 0.102
dE(t+1) 25,777 -0.059 0.014 0.010 0.094 0.102
(continued)
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Table 2.2: —Continued
Panel B
variable N p10 mean p50 p90 sd
dNA(t) 25,777 -0.143 0.066 0.058 0.327 0.231
dNA(t+1) 25,777 -0.144 0.117 0.050 0.414 0.345
D 25,777 0.000 0.024 0.011 0.062 0.037
dD(t) 25,777 -0.013 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.028
dD(t+1) 25,777 -0.014 0.004 0.000 0.024 0.033
I 25,777 0.003 0.021 0.018 0.042 0.019
dI(t) 25,777 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.011
dI(t+1) 25,777 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.013
C 25,777 0.009 0.177 0.069 0.417 0.345
dC(t) 25,742 -0.071 0.009 0.002 0.098 0.135
dC(t+1) 25,754 -0.071 0.014 0.003 0.109 0.152
dispM 20,089 0.019 0.173 0.088 0.426 0.241
errorF12 19,229 0.000 0.331 0.065 1.020 0.927
lnCash 25,777 -4.700 -2.730 -2.670 -0.875 1.490
realNA 25,777 10.900 13.200 13.000 15.600 1.750
FCF 25,777 -0.070 0.019 0.035 0.119 0.142
NWC 25,777 -0.154 0.059 0.054 0.298 0.191
vola12 25,777 0.054 0.124 0.105 0.219 0.072
RD/sales 25,777 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.083 0.115
MV 25,777 0.871 1.660 1.330 2.830 1.080
SALESg 25,777 -7.240 17.000 9.400 46.500 33.800
leverage 25,777 0.016 0.250 0.239 0.476 0.177
DIVDUM 25,777 0.000 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.452
Capex 25,777 0.017 0.075 0.055 0.155 0.068
The table shows summary statistics (number of observations, 10% and 90% percentile, mean, median, and the standard
deviation) of the scaled variables over the 1995 to 2005 period included in our two regression specifications. The variables
in Panel A are required for the regression approach by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). The variables in Panel B are required for
the regression approach by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The definitions of these variables are provided in Section
2.2.2.2.
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Ultimately, we are interested in the value of cash holdings in connection with IA.
In order to proxy for this effect, an interaction term (INT ) is included in the model.
This variable is calculated by multiplying the cash level (C ) with the dispersion variable
(dispM ). Additionally, the variable dispMi,t as such is used as an explanatory variable to
control for a direct influence of IA on firm value. The model is estimated by running a
fixed effects regression. The fixed effects estimator focuses on differences within firms (the
within dimension of the data). This is exactly what we need in order to investigate how
the value of cash in a firm changes when the degree of IA varies over time. To control
for macroeconomic effects, time dummies are included in the model. The preceding
argumentation results in the following final model:
Vi,t = α+ β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1
+ β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1
+ β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dVi,t+1 + β16Ci,t
+ β17(C × dispM)i,t + β18dispMi,t + αi + µt + εi,t
(2.2.5)
The statistical inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors.18
These standard errors are not only heteroscedasticity consistent but they are also robust
to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. Moreover, robustness
to cross-sectional correlation of the error terms of the individual firms is often mentioned
(e.g. Fama and French, 1998) as the main advantage of the estimation approach of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). Although the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors are robust
to cross-sectional dependence, we additionally estimate the model with the approach of
Fama and MacBeth as this method is more commonly used in the literature. By using
the Fama-MacBeth procedure, however, one cannot control for unobserved firm effects.
2.2.2.2 The Approach by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)
This section describes our second approach used to measure the influence of cash on the
value of the firm in the presence of IA. This approach serves as a robustness test to
the previous method. It is not used as the main specification for two reasons. First,
our Hypothesis 1 is based on the pecking order theory. In a pecking order world there
is actually no cash optimum which, however, must be known to calculate the variable
18 Ho¨chle (2007) shows in a Monte Carlo simulation that the finite sample properties of Driscoll and
Kraay’s nonparametric covariance matrix estimator are significantly better than those of commonly
used alternatives in the case that cross-sectional dependence is present.
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“excess cash” that is used in this approach. Second, the calculation of “excess cash”
requires more variables that are not available for all firms in the sample and, therefore,
more observations drop out of the sample reducing the sample size substantially.
The approach by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) is similar to the first method as
it also uses the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998). However, instead of
including as the independent variable the actual cash level or the difference, excess cash
is calculated beforehand. Specifically, the necessary calculations are laid out as a two-
step approach where in the first step the normal level of cash is predicted based on the
specification by Opler et al. (1999). The residuals from the prediction regression, i.e.,
the difference between the actual cash level and the predicted cash ratio, are defined as
“excess cash”. This name stems from the fact that this level of cash can neither be justi-
fied under the transaction cost motive nor under the precautionary motive. The former
hypothesis puts forward that a certain level of cash is necessary in order to economize
on transaction costs (Keynes, 1936; Miller and Orr, 1966). Transaction costs are deter-
mined by characteristics that either increase the probability and costs of cash shortfalls
or increase the costs of raising funds. In order to control for this effect, Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007), following Opler et al. (1999), include net assets (total assets mi-
nus cash), net working capital, and a proxy for cash flow volatility in their prediction
regression.
Apart from the transactions cost motive, a second driving force for holding cash is
called the precautionary motive. It is built on the premise that financial slack is valuable
if investment opportunities are expected and external finance is prohibitively costly due
to adverse selection costs (see, in particular, Myers and Majluf, 1984). This implies that
one also has to control for investment opportunities (market-to-book ratio), cash flow,
and also for the access to external capital as proxied by firm size (book value of assets in
2000 U.S. dollars). However, as Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) have postulated, there
are endogeneity problems if the raw market-to-book ratio is used to predict the normal
level of cash in order to calculate excess cash, and then the latter variable is again used
to predict the market-to-book ratio. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) picked up on this
issue and instrumented the market-to-book ratio with past sales growth (SALESg) and
then used this instrumented market-to-book ratio in order to predict cash. We endorse
their approach and also instrument the market-to-book ratio by the average of last year’s
and this year’s sales growth. However, as a modification to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007) we also include capital expenditures, leverage, and a dividend dummy into the
analysis in order to fully adhere to the standard approach by Opler et al. (1999).19
19 The exception is that Opler et al. (1999) also include a regulation dummy; however, we include
sector dummies. Furthermore, as volatility measure we cannot use an industry sigma due to multi-
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Furthermore, based on the latter authors we also estimate the prediction regression with
the Fama-MacBeth estimation approach.
Therefore, following Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), the
regression specification for estimating the optimal level of cash is defined as follows:
ln
(
Ct
NAt
)
= α+ β1 ln(realNAt) + β2
FCFt
NAt
+ β3
NWCt
NAt
+ β4(V ola12)t
+ β5
MˆVt
TAt
+ β6
RDt
Salest
+ β7
Capext
NAt
+ β8
Debtt
TAt
+ β9DIV DUMt + SECTDUM + εt
(2.2.6)
with:
Ct: Cash
NAt: Net assets (book value of total assets minus cash)
realNAt: Natural logarithm of net assets in dollar terms for the year 2000
FCFt: Operating income after interest and taxes
NWCt: Working capital minus cash
V ola12t: Standard deviation of a firm’s monthly stock return over the prior
12 months
MˆVt: Market value of the firm computed as shares outstanding times price
plus total liabilities (instrumented with the average of last year’s and
this year’s sales growth (SALESg))
RDt: R&D expenditures
Capext: Capital expenditures
Debtt: Total debt (interest bearing)
DIVDUMt: Dividend dummy which is set equal to one if the firm paid dividends or
engaged in share repurchases and it is set equal to
zero in all the other cases
SECTDUM : Sector dummies
Excess cash (ExCash) is then calculated as the difference between the actual cash
ratio and the exponential of the predicted log cash ratio. The descriptive statistics of
the data are presented in Table 2.2 (Panel B). The values are broadly in line with those
reported in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). Having in a first step determined excess
cash, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) continue by calculating the effects of this variable
on the value of the firm. This is of particular interest as excess cash filters out the
collinearity. Hence, we use the standard deviation of the firm’s stock price instead as our volatility
measure. However, our results remain qualitatively the same if we calculate the volatility of the
cash flows averaged over our sectors and instead do not include the sector dummies in the prediction
regression.
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component of the actual cash ratio that cannot be directly related to operational needs
or investment opportunities for the future. Therefore, excess cash is held for discretionary
reasons. Consequently, it is especially prone to managerial squandering, as by their very
nature liquid assets can more easily be siphoned off when compared to plant or equipment.
This means that excess cash is directly related to the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen
(1986). Taken together, as the emphasis of this chapter is to study the value consequences
of cash in the presence of IA, excess cash can provide valuable insights in this setting.
Like Pinkowitz et al. (2006),20 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) also use the valuation
regressions of Fama and French (1998):21
Vi,t = α+ β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1
+ β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1
+ β12Di,t + β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dVi,t+1 + β16ExCashi,t
+ β17(ExCash× dispM)i,t + β18dispMi,t + αi + µt + εi,t
(2.2.7)
The variables have already been defined in Section 2.2.2.1 and the calculation of
the variable ExCash is outlined above. Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) all
variables are scaled by net assets and the valuation regression is only calculated for
positive values of excess cash.
2.3 Empirical Tests of the Hypotheses
2.3.1 Results from the Approach by Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (2006)
Table 2.3 presents the estimation results of the model without IA. It provides a basis
for the comparison of the estimated coefficients with those in other studies that do not
analyze the influence of IA. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) also include fixed effects
and Fama-MacBeth estimations for the cash level and cash changes for the whole sample.
Most of the coefficients have the expected signs and many are very similar to those
in Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004). Nevertheless, there are also numbers that differ
20 Please refer to Section 2.2.2.1 for details on the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998).
21 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) argue that they only use the level of excess cash and not the
change. One of the most important arguments is that a change in excess cash can potentially come
from two sources: either a change in the level of cash or in the prediction regression. Hence, it is
difficult to interpret the actual meaning of a change in excess cash. For the full reasoning, please
refer to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
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strongly. For instance, they present a positive coefficient for the earnings variable (E ) in
the Fama-MacBeth model compared to a negative one for the fixed effects specification.
In contrast, we find in both specifications a positive value. Such differences between the
two estimation approaches are somewhat surprising. It could be explained by the fact
that the Fama-MacBeth approach cannot control for firm fixed effects. However, we also
present a coefficient that gets the opposite sign in each of the two estimation methods.
The past change in earnings (Et) gets a negative sign by the estimation with fixed effects
and a positive sign by using the Fama-MacBeth procedure. However, the coefficient with
the negative sign is not statistically significant. Interestingly, Pinkowitz and Williamson
(2004) also get mixed signs for the variable Et. While one explanation of this outcome is
based on the differences in the model assumptions, we potentially see another reason in
the way the changes of the earnings are calculated. Fama and French (1998) include the
earnings changes as proxy for the expected growth of profits using two-year changes. Our
study is based on Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) and uses one-year changes having
the advantage of more observations but possibly leading to a noisier proxy. In Section
2.3.3 the model is estimated with two-year changes as a robustness test. Additionally,
other aspects could also explain why we get some different coefficients if compared to
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004). We estimate with an international sample and not
only with U.S. firms. Furthermore, we control for macroeconomic effects by including
time dummies. While we so far highlighted differences between the estimation methods,
it should be emphasized that the majority of the estimated coefficients are consistent
across the two models.
Importantly, the coefficients of interest are the one of cash (C) and that of the cash
change (dCt), respectively. By interpreting the results we focus on the fixed effect spec-
ification that includes the level of cash because we consider this method as the most
appropriate one. The results of the other specifications are also presented whether the
results are robust or not. Additionally, estimations are presented where all U.S. firms are
excluded. This is done to check whether the findings are driven by the large fraction of
U.S. firms in the sample.The coefficient of cash for the whole sample is 0.696 and it is
strongly significant. This figure can be interpreted as the marginal value of one unit of
money. The comparable coefficient in Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) is equal to 1.05.
As their sample is not laid out in an international setting, this value should rather be
compared with that of Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Unfortunately, they do not present this
coefficient for the whole sample but only for subgroups. In addition, they only use the
Fama-MacBeth approach for deriving their calculations. Their estimated coefficient of
C —depending on the subgroups (high versus low corruption)—ranges between 0.03 and
1.24. Hence, our coefficient lies in this range and is therefore a plausible outcome.
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Considering our results from other estimation methods included in Table 2.3, it be-
comes obvious that the coefficient of C and dCt considerably varies with the model.
However, by comparing the results of the sample that includes the U.S. firms and the
sample without U.S. firms, it can be noticed that the differences between the coefficients
based on the two samples are consistently found, i.e., the coefficient of cash (and the
change of cash) for the sample with U.S. firms is higher in every specification. This cor-
responds to the results derived by splitting the sample in other subgroups. Therefore, we
do not claim to estimate the effective marginal value of cash. We only claim to be able
to roughly evaluate whether the value of cash differs in subgroups and whether the effect
of IA on cash is positive or negative. The limitation of the interpretation of the isolated
numbers becomes particularly apparent when the scaling of the variables is changed (e.g.,
net assets instead of total assets). When we change the scale we find qualitatively the
same results, but the coefficients of C and dCt considerably change in some specifications.
Table 2.4 presents the results of the models that include the dispersion of analysts’
forecasts (dispM ) and its interaction with cash. Again, the estimation is carried out for
the whole sample as well as for the sample without U.S. firms. The observations for
which dispM is not defined drop away. The numbers of groups stay the same because in
a first step we exclude all firms for which dispM is not defined in at least one year. In
all specifications we find a significantly negative coefficient for the interaction variable.
Apparently, the results clearly support our Hypothesis 2 and not Hypothesis 1. That
means that the value of cash is not higher when the degree of IA is higher—it is even
lower. Thus, the free cash flow problem seems to be more relevant in relation to IA
than the advantage of having a liquidity reserve when raising external funds is difficult.
To see whether the negative effect of IA on liquidity is also economically significant, we
calculate—despite our own reservations—the marginal value of cash and the influence of
IA. By including an interaction term in the analysis, the marginal value of cash has to
be calculated as follows:
V
A
= α+ ...+ βc
C
A
+ βINT
(
C
A
× dispM
)
+ βdispMdispM (2.3.1)
∂ VA
∂CA
=
∂V
∂C
= βc + βINTdispM (2.3.2)
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Considering the results of the fixed effects estimation with the cash level, the coef-
ficient of C is 0.782 and that of the interaction is -0.594. Based on the median value
of dispM (0.109, see Table 2.2) the marginal value of cash is 0.717. An increase in the
degree of IA of one standard deviation (0.249, see Table 2.2) results in a marginal value
of cash that is 0.148 units of money lower, i.e., the marginal value amounts to 0.569. We
conclude that the negative effect of IA on cash is substantial. To control for the direct
influence of the dispersion on the firm value, we also included the variable dispM by
itself. We did not formulate an explicit expectation on the coefficient of this variable.
The results reveal that there is no clear relationship. In some specifications it is negative;
in others it is positive. The negative relationship can be explained by the fact that IA
in general is something unfavorable. Another explanation could be based on a possible
correlation with a firm’s risk. A possible reason for a positive result could be related to
the model of Miller (1977). He argues that under certain assumptions a higher divergence
of opinions among investors tends to increase the market value of securities as only the
most optimistic investors engage in trading.22
In Table 2.5 we present the results of our more detailed analysis by splitting the sample
according to firm characteristics. First, we examine splits by the firm size (measured with
total assets) and by the payout ratio to test the impact of financial constraints. Second,
the sample is split by the proportion of inside ownership (closely held shares) to test
for an influence of the corporate governance structure. Considering the results of the
fixed effects estimation, we can conclude that cash has a higher value for small firms
(smaller than the median firm) than for large firms (larger than the median firm). This is
consistent with the idea that large firms can more easily access financial markets, but the
result is not robust. The estimation with the Fama-MacBeth method does not confirm
this finding, but that does not pose a problem as we are primarily interested in the
coefficient of the interaction term, for which we are able to present more robust results.
The negative effect of IA on cash is less strong (or does not even exist) for small firms.
Supposedly, the negative effect of IA on cash (as predicted by Hypothesis 2) is to some
extent canceled out by an opposite effect, i.e., cash is more important in periods with
higher IA (as predicted by Hypothesis 1). When the payout ratio is used as proxy for the
degree of financial constraints, we again find that cash is more valuable for firms that face
financing constraints. The results for the interaction variable are mixed. Based on the
split by the payout ratio we cannot conclude that there is an opposite effect as discussed
before. The final split by firm characteristics results in three groups. In the choice of
the cut-off levels (0–5%, 5–25%, and 25% or more) we follow Morck et al. (1988) (see
also Opler et al., 1999, for these cut-off levels). Thus, we expect that cash has less value
22 Diether et al. (2002) provide evidence for this model.
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and that IA has a more negative impact for firms with inside ownership between 5% and
25% due to an entrenchment effect. Firms with such a high proportion of managerial
ownership could suffer more from agency conflicts because the managers could fleece the
shareholders more easily. Yet, in most specifications we find that cash has more value
in the middle range, contrary to the prediction. Thus, the findings indicate that in the
middle range an incentive effect is prevalent rather than an entrenchment effect and it is in
line with the results of McConnell and Servaes (1990). They find a positive relationship
between the firm value and the inside ownership up to a fraction of about 45%. The
relationship between the coefficient of the interaction variable and the proportion of the
closely held shares is not that clear. We can only detect a tendency that the negative
influence of IA is most pronounced for firms featuring a low managerial shareholding.
Table 2.5: Estimated Value of Cash in Different Subgroups (Firm Characteris-
tics)
all firms non-U.S. firms U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
large C 0.467*** 2.249*** 0.176 1.454*** 1.114*** 3.647***
firms (2.68) (8.47) (1.63) (5.62) (3.35) (9.33)
C×dispM -1.018*** -0.524 -1.307*** -1.539* 0.423 2.181*
(-4.32) (-0.58) (-4.38) (-2.04) (1.10) (2.04)
N 14979 14979 10432 10432 4547 4547
Groups 3761 10 2760 10 1007 10
small C 0.844*** 1.919*** 0.335** 1.088*** 1.167*** 2.117***
firms (4.08) (9.38) (2.18) (6.32) (4.50) (9.88)
C×dispM -0.281 -0.166 -0.463*** 0.175 0.041 -0.033
(-1.20) (-0.41) (-3.49) (0.54) (0.13) (-0.08)
N 14984 14984 9229 9229 5755 5755
Groups 4720 10 2799 10 1926 10
payout C 0.241 0.820*** 0.173 0.730*** 0.219 1.016***
ratio high (1.39) (4.96) (1.10) (5.41) (0.78) (4.06)
C×dispM -0.250 -1.631** -0.299* -1.299** 0.904*** -1.353**
(-0.79) (-2.58) (-1.73) (-2.42) (3.13) (-2.72)
N 14862 14862 11095 11095 3767 3767
Groups 4434 10 3322 10 1114 10
payout C 1.145*** 2.780*** 0.770*** 1.969*** 1.416*** 3.016***
ratio low (4.75) (10.36) (3.41) (5.80) (5.37) (11.04)
C×dispM -0.658*** -1.036*** -1.367*** -1.280*** 0.062 -0.350
(-2.82) (-5.93) (-5.83) (-4.73) (0.24) (-1.12)
(continued)
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Table 2.5: —Continued
all firms non-U.S. firms U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
N 14867 14867 8372 8372 6495 6495
Groups 5524 10 3374 10 2156 10
inside C 0.990*** 2.247*** 0.529* 1.078* 1.308*** 2.669***
ownership (5.41) (6.09) (1.80) (1.84) (5.59) (7.78)
0-5% C×dispM -1.251** 0.322 -3.038*** 0.489 -1.212* -0.369
(-2.45) (0.27) (-5.21) (0.25) (-1.73) (-0.33)
N 3326 3326 966 966 2360 2360
Groups 1144 10 410 10 734 10
inside C 1.042*** 2.671*** -0.061 1.351** 1.463*** 2.924***
ownership (4.26) (9.79) (-0.29) (3.20) (4.83) (9.25)
5-25% C×dispM -0.501** 0.621 -1.899*** 1.276 0.105 0.742
(-2.28) (1.15) (-3.37) (1.23) (0.49) (1.13)
N 6559 6559 2809 2809 3750 3750
Groups 2563 10 1175 10 1389 10
inside C 0.286*** 1.974*** 0.239** 1.092*** 0.600 2.842***
ownership (2.61) (11.40) (2.15) (7.63) (1.53) (9.57)
+25% C×dispM -0.284 -0.851*** -0.911*** -1.438*** 0.436 -0.524
(-1.14) (-3.67) (-4.20) (-3.25) (1.55) (-1.33)
N 14787 14787 10857 10857 3930 3930
Groups 4793 10 3260 10 1537 10
This table shows estimation results without IA for fixed effects regressions (FixEf.) and FamaMacBeth regressions (FM-
Beth) for different sub-samples over the 1995 to 2005 period. The dependent variable in all specifications is the total
market value scaled by total assets. Year dummies and different variables on firm characteristics (as in Table 2.2 and 2.3)
are included in all specifications, but are not presented for brevity reasons. The definitions of all variables are provided in
Section 2.2.1.2. Statistical inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998). t-values are presented in parentheses. . ***,
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
We now turn to the estimation results included in Table 2.6 where we split the sample
by proxies for the corporate governance and financing practices at the country level. The
first three splits are based on three indices that were described in Section 2.2.1.3, i.e., the
rule of law index, the anti-director-rights index and the corruption index. For each index,
the sample is divided into two groups according to a higher (lower) index value than
the median country. A higher index value indicates that a country has better corporate
governance practices. With very few exceptions we find exactly what we expected. The
coefficient of cash is higher (with one exception) for firms located in countries with a
higher index value and the negative influence of IA on cash is stronger for firms in
countries with a lower index value (also with one exception). This result supports the
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idea that IA is more problematic for firms operating in countries with lower corporate
governance standards.
The next two splits are based on the financing practices of the countries. We use the
stock market capitalization and that of the private bond market, respectively, divided by
the gross domestic product as measurement for the financing practices. We expect that
in countries with a lower level of those ratios, internal financing is more important and
hence cash holdings play a major role. If we were to find a less negative coefficient of the
interaction term or even a positive relationship between cash and IA, we would interpret
this result as supporting our Hypothesis 1. Surprisingly, we find exactly the opposite.
The coefficient of cash and the coefficient of the interaction term are generally smaller for
firms in countries with a lower ratio. Therefore, we cannot corroborate our Hypothesis
1. We put forward two reasons for this finding. The first explanation is based on the
correlation of a country’s financing and its corporate governance practices. Common law
countries are typically market-based countries and we can expect that these countries
have a higher ratio of bond and stock capitalization to GDP than civil law countries. At
the same time, investors generally are better protected in common law countries (La Porta
et al., 2000). Our other explanation is based on the role of IA in capital markets and the
role of financial intermediaries. Civil law countries are rather bank-based and, therefore,
financial intermediaries play a decisive role. Financial intermediaries can be considered
as a natural response to IA (Leland and Pyle, 1977). In contrast to shareholders and
bondholders, banks know more about a company’s prospects because banks have more
information sources than the average market participant. Hence, the adverse selection
problem is less important for banks than for other investors. Consequently, in market-
based countries where firms typically access financial markets to raise funds, IA is more
problematic. Thus, our Hypothesis 1 (cash has more value when IA is high) should be
more important for common law countries and this could be reflected in the less negative
interaction term, which is not even significant in most specifications.
Table 2.6: Estimated Value of Cash in Different Subgroups (Country Charac-
teristics)
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
rule of C 0.883*** 2.427*** 0.426*** 1.481***
law index high (4.92) (11.10) (4.97) (5.56)
C×dispM -0.497** -0.062 -0.998*** 0.016
(-2.54) (-0.24) (-6.93) (0.05)
(continued)
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Table 2.6: —Continued
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
N 23240 23240 12938 12938
Groups 5470 10 2986 10
rule of C 0.374** 0.950*** 0.374** 0.950***
law index low (2.34) (5.34) (2.34) (5.34)
C×dispM -1.281*** -1.674*** -1.281*** -1.674***
(-4.62) (-3.50) (-4.62) (-3.50)
N 6723 6723 6723 6723
Groups 2011 10 2011 10
anti-director C 1.028*** 2.471*** 0.533*** 1.213***
rights index high (4.99) (10.82) (6.12) (5.18)
C×dispM -0.269 0.055 -0.996*** -0.008
(-1.14) (0.20) (-3.66) (-0.02)
N 17246 17246 6944 6944
Groups 4217 10 1726 10
anti-director C 0.250** 1.353*** 0.250** 1.353***
rights index low (2.16) (4.79) (2.16) (4.79)
C×dispM -0.985*** -0.721* -0.985*** -0.721*
(-5.26) (-1.95) (-5.26) (-1.95)
N 11966 11966 11966 11966
Groups 3048 10 3048 10
corruption C 0.883*** 2.427*** 0.426*** 1.481***
index high (4.92) (11.10) (4.97) (5.56)
C×dispM -0.497** -0.062 -0.998*** 0.016
(-2.54) (-0.24) (-6.93) (0.05)
N 23240 23240 12938 12938
Groups 5470 10 2986 10
corruption C 0.374** 0.950*** 0.374** 0.950***
index low (2.34) (5.34) (2.34) (5.34)
C×dispM -1.281*** -1.674*** -1.281*** -1.674***
(-4.62) (-3.50) (-4.62) (-3.50)
N 6723 6723 6723 6723
Groups 2011 10 2011 10
stock/gdp C 0.852*** 2.357*** 0.378*** 1.452***
high (4.57) (10.95) (3.54) (5.62)
C×dispM -0.436** -0.071 -0.861*** -0.017
(-2.43) (-0.29) (-7.40) (-0.06)
(continued)
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Table 2.6: —Continued
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
N 24886 24886 14584 14584
Groups 5943 10 3458 10
stock/gdp C 0.373*** 1.034*** 0.373*** 1.034***
low (6.90) (10.15) (6.90) (10.15)
C×dispM -1.378*** -1.338*** -1.378*** -1.338***
(-5.59) (-3.82) (-5.59) (-3.82)
N 5077 5077 5077 5077
Groups 1539 10 1539 10
bond/gdp C 0.814*** 2.430*** 0.097 1.418***
high (3.88) (11.45) (0.73) (4.87)
C×dispM -0.497** -0.276 -0.863*** -0.179
(-2.48) (-1.54) (-5.01) (-0.50)
N 22494 22494 12192 12192
Groups 5528 10 3044 10
bond/gdp C 0.619*** 1.032*** 0.619*** 1.032***
low (3.71) (5.36) (3.71) (5.36)
C×dispM -0.701*** -1.206* -0.701*** -1.206*
(-2.67) (-2.12) (-2.67) (-2.12)
N 6995 6995 6995 6995
Groups 1788 10 1788 10
common C 1.045*** 2.491*** 0.517*** 1.164***
law (4.89) (10.60) (3.96) (4.69)
C×dispM -0.215 0.078 -0.859*** -0.053
(-0.91) (0.27) (-3.05) (-0.13)
N 16008 16008 5706 5706
Groups 3981 10 1490 10
civil C 0.283*** 1.345*** 0.283*** 1.345***
law (2.70) (5.28) (2.70) (5.28)
C×dispM -1.048*** -0.618* -1.048*** -0.618*
(-6.94) (-2.02) (-6.94) (-2.02)
N 13955 13955 13955 13955
Groups 3506 10 3506 10
This table shows estimation results without IA for fixed effects regressions (FixEf.) and FamaMacBeth regressions (FM-
Beth) for different sub-samples over the 1995 to 2005 period. The dependent variable in all specifications is the total
market value scaled by total assets. Year dummies and different variables on firm characteristics (as in Table 2.2 and 2.3)
are included in all specifications, but are not presented for brevity reasons. The definitions of all variables are provided in
Section 2.2.1.2. Statistical inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998). t-values are presented in parentheses. . ***,
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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2.3.2 Results from the Approach by Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007)
In Table 2.7 we report the results from estimating the Fama and French (1998) valuation
regression for firms that experience a positive value of excess cash (refer to Section 2.2.2.2).
The results are estimated with fixed effects regressions (our standard model) and as a
double check we also run Fama-MacBeth regressions. In order to control for a U.S.
effect, the results are also shown without North American firms. The value for ExCash
is statistically and economically significant. Specifically, the marginal value of excess
cash is positive and significant at the one percent level for all specifications. Focusing on
the results from the fixed effects estimator, the coefficient of ExCash amounts to 1.905
which means that one dollar put into excess cash increases the firm value by more than
its par value. These results point to a value-enhancing role of excess cash and they are
comparable to other studies in this field, e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) who find
a value for excess cash of 2 to 3 dollars depending on the governance proxy used.23
However, as outlined above the emphasis of our study is placed on investigating the
value consequences of cash in the presence of IA. Therefore, in Table 2.7 the models
also include the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts (dispM ) as our measure for
IA. In order to study the combined effect of excess cash and IA, an interaction variable
is also included in the model. Our results reveal that the coefficient on the interaction
term is negative and significant in all but one specification. Importantly, we find that
IA decreases the marginal benefit of holding excess cash. This means that the empirical
evidence corroborates our Hypothesis 2. In order to illustrate the detrimental value effect
of IA, we calculate the marginal value of excess with IA for the fixed effects calculations
(see Section 2.3.1). In Table 2.7 the stand-alone coefficient on ExCash amounts to 1.905.
However, if IA is taken into account, the marginal value of excess cash is reduced to a
value of 1.863 (based on a median value of dispM of 0.088 according to Table 2.2 (Panel
B).24 And if we now increase the IA by one standard deviation [0.241, see Table 2.2
(Panel B)], the marginal value of excess cash decreases by 0.115 (6.2%) money units to
a low level of 1.747.25 Therefore, these results can be interpreted as a valuation discount
placed on firms where IA constitutes a problem and the evidence clearly supports our
Hypothesis 2. This means that the agency costs from the free-cash flow theory dominate
23 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) abstain from interpreting the stand-alone coefficient on excess
cash as they argue that excess cash could still be aﬄicted with endogeneity and hence they only
focus on the interpretation of their interaction term (excess cash times governance index).
24 The calculation is done as follows: 1.905+(−0.479)×0.088. For more information on the calculation
of the marginal value of cash, please refer to Section 2.3.1.
25 The calculation is done as follows: 1.905 + (−0.479)× (0.088 + 0.241).
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any supposed cost savings from the availability of internal capital.
The empirical models presented thus far provided a first attempt to investigate
whether IA impacts the value effect of cash holdings. However, for the sake of dis-
tinguishing more accurately between our two conflicting hypotheses, we split the sample
into subgroups based on corporate governance (related to the free cash flow theory) and
financing constraints (related to Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection problem) (for
details refer to 2.2.1.3).26
Table 2.7: Estimated Value of Excess Cash in Relation with IA
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
E 5.440*** 2.337*** 5.223*** 3.207***
(24.76) (5.47) (14.52) (5.34)
dE(t) -0.057 1.894*** -0.511* 0.17
(-0.61) (5.18) (-1.68) (0.39)
dE(t+1) 3.281*** 2.681*** 2.089*** 0.858
(12.91) (8.26) (4.58) (1.42)
dNA(t) 0.351*** 1.076*** 0.176*** 0.421***
(2.74) (8.05) (3.49) (4.62)
dNA(t+1) 0.697*** 0.634*** 0.484*** 0.483**
(6.13) (4.18) (3.70) (2.37)
RD 10.748*** 8.183*** 8.268*** 6.627***
(6.56) (11.57) (3.52) (5.90)
dRD(t) -2.088 0.498 0.668 4.338
(-1.46) (0.28) (0.59) (1.54)
dRD(t+1) 8.260*** 9.044*** 4.227** 7.444***
(9.89) (4.80) (2.15) (5.47)
I -0.775 -4.560*** -2.846 -5.307***
(-0.73) (-4.23) (-1.21) (-4.99)
dI(t) 0.586 -1.327 3.311*** 3.233***
(0.71) (-0.65) (2.83) (3.51)
dI(t+1) -2.381*** -8.829*** -1.663 -3.851*
(-3.49) (-6.51) (-1.55) (-2.09)
D -2.130*** 4.492*** 0.511 4.868***
(-5.12) (10.51) (0.94) (7.14)
dD(t) -0.215 -2.553** -0.296 -1.787**
(-0.76) (-2.89) (-0.71) (-3.21)
(continued)
26 The only difference to the classifications taken for the actual cash ratio is that in the case of excess
cash we abstain from grouping firms along the dimension of size and the payout ratio as these two
characteristics are endogenously related to the computation of excess cash and the ownership split
is also omitted as the results have turned out to be not significant for the actual cash ratio.
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Table 2.7: —Continued
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
dD(t+1) -1.169*** 0.781 0.159 1.294
(-8.78) (1.06) (1.07) (1.67)
dV(t+1) -0.274*** -0.136 -0.154* -0.048
(-4.09) (-1.26) (-1.78) (-0.29)
dispM -0.007 -0.034 0.04 0.131
(-0.16) (-0.29) (0.66) (1.29)
ExCash 1.905*** 3.083*** 1.299*** 2.036***
(8.84) (14.82) (7.41) (9.78)
ExCash×dispM -0.479** -0.42 -0.776*** -1.016**
(-2.23) (-0.49) (-2.80) (-2.35)
Const. 1.182*** 1.063*** 0.948*** 1.019***
(14.83) (21.59) (19.28) (28.36)
R2 0.444 0.589 0.362 0.617
N 10876 10876 6569 6569
Groups 3455 10 1895 10
Fixed effects regressions (with year dummies) and Fama MacBeth regressions (1995 to 2005). The dependent variable is
the total market value scaled by net assets. The explanatory variables are defined in Section 2.2.1.3. t-values (Driscoll and
Kraay, 1998) are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The results are reported in Table 2.8. Accordingly, the first corporate governance
grouping is based on the rule of law index (corporate governance variable at the country
level). A first glimpse at the results reveals that they correspond to our expectations. The
evidence for the interaction term further confirms our Hypothesis 2 as the interaction term
is significantly more negative in low rule of law countries. This means that IA significantly
decreases the value of cash and this effect is even more pronounced if the governance
environment is weak. Moreover, this result is further emphasized by investigating the
evidence for the anti-director-rights index, which is a further corporate governance split
at the country level. In line with the previous discussion, the marginal value of excess cash
is significantly decreased if the shareholder protection is weak. Accordingly, this result
further enforces Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory. The evidence for the corruption
index also points in the same direction. The interaction term for high corruption countries
(low corruption index) is negative and relatively higher in absolute terms (-2.563) than the
interaction term if corruption is relatively low (-0.283). This means that a) IA decreases
the value of cash and b) that this effect is even more pronounced if the external governance
environment is weak. The last split of governance at the country-level (common law
countries versus civil law countries) reveals that according to expectations the coefficient
on ExCash is lower in civil law countries (0.934) versus common law countries. This
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confirms the results by La Porta et al. (1998) indicating that the governance environment
in countries with a civil law tradition is weaker. This result is also confirmed by the
interaction term, which is significantly negative in civil-law countries and not significant,
albeit still negative, in common-law countries. Taken together, the splits according to
corporate governance measures further emphasize that the free cash flow theory of Jensen
(1986) is the common denominator between the results because the coefficient on ExCash
is lower in a low governance environment as well as the interaction being more negative
if the governance is weaker.
Table 2.8: Estimated Value of Cash in Different Subgroups (Country Charac-
teristics)
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
rule of ExCash 1.952*** 3.172*** 1.165*** 2.164***
law index high (6.59) (12.55) (5.82) (7.76)
ExCash×dispM -0.317* 0.194 -0.258 -1.175*
(-1.70) (0.16) (-0.89) (-1.89)
N 8513 8513 4206 4206
Groups 2768 10 1207 10
rule of ExCash 1.403*** 1.738*** 1.403*** 1.738***
law index low (5.68) (5.77) (5.68) (5.77)
ExCash×dispM -1.982*** -0.112 -1.982*** -0.112
(-5.28) (-0.10) (-5.28) (-0.10)
N 2363 2363 2363 2363
Groups 688 10 688 10
anti-director ExCash 2.155*** 3.370*** 1.948*** 2.435***
rights index high (6.17) (13.27) (6.76) (6.29)
ExCash×dispM -0.26 0.051 -1.241 -0.552
(-1.15) (0.04) (-1.51) (-0.42)
N 6578 6578 2271 2271
Groups 2288 10 723 10
anti-director ExCash 0.929*** 1.884*** 0.929*** 1.884***
rights index low (7.56) (8.93) (7.56) (8.93)
ExCash×dispM -0.446** -1.478** -0.446** -1.478**
(-2.27) (-2.71) (-2.27) (-2.71)
N 4295 4295 4295 4295
Groups 1170 10 1170 10
(continued)
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Table 2.8: —Continued
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
corruption ExCash 1.929*** 3.180*** 0.977*** 2.078***
index high (6.34) (12.71) (5.70) (8.28)
ExCash×dispM -0.283 0.193 -0.034 -0.941
(-1.45) (0.16) (-0.11) (-1.49)
N 8442 8442 4135 4135
Groups 2769 10 1208 10
corruption ExCash 1.802*** 1.895*** 1.802*** 1.895***
index low (4.42) (5.72) (4.42) (5.72)
ExCash×dispM -2.563*** -0.367 -2.563*** -0.367
(-5.54) (-0.36) (-5.54) (-0.36)
N 2434 2434 2434 2434
Groups 689 10 689 10
stock/gdp ExCash 1.948*** 3.170*** 1.041*** 2.086***
high (7.48) (13.26) (9.35) (12.44)
ExCash×dispM -0.329 0.115 -0.457 -0.181
(-1.41) (0.11) (-1.51) (-0.29)
N 8738 8738 4431 4431
Groups 2819 10 1258 10
stock/gdp ExCash 1.643*** 1.975*** 1.643*** 1.975***
low (3.67) (3.88) (3.67) (3.88)
ExCash×dispM -1.912** -2.910* -1.912** -2.910*
(-2.27) (-2.11) (-2.27) (-2.11)
N 2138 2138 2138 2138
Groups 639 10 639 10
bond/gdp ExCash 1.861*** 3.138*** 0.748*** 1.769***
high (6.71) (13.84) (8.19) (8.67)
ExCash×dispM -0.325 -0.171 -0.291 -1.164*
(-1.26) (-0.18) (-1.37) (-2.05)
N 8285 8285 3978 3978
Groups 2623 10 1061 10
bond/gdp ExCash 1.847*** 2.199*** 1.847*** 2.199***
low (5.80) (5.84) (5.80) (5.84)
ExCash×dispM -1.194* 0.063 -1.194* 0.063
(-1.67) (0.06) (-1.67) (0.06)
N 2454 2454 2454 2454
Groups 787 10 787 10
(continued)
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Table 2.8: —Continued
all firms non-U.S. firms
FixEf. FMBeth FixEf. FMBeth
common ExCash 2.157*** 3.344*** 1.934*** 2.525***
law (6.00) (13.11) (6.11) (6.24)
ExCash×dispM -0.197 0.155 -0.986 -1.251
(-0.88) (0.11) (-1.11) (-0.92)
N 6256 6256 1949 1949
Groups 2191 10 626 10
civil ExCash 0.934*** 1.910*** 0.934*** 1.910***
law (7.79) (8.95) (7.79) (8.95)
ExCash×dispM -0.492** -1.476** -0.492** -1.476**
(-2.55) (-2.69) (-2.55) (-2.69)
N 4620 4620 4620 4620
Groups 1269 10 1269 10
This table shows estimation results without IA for fixed effects regressions (FixEf.) and FamaMacBeth regressions (FM-
Beth) for different sub-samples over the 1995 to 2005 period. The dependent variable in all specifications is the total
market value scaled by total assets. Year dummies and different variables on firm characteristics (as in Table 2.2 and 2.3)
are included in all specifications, but are not presented for brevity reasons. The definitions of all variables are provided in
Section 2.2.1.2. Statistical inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998). t-values are presented in parentheses. . ***,
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Finally, the results for the splits according to financing constraints at the country-
level (stock/gdp and bond/gdp) should proxy for the fact that in countries where the
capital market is less developed, i.e., lower stock/gdp and/or lower bond/gdp, hoarding
cash becomes more important as external finance is harder to obtain. This means that
we expect that in countries where the capital market development is lower, the coefficient
on ExCash is higher and the interaction term is relatively less negative. However, this
prediction is not borne out by our data. For both measures of the capital market develop-
ment (stock/gdp and bond/gdp) the coefficient on ExCash is lower for more constrained
countries and the interaction term is only significantly negative in the same environment.
One explanation of this result is that our proxy for the capital market development is
imperfect as there is a high correlation between the country law tradition (civil law versus
common law) and our capital market development measures. In effect, stock/gdp and
bond/gdp are then actually proxies for the governance environment and hence, to a lesser
extent, measures for the capital market development.
In a nutshell, the results provide an overwhelming view that IA decreases the value of
cash, which is in line with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow argument and which corresponds
to our Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the results consequently do not confirm Myers
and Majluf’s (1984) argumentation for the value benefits of financial slack (our Hypothesis
1).
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2.3.3 Robustness Tests
To further test the robustness of our main result, we alter the specification of our estima-
tions as well as the definition of some variables. The coefficients of interest are presented
in Table 2.9. For brevity, we only report (with one exception) the results of the fixed
effects estimation with the level of cash. For the ease of comparison, Panel A of Table 2.9
shows again the coefficients of cash and the interaction variable as they were presented
in the first column of Table 2.4. The other panels show the results of the robustness tests
where we changed some parameters of the estimations as described subsequently:
• Panel B: As discussed above, the valuation regression used in this study is based
on Fama and French (1998). While they use two-year changes for the calculation
of those explanatory variables that capture differences, we followed in our main
specification Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) who
only use one-year changes. By using two-year changes the sample becomes smaller,
but we still find a clear negative influence of IA on the value of cash.
• Panel C: We estimate the regression without including time dummies. The coeffi-
cients and the statistical inference do not change considerably.
• Panel D: In this specification we estimated the model with ordinary least squares
and cluster robust standard errors (Arellano (1987), Rogers (1993)). The coefficient
of C changes considerably, that of the interaction variable changes to a lesser extent.
The interaction remains significant but not anymore at the 1% significance level.
• Panel E: To control for a possible correlation between risk and IA we include two
more variables. First, we add the volatility of the monthly stock returns over the
year. Second, we include the interaction of the volatility and the cash ratio (C ).
We find a higher coefficient and a higher t-value for the interaction of cash and
IA. Moreover, the estimation reveals that there is positive interaction between cash
and risk (at least for non-U.S. firms). This can be explained by the fact that cash
is more important when the risk of the firm is higher. This test indicates that the
influence of risk and of the IA runs in the opposite direction. Obviously, we can
conclude that our results cannot be explained by a positive correlation between our
measurement of IA and risk.
• Panel F: In Panel F, we change the proxy for IA. Instead of using the dispersion
of analysts’ forecasts, we employ the forecast error (see the discussion in Section
2.2.1.1). We calculate this variable as follows:
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forecastError = ln
(
1 +
|epsforecast − epsactual|
|median|
)
(2.3.3)
where the forecast of the earnings per share is the average of all forecasts provided
by the analysts in November and December. The difference of the actual and
the forecasted earnings per share in absolute terms is scaled by the median of the
earnings per share forecast. Similar to the calculation of dispM, we add one to this
ratio and take the natural logarithm. Observations are excluded if the average of
the forecasts is not at least based on the estimates of two analysts. The estimation
indicates that our main finding is robust to a change of the measurement of IA.
Table 2.9: Robustness Tests
all firms non-U.S. firms
Panel A C 0.782*** 0.391***
(base case) (4.50) (4.53)
C×dispM -0.594*** -1.041***
(-3.34) (-10.24)
N 29963 19661
Groups 7474 4991
Panel B C 0.512** 0.296**
(2-year lags) (2.22) (2.05)
C×dispM -0.804*** -0.754***
(-4.15) (-9.51)
N 22908 15182
Groups 6072 4135
Panel C C 0.839*** 0.566***
(no time dummies) (4.65) (6.54)
C×dispM -0.587*** -1.163***
(-2.97) (-9.17)
N 29963 19661
Groups 7474 4991
Panel D C 2.281*** 1.501***
(pooled OLS) (19.28) (10.79)
C×dispM -0.610** -0.479*
(-2.31) (-1.83)
N 29963 19661
Groups 7474 4991
(continued)
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Table 2.9: —Continued
all firms non-U.S. firms
Panel E C 0.567** 0.215*
(volatility) (2.34) (1.73)
C×dispM -0.687*** -1.205***
(-3.72) (-14.97)
Vola -0.322** -0.129
(1.98) (0.79)
C×Vola 1.534 1.730**
(1.58) (2.00)
N 29559 19441
Groups 7408 4961
Panel F C 0.797*** 0.266**
(forecast error) (4.85) (2.54)
C×forecastError -0.237** -0.266***
(-2.06) (-2.43)
N 31370 20452
Groups 8016 5354
This table provides an overview of the estimation results of different robustness tests. The sample period corresponds to
the period from 1995 to 2005. The regression specifications are explained in Section 2.3.3. The dependent variable in all
specifications is the total market value scaled by total assets. The definitions of all variables are provided in Section 2.2.1.3
and Section 2.3.3, respectively. Statistical inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) (Panel A, B, C, E,F) and on
White (1980) (Panel D). t-values are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapters examines the value effects of corporate cash holdings. To date, the com-
mon practice in the cash holdings literature is to examine the valuation effects of cash
holdings whereby the researcher discriminates according to corporate governance mea-
sures. However, we take a different perspective and focus on the valuation effects of cash
in connection with information asymmetry. Specifically, we put forward two different
hypotheses. First, focusing on Myers and Majluf (1984), cash in combination with in-
formation asymmetry should have a positive influence on the value of the firm because
the adverse selection problem will be mitigated. Second, referring to Jensen (1986), the
free cash flow argument coupled with information asymmetry leads to moral hazard and
accordingly the value of cash should be lower.
For the sake of empirically opposing these two hypotheses, we employ a large data
set covering 7,474 firms from 45 countries. We use the Fama and French (1998) valuation
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regressions and derive our results from two different cash specifications. As the main
approach we use the actual cash ratio in line with Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and as a
robustness test we also calculate excess cash based on Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
The results for the actual cash ratio reveal that the value of one unit of cash without
taking information asymmetry into account is on average around one. This result is con-
sistent with previous papers in this field (see Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004; Pinkowitz
et al., 2006). However, if a firm faces a high level of information asymmetry, the value of
its cash reserves is significantly and substantially reduced. This evidence indicates that
the agency costs of the free cash flow argument outweigh the benefits from cash as inter-
nal capital. For being able to further distinguish between our two opposing hypotheses,
we split the sample according to governance and financing constraints. Taken together,
these splits further emphasize our results that agency costs due to moral hazard decrease
the value of cash. Specifically, the value of cash is higher if the level of governance is
stronger. According to the splits on the basis of financing constraints, the expectation
that cash is valued relatively higher if the firms are financially constrained (either on the
firm-level or because the markets are less developed) are only borne out partly by our
data.
Our second approach which is based on the framework of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007) and the calculation of excess cash according to Opler et al. (1999) serves as a
robustness test for the results above. If we use excess cash as our measure of cash
holdings the results stay qualitatively the same compared to the results derived with
the actual cash ratio. Accordingly, information asymmetry significantly decreases the
value of excess cash. This evidence further confirms the free cash flow theory by Jensen
(1986) and provides no empirical justification for the theoretical argument by Myers and
Majluf (1984). When we consider the governance and financing constraints in our second
approach, the results are also in line with what was found by the estimations with the
actual cash ratio. Again the value of excess cash is higher if the level of governance is
stronger; however, based on financing constraints no clear picture emerges.
Taken together, our comprehensive results—which survive extensive robustness tests—
clearly indicate that the agency costs from the free cash flow theory outweigh the benefits
from ‘financial slack’ in mitigating adverse selection.
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Appendix
Detailed formula for measure of information asymmetry (dispMi,t)
ln
1 + 1Mi,t ×
√√√√√√ Mi,t∑
mi,t=1
 1Ami,t−1 ×
∑Ami,t
ami,t=1
(EPSami,t − 1Ami,t ×
∑Ami,t
ami,t=1
EPSami,t )
2
Medmi,t


with:
Medmi,t : Absolute median earning per share forecast in month m in year t for firm i
Ami,t : Number of analysts that cover firm i in year t in month m
Mi,t: Number of months for which more than three analysts cover firm i in year t
EPSami,t : Earnings per share estimate of analyst a for firm i in year t in month m

Chapter 3
Cash and Governance1
The main impetus to this paper was sparked by coming across an article in the Wall Street
Journal (April 3, 2006) that says “Typically, companies recycle a country’s savings by
borrowing the money to invest [. . . ]. In the past five years, though, people and companies
in the U.S. have switched roles. Households have been saving less [. . . ]. Meanwhile,
companies have been spending a lot less than they earn, building up huge hoards of
cash.” The main question that arises from this statement is: What is the reason for
this corporate behavior or posed differently - Which factors lead firms to accumulate
enormous amounts of cash? Bates et al. (2007) report that the average cash to assets
ratio for industrial firms increased by 129% from 1980 to 2004. In effect, the related
question is: What are the value implications of great cash piles in the company? And
this is exactly what this paper strives for: finding answers to the last two questions.
Conventional wisdom suggests that cash is a zero net present value (NPV) investment.
Hence, one dollar of additional cash should increase the market value by exactly one
dollar. Accordingly, in the absence of market frictions, firms should optimally hold no
cash as external finance can always be obtained at a price that resembles its fair value.
However, relaxing the assumption of perfect capital markets and integrating transaction
costs and taxes in the analysis, cash suddenly has a value attached to it. The underlying
notion is that in this setting, external finance becomes costly and holding cash is an
optimal response to having to raise costly external finance. The rationale behind this
effect is subsumed under the trade-off model of cash holdings.
Second, if also the forces of asymmetric information and agency costs come into play,
then the motivation for holding cash becomes even more pronounced. The underlying
1 This chapter is based on a study of the same title by Hirschvogl (2007a).
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arguments date back to seminal papers in the capital structure literature. For instance,
Myers and Majluf (1984) are the only ones who explicitly refer to cash or in their words:
“financial slack”. In their model, informational asymmetries lead firms to build up cash
in order to finance all positive NPV projects as managers abstain from issuing under-
valued securities. Similarly, agency costs of debt in the form of the underinvestment
problem (Myers, 1977) and the asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
make external finance more costly and provide further motivation for firms to hold cash.
However, there are two sides to everything. Importantly, Jensen (1986) puts forward the
agency costs of free cash flow and thus contributes to the literature by analyzing the
costs of excessive cash holdings. In sum, holding cash can be beneficial but sometimes
also costly for shareholders, which effect dominates is an empirical question and will be
addressed in the present work.
However, the motivation to study the determinants of cash holdings was not driven
by theoretical arguments, but by detecting a contradiction in the existing empirical lit-
erature. Specifically, Dittmar et al. (2003) conduct a cross-country study and find a
negative relationship between governance at the country-level and cash holdings, i.e.
firms in weaker governance countries hold more cash. However, focusing on one country,
Harford et al. (2006) observe a positive effect between governance at the firm-level and
cash holdings, hence firms with weaker governance hold less cash. In this context, the
latter two studies focus on either one dimension of governance only - either they are laid
out as cross-country studies and then lose the firm-level governance dimension or the
studies focus on one specific country but then hold the country-level governance fixed.
This study extends the latter two strands of empirical literature by analyzing cash hold-
ings in a cross-country setting, but including proxies for governance at the firm-level as
well as the country-level. The only study who pursued the same approach2 is Kalcheva
and Lins (2007). However, their measure of firm-level governance is equal to absolute and
also relative managerial ownership, in contrast to this study which uses the Transparency
and Disclosure index as developed by Standard & Poor’s in 2001. Thus, the rich setting
of this study allows investigating the governance motive for holding cash by emphasizing
the country- and firm-dimension.
Aside from the determinants of cash holdings, the second contribution of the paper is
to turn to a different angle and analyze the value consequences of cash holdings. In this
respect, the key idea is to establish a link between bad governance and value destruction,
expressed in a lower sensitivity of market value to cash. The central idea behind this
approach dates back to the related literature on agency costs (most notably, Jensen and
2 From the first draft of this paper to the present one, another paper was written that is similar in
vein, for details refer to Huang and Zhang (2007).
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Meckling, 1976). If the level of corporate governance is very low, then the checks and
balances in the company are not very well established and managers’ control is unfettered.
This in turn provides an incentive for managers to waste corporate resources and as Myers
and Rajan (1998) point out, it is easier for management to siphon off cash as to use a
plant for the sake of private benefits. Hence, investors value cash inside the firm for less
than the fair value as they expect that cash is partly kept for the benefit of enjoying
private benefits to the detriment of outside investors. Therefore, liquid assets represent a
promising avenue to study the value consequences of good or bad corporate governance.
The results in the first part of the paper suggest that both dimensions of governance,
that is the firm-level and the country-level, are important determinants of cash holdings.
The influence of shareholder rights is negative while the governance practices at the firm-
level have a positive effect on cash. In effect, corroborating the results from previous
studies but using one combined regression framework. Yet, if the corporate governance
index is cleaned off country influences, then it loses its significance. This result provides
an answer to the question whether country- or firm-level governance dominates and it
clearly shows that only investor protection, i.e. the country-level, is significant in this
respect.3 The results in the second part of the paper reveal that firms with low corporate
governance or firms operating in low shareholder protection countries endure a huge
valuation discount. One additional dollar of cash built up over the last period increases
the market value of those firms by far less than the fair value of one dollar. Finally,
the last part of the paper investigates the reasons for the valuation discount of low
corporate governance firms. The results bring to light that although firms lacking sound
governance systems do not hold more excess cash, yet they use less cash for supposedly
value-enhancing activities, such as R&D expense or capital expenditures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the main theoretical as well as
empirical literature on cash holdings and derives the hypotheses tested in this study.
Section 3 describes the data and discusses the summary statistics and then proceeds by
outlining the main results from this empirical work. And last but not least, section 4
provides the concluding remarks.
3.1 Related Literature on Cash Holdings
In the absence of market frictions, firms should optimally maintain zero excess liquidity as
external finance can always be obtained at a fair price. However, the existence of market
frictions provides a rationale for firms to hold cash. In this context, the trade-off theory,
3 This result is consistent with the hypothesis in Doidge et al. (2007) and Harford et al. (2006).
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the precautionary motive and the agency motive for holding cash will be reviewed.
3.1.1 Transaction Costs and Trade-off Theory
In this model, the firm equates the marginal costs and benefits of cash in order to de-
termine an optimal level of liquid asset holdings. In specific, the cost of liquid assets
refers to the lower return (liquidity premium) generated by holding liquid assets. An-
other cost is the tax disadvantage of cash due to double taxation of income from liquid
assets at the corporate as well as shareholder level (Masulis and Trueman, 1988). On the
other hand, the benefits of liquidity are the saving of transaction costs as put forward
by Keynes (1936) and further analyzed by Tobin (1956) and Miller and Orr (1966). The
underlying notion is that the fixed costs of accessing capital markets induce firms to
hold cash as a pillow and approach the capital markets only infrequently. Transaction
costs are determined by characteristics that either increase the cost of cash shortfalls or
increase the cost of raising funds. In this vein, Kim et al. (1998) theoretically provide
some of the drivers for the transaction costs. Empirically, Opler et al. (1999) find that
firms with the following characteristics hold lower cash balances: big firms, firms with
high net working capital, high leverage, firms that pay dividends, and regulated firms.
Furthermore, their empirical analysis shows that cash holdings increase with the cashflow
to assets ratio, the capital expenditures to assets ratio, industry volatility, and the R&D
to sales ratio. Hence, firms with strong growth opportunities, firms with riskier activities,
and small firms hold more cash. In their analysis, however, they cannot corroborate the
hypothesis that positive excess cash leads firms to overinvest or spend their money on
wasteful acquisitions. Therefore, they cannot confirm the agency motive of managerial
entrenchment for holding cash. But what they find is that managers accumulate cash if
they have the possibility to do so, hence they find evidence for the precautionary motive
of holding cash.
3.1.2 Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs of Debt, and
Cash Holdings
The transaction cost model does neither consider information asymmetries nor agency
costs. Hence, if those two effects are also included in the analysis, the motives for holding
cash become even more pronounced as external finance becomes more costly (precau-
tionary motive). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) propose the pecking order
theory. Accordingly, asymmetric information between managers and investors leads firms
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to abstain from issuing undervalued security. Therefore, cash (“financial slack”) is a nat-
ural way to finance all positive investment projects as external finance would be too
costly. In this model, firms finance their activities first with retained earnings and cash,
secondly with debt and only as a means of last resort with equity. Hence, there exists
no optimal level of cash which is only a sideshow and fluctuates with the development of
internal cash flow.
Another strand of literature considers the agency costs of debt. In this case, the in-
terests of the debtholders and shareholders differ. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that
highly levered firms are likely to engage in asset substitution, making it more expensive
and difficult for those firms to raise external finance. Naturally, this leads to a further
argument of why cash holdings can be value-enhancing. Furthermore, as put forward by
Myers (1977) firms with high leverage are prone to the underinvestment problem where
management abstains from implementing positive NPV projects as the benefits would
mostly accrue to the debtholders. In this setting, cash holdings are a response to the
increased cost of acquiring external finance to fund value-enhancing projects.
3.1.3 Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion
As before, the subsequent discussion is also related to agency costs. However, the topic
is studied from a different angle. Previously, agency costs of debt provided an optimal
response for holding cash but now agency costs of free cash flow represent a deterrent
to large cash amounts. As analyzed by Jensen (1986) large amounts of free cash flow
lead managers to squander money on unprofitable acquisitions for the sake of empire-
building or to pursue their pet projects.4 Hence, there are costs associated with liquidity
holdings in addition to the liquidity premium as already mentioned above. The preceding
discussion relates to agency problems at the firm-level. However, factors at the country-
level may also influence managerial opportunism. In this vein, shareholder protection can
put a grip on outright stealing by management as outside investors are legally entitled
to curb the management’s decisions. Accordingly, the law dimension at the country-level
may intensify or weaken agency problems at the firm-level. One might argue that agency
problems at the-firm level may provide the incentives and lack of outside shareholder
protection provides the ability of management/controlling shareholders to expropriate
outside investors. The basic idea is as follows: the more protection outside investors
enjoy, the more they are willing to provide capital at lower cost and consequently firms
are less dependent on cash. The other side of the coin is that in countries with weak
4 See also Stulz (1990) and Jensen (1993).
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shareholder protection, firms face limited external finance opportunities, rendering cash
more valuable in this setting. In this vein, La Porta et al. (1997) and La Porta et al.
(1998) (hereafter, LLSV) have put forward some measures (anti-director rights, creditor
rights, rule of law) for characterizing the institutional and legal systems across countries.
However, although cash is more valuable in countries with weak shareholder protection,
it is also well known that those countries are aﬄicted with more agency problems and
hence lower firm values (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002).
Hence, if according to Jensen (1986) high cash balances lead to overinvestment, then
those countries with low protection of outside investors face an even more pronounced
value discount.
In contrast to Opler et al. (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003) find that agency problems
are an influential factor for the determination of cash holdings. Specifically, their results
reveal that firms in countries with a low level of shareholder protection hold double the
amount of cash than their counterparts in high shareholder protection countries. Interest-
ingly, their results become even stronger if they control for capital market development.
It is important to stress that Dittmar et al. (2003) use as their governance variable, the
LLSV (1998) score at the country-level, hence they cannot control for agency problems
at the firm-level. The derived predictions for the remaining variables are in line with
prior evidence. For example, Dittmar et al. (2003) find that cash holdings increase with
higher market-to-book ratios and higher R&D expenditures. On the other hand, their
results show that cash holdings decrease with the size of the firm, with higher net working
capital, and dividend payments.
Another study which emphasizes the agency motive is the work by Kalcheva and
Lins (2007). However, in contrast to Dittmar et al. (2003), Kalcheva and Lins (2007)
not only control for a country-level measure of shareholder protection, but they also
incorporate a proxy for firm-level agency problems in their analysis. Hence, the paper
by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) is closely related to this study, but while they use as their
firm-level corporate governance variables different measures of managerial control rights,
this paper uses the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Index (which will be discussed
in section 4.3.1). The common denominator between Kalcheva and Lins (2007) and
Dittmar et al. (2003) is that they both are cross-country studies and both use the LLSV
(1998) measure of anti-director rights at the country-level. However, Kalcheva and Lins
(2007) can be seen as a fruitful extension of Dittmar et al. (2003) as the former also
incorporate the corporate agency problem. Interestingly, their results reveal that neither
the anti-director rights index from LLSV (1998), nor most of their managerial control
rights measures are significantly related to corporate cash holdings. Thus they cannot
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corroborate the hypothesis that agency problems provide a motivation for firms to hold
cash. Nevertheless, it is important to stress once again that this paper is closely related
to Kalcheva and Lins (2007) in that they also study the determinants as well as the
valuation consequences of cash. Furthermore, in pursuing this approach, the emphasis in
their and this study is on two important dimensions: the country-level and the firm-level
dimensions of governance.5
Similar to Opler et al. (1999), but contrary to Dittmar et al. (2003) and Kalcheva
and Lins (2007), Harford et al. (2006) only study the U.S. capital market. Interestingly,
they find that firms with high anti-takeover provisions (weak shareholder rights) have
lower cash reserves. This stands in contrast to the results derived from cross-country
studies (most notably, Dittmar et al., 2003) where firms hold more cash in countries with
low anti-director rights (weak shareholder rights). Taken together, it is important to
stress that whereas Dittmar et al. (2003) hold the firm-level dimension constant, Harford
et al. (2006) hold the country-dimension constant. Therefore, it is interesting as a follow-
up study to investigate the country- versus firm-layer in corporate governance and the
relationship to cash holdings. This is exactly what the first part of this paper aims for:
incorporating in a cross-country framework the country- and firm-dimension of corporate
governance in the vein of Kalcheva and Lins (2007).
Hypothesis 1: Based on Dittmar et al. (2003), it is assumed that the country-level
influence of governance is negative. Thus firms conducting their business in countries
with low shareholder rights hold more cash.
Hypothesis 2: The influence of firm-level governance is not straightforward. Al-
though Harford et al. (2006) find a positive influence of firm-level governance on cash
holdings, they also put forward that the country-level might dominate the firm-level
influence of governance. Given that their analysis focused on the U.S., no prediction con-
cerning the influence of firm-level governance on cash can be inferred in an international
context. It is left for the empirical part to shed more light on this matter.
Most notably, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) represent a cross-country study encompassing
35 countries and a period of 11 years. They focus on the value consequences of agency
conflicts in relation to cash holdings. As corporate governance proxies the authors employ
two measures: the anti-director rights index from LLSV (1998) and the index for the rule
of law from the International Country Risk Guide. In order to derive their results, they
5 In order to theoretically motivate the subject, the model by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) can
be slightly modified. In their model, they use the illusive term b as a measure for the quality of
institutions. If one replaces that variable by a term t*s whereby t refers to firm-level governance and
s to shareholder rights, then their model delivers predictions consistent with the empirical results
contained in this paper.
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classify the countries according to the medians of those two variables and then use a
valuation specification which is built on the regression specification of Fama and French
(1998). Their results bring to light that in countries with high investor protection, one
dollar invested in liquid assets is also approximately worth this dollar. However, more
interestingly, in countries with weak shareholder protection, one dollar of liquid assets
is worth much less: ranging from 0.29 to 0.33 dollar. Taken together, the weak relation
between firm value and cash holdings further corroborates the agency theory of cash
holdings. Moreover, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find that the relation between dividends and
firm value is weaker if the external governance environment is stronger, thus providing
further evidence for agency theory.
Another paper in this vein is the comprehensive study by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007) which focuses on the U.S. and encompasses the period from 1990 to 2003. Using
several governance variables such as the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance in-
dex (it relates to anti-takeover provisions), the index from Bebchuk et al. (2005) which
is similar to the Gompers et al. (2003) index, and two measures for institutional share
ownership, they can confirm the results derived by Pinkowitz et al. (2006). More specif-
ically, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that pouring one dollar of cash in a poorly
governed firm only increases the market value from a minimum of 0.42 to a maximum
of 0.88 dollars depending on the governance variable used. In addition, they find that
poorly governed firms spend cash quickly in contrast to firms with stronger governance.
All this evidence points to the fact that firms with weak governance use cash in ways that
are not consistent with shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, the authors reveal that for
good corporate governance firms, one dollar of cash increases the market value by about
two dollars.
Hypothesis 3: Similar to Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007), low governance (firm-level and country-level) significantly reduces the value of
cash.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
3.2.1 Sample Selection and Variable Construction
For investigating the relationship between cash and governance, the sample is predeter-
mined by the scope of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure Index being one of the
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main explanatory variables. This index is composed of 98 disclosure criteria6 and will
be used as the proxy for firm-level corporate governance in this paper (similar to Doidge
et al., 2007; Durnev and Kim, 2005). The advantages of this index lie in its objectivity
across countries and its wide scope covering slightly more than 1,400 firms from about 40
countries which can be grouped into the following regions (number of firms included in
parentheses): Asia Pacific (99 firms), Europe (351 firms), U.S. (460 firms), Emerging Asia
(254 firms), Latin America (89 firms), and Japan (150 firms). The disadvantage concern-
ing this corporate governance measure relates to its static nature as it is only available for
the year 2001. In order to obtain financial data for the firms covered by the S&P ranking,
they had to be matched on a case-by-case basis with the Datastream/Worldscope files.
However, firms engaged in the financial industry were discarded from the analysis as they
arguably hold cash for other purposes.7 This procedure leads to a final sample of 935
firms for one year and 10,912 firm-year observations for the period 1996 to 2006.
As can be seen from the summary statistics, Table 3.1 (the S&P Transparency and
Disclosure Index is labeled t), there is a wide variation in the governance score. It ranges
from a low of about 20 points for Venezuela and Turkey to a maximum of about 70 for
the U.S. and Finland. The mean score over all firms and countries is about 48 and many
European countries can be found in the mean range. In line with intuition, most countries
from the Asian and Latin American region have scores below the mean value.
A key contribution of this paper is that in contrast to most previous studies, two
dimensions of governance are explicitly incorporated in the analysis. In addition to
firm-level corporate governance, the LLSV (1998) measure of anti-director rights (called
srights) is also included to capture governance at the country-level due to the cross-
country nature of this paper. Srights proxies for the external governance environment
as it is determined by laws on shareholder protection and hence it is the same for firms
within one country. This index ranges from zero to five with higher values indicating
better protection at the country-level. As can be seen from the summary statistics (Table
3.1: low shareholder rights (Panel A); high shareholder rights (Panel B)), the countries
with the lowest shareholder rights do not only include countries from emerging markets,
but also encompass surprisingly many European countries. For example, two European
countries (Belgium and Luxembourg) represent the bottom league of all countries with
srights scores of zero. But also Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Switzerland
are considered to be not very investor-friendly. On the other hand, Panel B contains the
6 In the empirical part (section 4.3.2.1), the S&P Transparency index is scaled to reach until a value
of five in order for the results to be directly comparable to the anti-director rights measure (it has
a maximum value of five).
7 This is consistent with the main studies in this literature; see, for example, Opler et al. (1999) or
Pinkowitz et al. (2006).
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countries with the highest shareholder rights (above a value of two). The mean srights
for the high shareholder rights panel is 3.91 with India, Hongkong, Pakistan, UK, and
U.S. taking the lead with the maximum score of five.
As a measure of cash holdings, I employ the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net
assets where net assets are defined as book value of assets minus cash and cash equivalents
(see, Opler et al., 1999). In section 4.3.2.1, I employ the natural logarithm of the cash
ratio as dependent variable. Table 3.1 contains the summary statistics and shows that
there is a wide dispersion in the cash variable across the sample. The values for cash
range from a low of 0.05 for Venezuela and a maximum of 0.48 for Ireland. Interestingly,
the summary statistics reveal that the countries belonging to the low shareholder rights
group have a lower cash ratio compared to their counterparts in the high shareholder
rights sample. However, this effect could be driven by the higher number of observations
in the latter group (due to a U.S. overweight).
The following control variables are included. First, as it is expected that bigger firms
need less cash, size is included as control variable and computed as the logarithm of
net assets (Mulligan, 1997). Second, high leverage firms are assumed to hoard less cash
and thus a variable for leverage is also considered, computed as the ratio of long-term
debt plus short-term debt divided by net assets. Third, net working capital to assets
ratio (nwc) calculated as current assets less current liabilities and cash divided by net
assets is expected to be a cash substitute. Fourth, as firms that spend a lot on capital
expenditures are assumed to need more cash, capital expenditures (capex ) are also taken
into consideration. This variable is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to
net assets. Fourth, a proxy for free cash flow (fcf ) is included in the empirical analysis
computed as the ratio of Ebitda minus the sum of dividends, taxes, and interest payments
in the nominator and net assets in the denominator. As it is expected that firms that
experience higher growth need more cash, one-year sales growth (salg1y) is used as a
proxy for growth opportunities. Finally, when viewed from an international perspective,
another reason for holding cash might be the respective capital market development of
the country; hence two proxies for this effect are included. They are taken from Beck
et al. (2000) and measure the stock market capitalization as share of GDP (mcap) and
the total amount of outstanding domestic debt (privateb), respectively. Furthermore, all
empirical specifications include industry dummies (defined at the two-digit sic-code level)
and region dummies (five regions: (1) Europe, (2) U.S., UK, Australia, New Zealand, (3)
Latin America, Asia, (4) Japan, Singapore, Hongkong).8
8 Region dummies are chosen as country-dummies cannot be taken due to the country-level nature of
the anti-director rights index. Otherwise the country-level influence of this variable would be swept
away by the country dummies.
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3.2.2 Empirical Results
This section contains the main empirical results which for the ease of presentation are
subsumed under three different subsections. The first empirical analysis focuses on the
determinants of cash. In specific, the main question is whether firm-level and country-
level governance mechanisms are influential factors in the determination of corporate
liquidity holdings. This approach is based on the analysis by Kalcheva and Lins (2007)
and Dittmar et al. (2003). The second part of the empirics directly measures the value
consequences of liquid asset holdings. In the vein of Pinkowitz et al. (2006), it will be
analyzed by how much a one-dollar increase in cash increases the market value of the
firm. If there exists a wedge in the value between low and high governance firms, the
agency hypothesis, i.e. managers waste cash on the consumption of private benefits, finds
some more empirical justification and should be further scrutinized. Directly addressing
this issue, the following subsection further explores whether low governance firms hold
more excess cash and on which items they spend their cash. This empirical approach
was inspired by the influential work by Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007).
3.2.2.1 Determinants of Cash
Following the main empirical literature in this area (see, for example, Opler et al., 1999;
Dittmar et al., 2003), the log of cash is used as the dependent variable. As already out-
lined above, many control variables which previous studies (most notably, Opler et al.,
1999) have found to be important are also included as well as the main variables of in-
terest, i.e. the country- and firm-level governance measures. Furthermore, all regressions
include industry and region dummies. Table 3.2 contains the empirical results from this
subsection.
As a preliminary test, model (1) tries to retrieve the results from previous studies
which only have governance data at the country-level at disposition. Thus, model (1)
includes the anti-director rights index (srights) as main explanatory variable in addition to
a battery of control variables. Interestingly, the results from extant cross-country studies
can be corroborated. Like Dittmar et al. (2003), the influence of srights is negative, hence
in countries where the shareholder protection is low, firms hold more cash. Dittmar et al.’s
(2003) interpretation is that the level of cash in low investor protection countries is higher
because that allows managers to spend more resources on pursuing their own ends, i.e.
squandering cash on private benefits. This interpretation is also endorsed here and hence
the empirical evidence is in line with Hypothesis 1. This managerial agency motivation is
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further emphasized by the fact that although the capital market development is directly
controlled for (mcap and privateb), the influence of srights is still significant (at the 1%
level) and negative. All the signs of the control variables are in line with expectations with
the exception of sales growth (salg1y) which is not statistically significant at conventional
levels. Furthermore, the results are fairly robust across all specifications due to the fact
that most variables do neither switch sign nor become insignificant.
Model (2) is similar to model (1) with the difference that now the focus is on the
Transparency and Disclosure index (t5 ) which is rescaled to range until a maximum of
five in order to be comparable to the LLSV (1998) anti-director rights index (srights).
Again, the detected influence of t5 is in line with prior country studies using some kind
of measure for firm-level governance (e.g., Harford et al., 2006). The significant (at the
10% level), positive influence of t5 on the log of cash means that firms with better
governance practices in place use more cash. This effect is somehow counterintuitive to
the negative relationship that was derived using country governance. With reference to
Hypothesis 2, up to this point I found some preliminary evidence that the influence of
firm-level governance is positive. Thus it is interesting to combine the two measures in
one regression and examine whether they can coexist besides each other.
Model (3) includes the results from integrating both governance measures in one
regression. As can be seen from Table 3.2, the influence of srights and t5 remains negative
and positive, respectively, and even slightly increases its economic significance. The
effect of firm-level governance is a little bit stronger with a coefficient of 0.219 versus
country shareholder protection having a coefficient of -0.199. This result is interesting
as it deviates from the results obtained in the study by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) where
country and firm-level governance does not remain individually significant if combined
in one regression. Thus, the present results point to two independent effects which are
working in the opposite direction. One interpretation of the firm-level governance results
could be that good governance firms hold more cash simply because they are the ones
being more profitable, hence generating higher free cash flow. This result could arguably
be related to the endogeneity discussion of governance. Maybe it is not high governance
that is driving performance, but firms that are more successful have higher governance
standards because they can be implemented at relatively lower cost. Taken together,
this effect would lead to the positive relationship between cash and governance. Thus
it is essential to further investigate the agency motive of holding cash which will be
pursued in the following subsection. At the country-level, there are at least two possible
interpretations of the results that seem plausible. It could be argued that firms in low
shareholder protection countries (low srights) accumulate cash because the shareholders
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have essentially no say in those countries and cannot take actions against the decisions of
the management. The argument could also be put differently as follows. Firms hoard cash
in low shareholder protection countries as it is more difficult in this environment to raise
external capital. However, the second interpretation seems to be more minor of nature
as I directly take the capital market environment into consideration and still observe a
significant influence between cash and external governance. Thus the first interpretation
seems to be the more plausible in this context which is in line with Hypothesis 1.
One concern with model (3) of Table 3.2 is that the level of country governance
and firm governance could be related. There are some similiar papers that pursue that
direction. For example, Doidge et al. (2007, p. 3) put forward that “Countries matter
because they influence the costs that firms incur to bond themselves to good governance
and the benefits from doing so.” Moreover, Harford et al. (2006, p. 4) state that “the
effects of country-level granting and enforcing of shareholder rights dominates the effect of
firm-level variation in the control of agency conflicts. In countries with poor shareholder
protection, managers can hoard cash and pay low dividends with relative impunity.”
Testing this hypothesis, it was found that the correlation between srights and t5 is about
49% in this sample. In order to address this issue, t5 was regressed on country dummies
and the error terms from this regression are calculated. The residuals can be interpreted
as the part of the firm-governance score that is not influenced by country aspects, hence
the correlation afterwards between srights and spnocou5 (i.e. the country-cleared firm-
level governance score) is equal to zero. In a second step, the same regression specification
as in model (3) of Table 3.2 is chosen but instead of t5, the now derived anti-country firm-
level score (spnocou5 ), is added to the model. The results from model (4) of Table 3.2
reveal that the coefficient of the firm-level score is insignificant after this modification. Yet
the influence of the country-governance, srights, strengthens in economic and statistical
significance. This result entangles the influence of country- versus firm-level governance
and clearly shows that only the level of investor protection has an influence on cash
holdings which is in line with the papers cited above. That means that Hypothesis 1
could be further corroborated and concerning Hypothesis 2, the empirics point to no
significant influence of firm-level governance.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable lncash lncash lncash lncash
size -0.210*** -0.203*** -0.216*** -0.163***
(-6.38) (-6.15) (-6.56) (-5.38)
leverage -1.251*** -1.254*** -1.268*** -1.341***
(-5.42) (-5.40) (-5.50) (-5.78)
capex 2.450*** 2.266*** 2.301*** 2.602***
(3.22) (2.96) (3.02) (3.37)
nwc -0.682*** -0.677*** -0.670*** -0.676***
(-5.63) (-5.56) (-5.54) (-5.52)
fcf 1.151*** 1.154*** 1.160*** 1.176***
(4.13) (4.12) (4.18) (4.18)
salg1y -0.053 -0.061 -0.056 -0.040
(-1.10) (-1.26) (-1.16) (-0.81)
divdum -0.705*** -0.723*** -0.695*** -0.644***
(-6.51) (-6.65) (-6.42) (-5.91)
privateb -0.336 -0.329 -0.465* -0.165
(-1.21) (-1.17) (-1.65) (-0.75)
mcap 0.735*** 0.680*** 0.738*** 1.012***
(3.55) (3.28) (3.57) (5.98)
srights -0.180*** -0.199*** -0.261***
(-3.38) (-3.69) (-6.68)
t5 0.164* 0.219**
(1.69) (2.24)
spnocou5 0.071
(0.58)
Constant 1.570** 0.054 1.062 1.044**
(2.57) (0.09) (1.63) (2.26)
Adj. R2 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.25
N 935 935 935 935
Regression estimates of the natural logarithm of cash as the dependent variable on external and internal governance variables
of interest and controls. All specifications are for the year 2001 (publication date of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure
index).In model (4) the S&P Transparency and Disclosure index (t) will be orthogonalized by firstly regressing t on country
dummies and then proceeding only with the residuals of this equation. This procedure is done in order to clear t of any
country effect. Then the residuals are scaled in order to range until a maximum of five (spnocou5) and included instead of
t5. Cash refers to the ratio of cash plus short-term investments divided by net assets (total assets minus cash). Size refers
to the natural logarithm of total assets minus cash. Leverage stands for the ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt
divided by net assets. Capex is the abbreviation for capital expenditures and is simply the ratio of capital expenditures
(as reported in the balance sheet) divided by net assets. Nwc refers to net working capital and is calculated as the ratio
of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash in the nominator and net assets in the denominator. Fcf denotes
free cash flow and is equal to ebitda minus dividends, taxes, and interest payments, divided by net assets. Sales growth
(salg1y) denotes the one year growth rate in sales. Divdum is a dummy variable and takes the value of one if the firm paid
dividends in the year 2001 and is set to zero otherwise. The two measures for the capital market development are mcap
(equal to the stock market capitalization) and privateb (equal to total amount of outstanding domestic debt). The latter
two variables are taken from Beck et al. (2000). Srights refer to the anti-director rights as reported by LLSV (1998). T5
corresponds to the S&P Transparency and Disclosure index, however, the values are scaled to range only until five in order
to be comparable srights. All models include industry dummies (defined at the two-digit sic-code) and region dummies
(there are five regions: Europe; U.S., UK, Australia, New Zealand; Latin America; Asia; Japan, Singapore, Hongkong).
T-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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3.2.2.2 Valuation Results
This subsection is based on the paper by Pinkowitz et al. (2006) which studies the valua-
tion effects of governance and cash holdings. The authors propose that cash is valued at
a discount in countries with low investor protection (low srights) because management
enjoys more discretionary power in those countries and can use cash for pursuing their
own interests.9 They use the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998):
Vi,t = αi + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dAi,t + β5dAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t
+ β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t
+ β13dDi,t + β14dIi,t+1 + β15dVi,t+1 + εi,t
(3.2.1)
where Vi,t refers to market value of the firm (measured as the sum of the market
value of equity, long- and short-term debt); Ei,t relates to earnings before extraordinary
items plus interest, and tax credits; Ai,t means total book value of assets; RDi,t refers to
R&D expenditures; Ii,t stands for interest payments; and finally Di,t measures dividend
payments. Generally, all variables are deflated by total assets of the year t and in addition
to the actual levels of the variables in year t, the lag and lead changes of the respective
variables are also included as independent variables in the regression framework.
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) reformulate the previous equation and replace total assets by
its two components: net assets (NAi,t: total assets minus liquid assets) and liquid assets
(Li,t).
Vi,t = αi + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t
+ β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t
+ β13dDi,t + β14dIi,t+1 + β15dVi,t+1 + β16dLi,t + β17dLi, t+ 1 + εi,t
(3.2.2)
The hypothesis of Pinkowitz et al. (2006) is that the coefficient of the change in
cash over the previous period (i.e. β16) should be lower in countries with low investor
protection as this sensitivity directly measures the effect of a change in cash (from the
previous to the present period) on the market valuation of the firm. The authors use the
econometric framework of Fama and MacBeth (1973) (hereafter FM) to estimate their
regressions. According to Petersen (2006), the approach of FM allows the researcher to
tackle a time effect (the residuals are correlated across different firms in one year), but
FM is not appropriate in the case of a firm effect (the residuals of one specific company
are correlated across different years).
9 See also the discussion in section 4.3.2.1.
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Table 3.3 contains the results of the valuation regressions. The period ranges from
1996 to 2006 as (1) it can be argued that over the medium-term governance does not
change significantly and (2) the year 2001 (the publication date of the S&P Transparency
and Disclosure index) is then surrounded by lead and lag terms of the FM regression
framework to properly conduct the analysis.10 In models (1) and (2) the sample is split
according to the median of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure index. The results
for the coefficient on the β16 term indeed point to a significant valuation discount for
firms with low corporate governance. This result does not contradict the evidence from
the previous section for the following reason. Although governance at the firm-level is
ultimately not driving the level of liquidity, it still can be that corporate governance is
responsible for how liquidity is deployed. This means that firms with low corporate gov-
ernance are prone to wasting cash while firms with high corporate governance standards
are using cash in the interest of shareholders. According to the empirical evidence a one
dollar increase in cash accumulated over the last period leads only to a 0.879 increase in
the market value of the firm. However, the market value of firms with high corporate
governance standards increases by far more than one dollar, i.e. by 2.014 (significant at
the 1% level). Model (3) and (4) address the same issue, however, they use the median
of the LLSV (1998) anti-director rights index (srights) as criterion for splitting the sam-
ple. In line with the previous results, there exists a discount for low governance. The
coefficient for low investor protection countries amounts to 0.859 while the value of cash
in high investor protection countries amounts to 2.123. This empirical evidence is in line
with Pinkowitz et al. (2006) as they also find a significant valuation discount for firms in
countries with minor shareholder protection.
Table 3.3: Valuation Effects (Fama MacBeth)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low CG High CG Low SH High SH
Variable V(t) V(t) V(t) V(t)
E(t) 4.764*** 7.662*** 4.521*** 7.887***
(4.08) (8.58) (4.29) (10.03)
dE(t) -0.460 -1.305* -0.719 -1.470**
(-1.00) (-2.22) (-1.40) (-3.17)
dE(t+1) 2.458*** 3.707*** 1.854*** 3.782***
(4.77) (5.75) (4.26) (6.13)
dNA(t) 0.112 0.290 0.314 0.213
(0.64) (0.99) (1.65) (0.83)
dNA(t+1) 0.182 0.388* 0.120 0.356*
(continued)
10 In order to mitigate the effect of outliers and following others in this literature, the sample is
trimmed by dropping 1% in each tail of each variable.
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Table 3.3: —Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low CG High CG Low SH High SH
Variable V(t) V(t) V(t) V(t)
(1.15) (2.30) (0.68) (2.07)
D(t) 7.840*** 9.285*** 10.441*** 7.804***
(4.46) (5.03) (7.00) (5.00)
dD(t) 3.436 -0.994 -0.064 1.950**
(0.80) (-0.82) (-0.07) (2.31)
dD(t+1) 9.059*** -1.950 4.767* 2.628
(3.87) (-0.82) (1.87) (1.31)
dV(t+1) -0.191 -0.212 -0.224 -0.197
(-1.08) (-1.38) (-1.16) (-1.37)
dL(t) 0.879** 2.014*** 0.859** 2.123***
(3.30) (5.15) (2.42) (4.60)
dL(t+1) 1.490* 2.113*** 1.546** 1.994***
(2.11) (4.06) (2.62) (4.12)
dI(t) 3.159 1.371 -0.548 7.142**
(1.38) (0.53) (-0.39) (2.50)
dI(t+1) -4.798 -7.943* 0.432 -8.664*
(-1.67) (-2.04) (0.23) (-2.04)
I(t) -10.596*** -13.539*** -4.919*** -14.486***
(-5.34) (-7.19) (-4.70) (-7.67)
dRD(t) -11.951 9.687* 10.359** 9.672
(-1.58) (1.95) (2.37) (1.75)
dRD(t+1) -0.278 14.739*** 8.614*** 16.198***
(-0.03) (4.52) (3.47) (4.42)
RD(t) 9.378** 7.165*** 5.375*** 7.474***
(2.38) (6.56) (4.55) (5.81)
Constant 0.576*** 0.307** 0.320*** 0.352***
(7.37) (3.12) (3.38) (4.34)
R2 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.58
N 1,365 6,126 1,839 5,652
T 9 9 9 9
The regressions are estimated using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) for the period 1996 to 2006. The dependent
variable in all specifications is V, the market value of the firm (measured as the sum of the market value of equity, long-
and short-term debt). E relates to earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, and tax credits; A means total book
value of assets. D is equal to the total dividend payments in a given year in U.S. dollar terms. Generally, all variables
are deflated by total assets of the year t and in addition to the actual levels of the variables in year t, the lag and lead
changes of the respective variables are also included as independent variables in the regression framework. The R2 of the
Fama MacBeth regression is the average value of the R2 of the single years. T-values are reported in parentheses below
the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Doidge et al. (2007) argue that firms might be limited in their possibilities to credibly
commit to good corporate governance in countries where shareholder protection is low.
In order to test this hypothesis in the context of cash holdings and disentangle the value
effects of governance and shareholder protection (srights), Table 3.4 presents combined
splits. The sample is initially split on the basis of the median of shareholder protection
and subsequently according to the median of the governance score (t5 ). Interestingly,
being in a low shareholder protection environment does not have any significant impact
on the value of liquidity if the firm’s corporate governance regime is strong. Similarly,
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being in a high shareholder protection environment and having low corporate governance
standards does not influence the market value of liquidity. This means that the casting
vote is exercised by the governance rules and regulations at the country-level as for
subsequent splits on the basis of firm governance only the groups are significant that are
in line with the governance at the country-level. For example, if shareholder protection
is low and firm governance is weak, the value of cash is equal to 1.050 (significant at the
5% level). Yet if shareholder rules at the country-level are sound, then being in the high
firm governance regime is rewarded with a value of liquidity amounting to more than
double (2.297) than that of the peer group. This result corroborates the hypothesis of
Doidge et al. (2007) that governance at the country level is decisive and firm governance
improvement might not credibly be communicated to shareholders.
Table 3.4: Valuation Effects (Fama MacBeth): Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low SH High SH
Low CG High CG Low CG High CG
Variable V(t) V(t) V(t) V(t)
E(t) 5.436*** 2.436*** 2.474*** 8.168***
(3.78) (6.56) (3.64) (8.83)
dE(t) -1.364** -0.323 0.721 -1.567**
(-2.42) (-0.46) (1.06) (-2.64)
dE(t+1) 1.891** 0.781* 2.501** 3.989***
(2.84) (2.29) (3.35) (5.92)
dNA(t) 0.286 0.218 0.438 0.284
(1.04) (1.18) (1.86) (0.98)
dNA(t+1) -0.000 0.346 0.440 0.448**
(-0.00) (1.42) (1.68) (2.52)
D(t) 5.934 16.969*** 12.607*** 9.427***
(1.76) (10.45) (15.88) (4.77)
dD(t) 1.591 0.173 -0.114 0.441
(0.37) (0.11) (-0.02) (0.36)
dD(t+1) 6.505 5.931* 9.770*** -0.711
(1.80) (1.96) (4.41) (-0.29)
dV(t+1) -0.051 -0.402 -0.346* -0.191
(-0.25) (-1.85) (-2.11) (-1.26)
dL(t) 1.050** 0.755 0.918 2.297***
(2.44) (1.43) (1.59) (4.98)
dL(t+1) 1.782** 1.948** 0.331 2.200***
(2.53) (2.32) (0.45) (4.76)
dI(t) 1.335 -0.124 0.722 3.460
(0.38) (-0.06) (0.14) (1.02)
(continued)
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Table 3.4: —Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low SH High SH
Low CG High CG Low CG High CG
Variable V(t) V(t) V(t) V(t)
dI(t+1) -3.446 6.521** -5.358 -12.538**
(-1.11) (2.36) (-1.03) (-2.86)
I(t) -9.619*** 2.845 -6.462*** -15.275***
(-5.14) (1.67) (-4.87) (-5.84)
dRD(t) -3.253 18.998* -83.331 9.310
(-0.45) (2.14) (-1.78) (1.67)
dRD(t+1) 3.647 15.254*** 8.563 15.754***
(0.45) (3.69) (0.23) (4.46)
RD(t) 1.143 7.140*** 84.737** 6.908***
(0.30) (3.65) (2.86) (5.89)
Constant 0.472*** 0.229** 0.617*** 0.302**
(4.20) (2.73) (9.63) (3.01)
R2 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.60
N 762 1,077 603 5,049
T 9 9 9 9
The regressions are estimated using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) for the period 1996 to 2006. The dependent
variable in all specifications is V, the market value of the firm (measured as the sum of the market value of equity, long-
and short-term debt). E relates to earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, and tax credits; A means total book
value of assets. D is equal to the total dividend payments in a given year in U.S. dollar terms. Generally, all variables
are deflated by total assets of the year t and in addition to the actual levels of the variables in year t, the lag and lead
changes of the respective variables are also included as independent variables in the regression framework. The R2 of the
Fama MacBeth regression is the average value of the R2 of the single years. T-values are reported in parentheses below
the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
3.2.2.3 Robustness Tests
One problem with the FM approach is that it is based on the assumption that all firms
have the same cost of capital which is a fairly strong simplification. Also Fama and
French admit this shortcoming in their paper (1998) by saying “our regressions impose
the same slope on all firms. The response of value to profitability depends, however, on
capitalization rates (costs of capital), which differ across firms. Since the regressions do
not allow for differences in capitalization rates, there is a specification problem” (p. 827).
Moreover, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004, p. 13) note that “our implementation of the
FM methodology may be problematic because it implicitly assumes that all firms have
the same discount rate within a given year”. Their solution to this problem is to compute
fixed effects regressions in addition to the FM estimations. Thus this approach is also
pursued here but in addition to firm-specific intercepts, time dummies are also added to
the regressions in order to let the discount rate not only vary across firms but also across
time.11 The results from Table 3.5 show that if a fixed effects estimator is applied, the
11 There is also a recent paper by Autore and Kovacs (2006) in which they argue that capitalization
rates change over time.
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value of cash changes somewhat in that it is generally lower. But the main inference
holds true that there is a large valuation discount of the value of cash between high and
low governance firms (external and internal governance).
Table 3.5: Valuation Effects (Fixed Effects with Time and Year Dummies)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low CG High CG Low SH High SH
Variable V(t) V(t) V(t) V(t)
E(t) 4.886*** 5.427*** 3.565*** 5.880***
(5.26) (8.41) (4.62) (8.68)
dE(t) -0.844** -0.587** -0.253 -0.876***
(-2.30) (-2.46) (-1.07) (-3.28)
dE(t+1) 2.520*** 3.149*** 2.040*** 3.205***
(7.01) (8.58) (6.07) (8.36)
dNA(t) 0.036 0.398*** 0.090 0.371***
(0.33) (3.28) (0.94) (2.83)
dNA(t+1) 0.515*** 0.653*** 0.536*** 0.674***
(3.76) (5.66) (5.31) (5.27)
D(t) -7.776** 4.209 -2.713 1.260
(-2.04) (1.36) (-0.62) (0.41)
dD(t) 1.747 -1.202 2.097 -0.306
(1.42) (-0.92) (1.49) (-0.30)
dD(t+1) -0.723 -2.618 0.550 -1.652
(-0.35) (-1.55) (0.28) (-0.94)
dV(t+1) -0.320*** -0.242*** -0.267*** -0.256***
(-7.64) (-7.70) (-9.96) (-7.80)
dL(t) 0.346 0.627** -0.064 0.834***
(0.83) (2.37) (-0.21) (2.95)
dL(t+1) 0.628** 1.090*** 0.323 1.210***
(2.47) (3.87) (1.14) (4.20)
dI(t) 2.442** -3.286** 0.300 -0.488
(2.03) (-2.11) (0.31) (-0.24)
dI(t+1) -4.838** -13.584*** -4.743*** -14.140***
(-2.44) (-4.77) (-3.05) (-4.31)
I(t) -8.081*** -8.057** -8.709*** -8.152**
(-3.23) (-2.25) (-4.13) (-2.04)
(continued)
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Table 3.5: —Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low CG High CG Low SH High SH
Variable V(t) V(t) V(t) V(t)
dRD(t) -0.193 4.293 8.996 2.694
(-0.05) (1.60) (1.63) (1.00)
dRD(t+1) -6.141 11.427*** -0.245 13.074***
(-0.92) (4.50) (-0.05) (4.82)
RD(t) -5.584 9.698*** -6.319 12.575***
(-0.46) (2.83) (-1.05) (3.45)
Constant 1.305*** 0.782*** 1.424*** 0.938***
(8.67) (5.50) (10.77) (6.45)
R2 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.37
Groups 185 771 245 711
N 1,365 6,126 1,839 5,652
The regressions are estimated using a firm fixed-effects model including time dummies for the period 1996 to 2006. The
dependent variable in all specifications is V, the market value of the firm (measured as the sum of the market value of
equity, long- and short-term debt). E relates to earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, and tax credits; A means
total book value of assets. D is equal to the total dividend payments in a given year in U.S. dollar terms. Generally, all
variables are deflated by total assets of the year t and in addition to the actual levels of the variables in year t, the lag
and lead changes of the respective variables are also included as independent variables in the regression framework. The
R2 of the fixed effects regression represents the R2 of the within dimension.Robust standard errors are clustered at the
firm-level. T-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
As a second robustness test, not the estimation methodology, but the estimation equation
is modified. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) state that one concern with equation (2) is that an
increase in cash might alter expectations about future growth opportunities as well. In
principle, lead terms in the Fama and French model capture expectations, but in order to
put this hypothesis under further scrutiny, Pinkowitz et al. (2006) replace the lead and
lag of cash changes with the value of cash:
Vi,t = αi + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t
+ β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10dIi,t + β11dIi,t+1 + β12Di,t
+ β13dDi,t + β14dDi,t+1 + β15dVi,t+1 + β16Li,t + εi,t
(3.2.3)
Accordingly, the coefficient on the the level of cash, β16, estimates the induced change
in market value if the level of cash holdings changes by one dollar. Table 3.6 contains
the results. For both splits, the estimation results reveal a significant valuation discount
between high and low external and internal governance. This means that the previous
results are further corroborated.
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Table 3.6: Valuation Effects (Fama MacBeth): Cash-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low CG High CG Low SH High SH
Variable V(t) V(t) V(t) V(t)
E(t) 4.882*** 7.699*** 4.664*** 7.917***
(4.57) (8.36) (4.67) (9.73)
dE(t) -0.229 -1.187** -0.540 -1.330***
(-0.59) (-2.52) (-1.20) (-3.57)
dE(t+1) 2.666*** 4.060*** 2.225*** 4.083***
(5.20) (6.18) (4.16) (6.46)
dNA(t) 0.180 0.588** 0.405** 0.491*
(0.99) (2.50) (2.33) (2.13)
dNA(t+1) 0.158 0.312* 0.057 0.297
(1.07) (1.92) (0.32) (1.67)
D(t) 6.966*** 9.415*** 9.033*** 7.376***
(4.53) (4.76) (6.11) (4.09)
dD(t) 2.926 -1.680 -1.244 2.071**
(0.68) (-1.05) (-1.60) (2.75)
dD(t+1) 8.830*** -3.208 2.972 2.192
(4.28) (-1.24) (1.12) (0.96)
dV(t+1) -0.124 -0.176 -0.203 -0.160
(-0.93) (-1.30) (-1.20) (-1.25)
L(t) 0.904*** 2.185*** 1.841*** 1.898***
(4.04) (8.49) (7.20) (7.62)
dI(t) 2.622 0.807 -1.180 5.627*
(1.18) (0.34) (-0.92) (2.25)
dI(t+1) -5.934 -3.730 2.951 -6.643
(-1.72) (-1.04) (1.29) (-1.58)
I(t) -10.226*** -6.885*** -3.651** -8.857***
(-6.38) (-5.03) (-3.19) (-5.75)
dRD(t) -7.723 11.083** 13.280** 11.442*
(-0.95) (2.36) (2.36) (2.12)
dRD(t+1) 1.138 13.984*** 6.657* 15.675***
(0.15) (4.69) (2.11) (4.64)
RD(t) 9.190** 5.678*** 4.122*** 6.077***
(2.43) (5.22) (3.70) (4.45)
Constant 0.510*** 0.015 0.136 0.115*
(7.34) (0.18) (1.32) (1.95)
R2 0.59 0.58 0.63 0.58
N 1,371 6,120 1,845 5,646
The regressions are estimated using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) for the period 1996 to 2006. The dependent
variable in all specifications is V, the market value of the firm (measured as the sum of the market value of equity, long-
and short-term debt). E relates to earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, and tax credits; A means total book
value of assets. D is equal to the total dividend payments in a given year in U.S. dollar terms. Generally, all variables
are deflated by total assets of the year t and in addition to the actual levels of the variables in year t, the lag and lead
changes of the respective variables are also included as independent variables in the regression framework. The R2 of the
Fama MacBeth regression is the average value of the R2 of the single years. T-values are reported in parentheses below
the coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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3.2.2.4 Excess Cash
This subsection calculates the excess cash level as defined by Opler et al. (1999). It is
based on a two-steps approach. The first step involves a regression where the natural log
of cash is used as the dependent variable:
lnCashi = β0 + β1MTBi + β2FCFi + β3Sizei + β4NWCi
+ β5Rdi + β6Divdumi + β7Capexi + εi
(3.2.4)
In a second step, the residual of the previous equation is calculated. It is then taken
to the exponential in order to arrive at the excess cash level. This notion defines cash
which is not directly needed for the operations of the firm, but arguably accumulated
for other purposes. Excess cash is calculated for all firms for the year 2001 and Table
3.7 contains the results. Additionally, Table 3.7 investigates the sources (EBITDA) and
uses of cash (acquisitions, capital expenditures, R&D expense, dividends) over time.12
In pursuing this approach, the sample is split in high and low internal governance firms
(high and low t values) such that it can directly be observed whether low governance
firms hold more excess cash and how the two groups differ according to their spending
behavior.
Table 3.7 reports the results of this subsection. The empirical evidence reveals that
there is no significant difference in means of excess cash between low and high governance
firms which is in line with the results obtained in section 4.3.2.1. Yet according the the
signs of the mean values, firms with high corporate governance hold negative excess cash
and firms with low governance hold positive amounts of excess cash which is in line with
expectations. Upon further examination of the results, the evidence exemplifies that high
corporate governance firms on the one hand generate more cash (Ebitda is higher) but also
spend more on items that are supposedly value increasing as their capital expenditures
and R&D expenses are higher. They also return more cash back to shareholders as their
dividend payments are higher and they spend more on acquisitions where it is debatable
whether these expenses are value-enhancing or not. Taken together with the evidence
from the previous subsection, it seems that investors value a one dollar increase in cash of
high governance firms more for the reason that these firms use their liquid asset holdings
for purposes that are beneficial for their shareholders. In the case of low governance
firms, this subsection reveals one reason for the valuation discount of liquid asset holdings
derived in the previous section. These firms keep excess cash in the company and do not
employ these funds in ways that are congruent with shareholder wealth maximization.
12 For related work, see, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).
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Table 3.7: Excess Cash
Means High CG Low CG T-test (p-value)
excess cash -0.25 0.10 0.205
netacquisitions 350,098 82,485 0.000
ebitda 2,040,650 1,093,513 0.000
capex 1,112,204 605,532 0.000
div 296,726 112,723 0.000
rdex 319,201 160,842 0.001
This table shows t-tests for equality of means for the year 2001 for all firms separated into low and high corporate governance
groups (by defining high and low at the median of the S&P Transparency and Disclosure index). Excess cash is calculated
similar to the paper by Opler et al. (1999). This variable is calculated in two-steps approach. The first stage involves a
regression of the log of cash on many independent variables which are known to determine the level of cash. In a second
step, the residual is calculated from the previous regression and taken to the exponential in order to obtain a ratio of excess
cash divided by net assets. Netacquisitions refers to net assets from acquisitions as defined by Worldscope. Ebitda stands
for earnings before interests, taxex, and depreciation. Capex is the abbreviation for capital expenditures and is simply the
ratio of capital expenditures (as reported in the balance sheet) divided by net assets. Div is equal to the dividend payments
in dollar amounts. Rdex refers to expenditures for research and development in U.S. dollar terms. A t-test for the equality
of coefficients is performed and the p-values are reported in the fourth column.
3.3 Conclusion
Liquid asset holdings provide a natural way to study the relation between agency conflicts
and the value consequences as cash can be relatively easy transformed into private bene-
fits. As a rather novel approach, this work uses not only data about country governance
(LLSV anti-director rights), but also incorporates an objective firm-level governance mea-
sure, the S&P Transparency and Disclosure index, into the analysis.
In this context, the first part of this paper uses external and internal governance data
of 935 firms worldwide in order to analyze the effect on global corporate liquidity. The
results reveal that country-level governance negatively influences the level of cash while
firm-level governance has a positive effect on the cash holdings. This provides evidence
that the results derived from research on either firm-level governance or country-level
governance also hold if the two partial effects are combined in an integrated framework.
However, very importantly, if the firm-level index is cleared of country effects, then the
corporate governance index loses its significance and is no longer related to the corporate
liquidity holdings. This provides, for the first time, evidence that its is crucial to dis-
entangle the firm-index in “pure” corporate decisions and country-influenced corporate
governance factors.
The second part of the paper directly examines the value consequences of cash in
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different governance regimes. It is shown that there is a significant value discount attached
to cash accumulated in low governance firms as well as in low shareholder protection
countries. One dollar of additional cash built up over the last period increases the firm
value by less than a dollar in those environments. However, in the case of high firm-level
governance firms and firms operating in high shareholder protection countries, the value
of one additional dollar of liquid asset raises the firm’s market value by much more than
the one dollar paid in. Importantly, as an robustness check, the results are also computed
via a fixed-effects estimator and qualitatively the same results can be obtained.
Finally, after identifying these huge value differences the paper continues by investi-
gating the sources of value creation/destruction. It is shown that although low-governance
firms do not hold significantly more excess cash, they spend less on sources that are con-
gruent with value maximization (e.g. using capital for research and development or
capital expenditures).

Chapter 4
Governance and Fee Setting in the
Mutual Fund Industry1
“The mutual fund industry is now the world’s largest skimming operation - a $7 trillion
through from which fund managers, brokers and other insiders are steadily siphoning off
an excessive slice of the nation’s household, college and retirement savings.”2 Before the
decisive year of 2003, the world of mutual funds was relatively intact compared to the
corporate landscape where Enron, WorldCom and their infamous alike took their toll on
companies’ reputations. However, in 2003 the tide turned and the mutual fund industry
found itself implicated in scandals like “late trading” and “market timing”.
In order to shed more light on these issues, this study undertakes an in-depth analysis
of the structure and governance of mutual funds domiciled in Luxembourg. Of primary
interest is the degree of vertical integration of mutual funds and the board composition.
In order to provide a measure for the inherent conflict of interest, it relates these two
governance aspects to funds’ expenses, manually collected from funds’ annual reports.
This paper focuses on UCITS, the dominant form of mutual funds in Europe, which are
based in one country, but can be sold across the whole European market. Luxembourg
is the European Union’s largest retail administration center by assets3 and about 90% of
all Luxembourg funds are set up as UCITS (see Figure 4.1).
Funds are similar to corporations in the sense that they are also legal entities overseen
by a board of directors. However, quite distinctively, funds do not have any staff of their
own. They are set up by their initial sponsor (often also referred to as promoter). This
1 This chapter is based on a study of the same title by Hirschvogl (2007b).
2 Fitzgerald (2003), Testimony to The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, November 3.
3 The Economist (2006), ”Progress of a sort”, March 9.
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entity, apart from launching the fund, also selects the initial board of directors. In
turn, the board of directors typically selects the sponsor as investment adviser. Drawing
further on the analogy to companies, that structure would compare to companies which
are only legal shells and whose entire services are outsourced, most noteworthy to the
investment adviser who receives a management fee. This cyclic appointment process
can be best expressed by the old adage “Dance with the one that brought you”, and it
induces a perceived conflict of interest between the adviser (the U.S. term for management
company) and their related funds. While the adviser wants to secure the highest possible
management fee in order to maximize his own profits, it is in the interest of the fund
holders to minimize the fee in order to maximize their net return, i.e gross return minus
fees.
While in principle the fund’s board should monitor the management company, its
supervisory role is likely to be compromised as they are “captured” by the management
company. Effectively, investment advisors are left to bargain with themselves when it
comes to fees. Why should one expect that this is done at arm’s length basis? Bogle
(2005, p. 153) states it quite bluntly with “The more the manager takes, the less the
owner makes”. In this context, Freeman and Brown (2001) show that equity pension
funds, with an average size of $0.4 billion, pay on average 28 basis points for advisory
services while the average equity mutual fund, with an average asset size of $1.3 billion,
pays an average fee rate of 56 basis points. In dollar terms, equity mutual funds pay
on average six times as much as their pension fund counterparts. The key difference in
terms of fee setting is that pension funds generally negotiate and “buy” advisory services
on the free market while mutual funds are bound to their initial sponsor and hence never
“shop around”.
The latter fact matters. First, there is a growing literature that demonstrates that
fees explain most of the differences in the cross-section of average fund returns. In this
vein, Carhart (1997) finds that expenses have at least a one-for-one negative impact on
fund performance, and that fund performance and load fees are strongly and negatively
related due to higher total transaction costs for load funds. Second, a growing proportion
of household savings are entrusted to mutual funds to finance retirement, housing, and
children’s education. According to figures from the ICI (Investment Company Institute)
$22.72 trillion have been invested in mutual funds worldwide in the first quarter of 2007
with 52% in the Americas region, 36% in Europe and 12% in Africa and Asia-Pacific
(Investment Company Institute, 2007c).
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the appropriate level of mutual
fund fees and expenses by providing the first detailed analysis of governance structures
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in the European Union. Measured by population (480,222), Luxembourg only takes the
global rank of 163 (CIA, 2007). However, it hosts the second largest fund industry world-
wide (after the U.S.) as 10% of world mutual fund assets are managed in Luxembourg
(Khorana et al., 2005). This fact makes Luxembourg an ideal laboratory to compare it
to well-known U.S. mutual fund structures as well as to established empirical evidence
on U.S. mutual fund fees.
While the U.S. provides a natural benchmark as most evidence originates from this
country, the U.S. mutual fund industry is currently trying to reorganize itself in the wake
of the mutual fund scandals, and hence insights from other organizational structures
could valuably contribute to this debate. This is all the more so as UCITS standards
gain increasing popularity in other non-European countries: For example, UCITS can
also be sold in countries as far as Hong Kong. Furthermore, while UCITS can be set up
as either investment companies (“SICAV”) or as contractual arrangements (“FCP”) in
Luxembourg, U.S. mutual funds can only be incorporated as investment companies. For
example, by observing huge differences in fee ratios between U.S. and the UK, a recent
book by Wallison and Litan (2007) calls for a reform of the regulatory structure of U.S.
mutual funds and proposes as a solution “managed investment trusts” which are similar
in spirit to FCPs. However, this study can provide a first set of answers to whether this
structure would provide any comparative advantage.
Apart from being a first mover, another contribution of this paper is that it adapts
the U.S. governance perspective to the European context. The discussion in the U.S
predominantly focuses on the governance role of independent directors. This is rooted
in the fact that the Investment Company Act of 1940 stipulates minimum thresholds
for the number of independent directors on boards. Moreover, the independent directors
are legally obliged to annually review the advisory and distribution contracts. Yet the
notion of independent directors is not even defined in the legal setting of Luxembourg.
In Luxembourg, oversight is either exerted by the depositary if the fund is organized in
the contractual form or jointly by the depositary and the board of directors if funds are
investment companies. Therefore, to reflect this different environment, the governance
variables are not limited to the board of directors, but the the level of integration between
the fund promoter, the management company, and the custodian is also investigated.
This paper studies the choice of the contract form, governance structure and the
relative performance of Luxembourg UCITS in terms of their fee setting behavior. The
analysis encompasses such governance elements as board composition and the degree of
vertical integration. In particular, an extensive hand-collected database of fund gover-
nance in Luxembourg is constructed, covering all equity UCITS domiciled in Luxembourg
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at the beginning of 2007. At the outset, the sample covers 2,230 equity UCITS. This in-
formation is supplemented for a random sample of 20% funds by manually collecting all
actual expenses and other related data items, not available from any public data vendor,
from the annual reports of UCITS. This is important as data on expense ratios does not
even have to be published in funds’ annual reports in Luxembourg.
The first part of the study reveals that 40% of all funds are vertically integrated and
only 10% can be considered as standalone funds (i.e. no integration between sponsor,
management company, and custodian). Furthermore, in 74% of all cases the management
company dominates the fund board. The second part of the paper relates the governance
measures to fund expenses in order to measure any existing conflicts of interest. The
results reveal that integration is indeed beneficial for fund investors in that it decreases
fund expense ratios. This result holds for varying definitions of expense ratios. How-
ever, the existence of multiple promoters increases fund expenses. This could be due to
coordination or communication problems when more promoters are involved in organiz-
ing the fund (similarly to the arguments on board size, see Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
or Jensen (1993)). Concerning the evidence on board structure, against all odds, board
dominance of the management company also lowers expense ratios. Taken together, these
results point to a value-enhancing role of the management company and any conflicts of
interest-theory cannot be corroborated for the world of European mutual funds.
These findings are interesting as in contrast to the U.S., there is hardly any gov-
ernance regulation imposed on funds in Europe. This means that European funds are
left to optimize their governance structure and the results point to efficient contracting
in the European governance industry. The results also shed light on the relative role of
integration versus the board structure and the evidence shows that for effective contract-
ing, board control of the management company has to go hand in hand with vertical
integration, i.e. the two are complementary to each other. Furthermore, as a robustness
test, the legal choice is modeled and in order to correct for a potential self-selection bias,
a switching model with endogenous switching is performed. This method is applied as
funds can either be set up as SICAVs or FCPs and this choice can arguably influence the
level of expenses. By following this approach, all previous results can be confirmed.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.1 describes the Luxembourg institutional
environment with an emphasis on legal structures and fee setting. Section 4.2 reviews
the main empirical literature. Section 4.3 introduces the estimation methodology and
section 4.4 presents the results. Section 4.5 contains robustness tests and, finally, section
4.6 concludes.
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4.1 The Luxembourg Fund Industry
Until the seventies, the “Grand Duchy” has been predominantly focused on steel produc-
tion. However, since then Luxembourg prospered as a major hub of the asset management
industry.4 Table 4.1 depicts this trend by comparing total net assets (Panel A) and the
number of mutual funds (Panel B) for the U.S., Europe, and Luxembourg for the years
1999 and 2006. Many interesting facts emerge. By the end of 2006, the U.S. was home to
the largest mutual fund industry managing 48% ($10,414 bn.) of worldwide mutual fund
net assets. Yet Luxembourg ranked already second with 10% ($2,188 bn.) of worldwide
mutual fund assets under management. Although the U.S. could increase its mutual fund
net assets over the period 1999 to 2006, its share of worldwide mutual fund net assets
is decreasing. Luxembourg, in contrast, was able to increase its total net assets over
the same period by 231% and almost doubled its share of worldwide mutual fund assets.
Panel B shows the number of mutual funds in operation during the observation period.
At the end of 2006, investors could choose between 7,919 different mutual funds offered
in Luxembourg, a number which is almost identical to the U.S. (8,120). It is important
to emphasize this fact. Although Luxembourg is only one fifth (Europe: 74%) of the
U.S. market size (measured by total net assets), it nevertheless hosts an almost identical
number of mutual funds.
Figure 4.1 shows the ten largest European fund markets as measured by total net
assets (in $ bn.) for the end of June 2007. Luxembourg is European’s largest fund
domicile by assets, followed by France, Germany, and the UK.5 Almost all Luxembourg
funds (90%) are set up as UCITS (the EU’s term for mutual funds that can be marketed
Europe-wide, see section 4.1.1). Equally, this observation holds true for almost all other
European fund markets except for Germany.6
4 Khorana et al. (2005) state that the growth of the asset management industry in Luxembourg
was enhanced in 1992 when Germany introduced a 25% withholding tax on interest income for
investment assets. This fact fostered a flight of German banks to asset management companies
domiciled in Luxembourg.
5 Khorana et al. (2005) try to explain the size of the mutual fund industry on a country-basis and
they find that larger fund industries correspond to better protected investor rights in line with the
law and economics literature.
6 Khorana et al. (2007) state another important difference between the U.S. and Europe. The U.S.
effectively has closed borders in terms of foreign-domiciled funds; however, European fund markets
are more integrated due to the existence of UCITS.
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Table 4.1: Total Net Assets of Mutual Funds in U.S. Dollars for 1999 and 2006
Panel A. Total Net Assets
1999 2006
Bn. $ % of World Bn. $ % of World
U.S. 6,846 58.20 10,414 47.85
Europe 3,203 27.23 7,744 35.58
Luxembourg 661 5.62 2,188 10.05
Worldwide 11,762 100.00 21,764 100.00
Panel B. Number of Funds
1999 2006
Number % of World Number % of World
U.S. 7,791 14.77 8,120 13.20
Europe 22,095 41.89 32,800 53.33
Luxembourg 5,023 9.52 7,919 12.88
Worldwide 52,746 100.00 61,506 100.00
This table shows a comparison of the U.S., Europe, and Luxembourg for the year 1999 versus 2006. Panel A shows total
net assets (in $ bn.) and Panel B considers the number of mutual funds.
Source: Investment Company Institute (2006), Annual Statistics, Worldwide Mutual Fund Totals.
Figure 4.1: Total Net Assets and Share of UCITS of the 10 Largest European
Fund Markets
This figure shows a comparison of European fund markets. It depicts net assets ($ bn.) on the vertical axis. It further
shows UCITS as a percentage of the local fund market.
Source: ALFI (Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry), The European Investment Fund Industry at End June
2007, http://www.alfi.lu/index.php?id=191.
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4.1.1 Regulation
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS, European
equivalent to U.S. mutual funds) are investment funds that are governed by a set of Eu-
ropean Union directives.7 The cornerstone was the 1985 UCITS Directive 85/611/EEC.
Luxembourg was the first country to transpose this Directive (often referred to as “UCITS
I”) into national law in 1988. This first mover advantage secured Luxembourg the lead
in terms of retail asset management. Generally, the 1988 Law governs UCIs (Under-
takings for Collective Investments) and it contains two parts. UCITS are only “Part I”
investment funds and “Part II” are other investment funds.
The main objective of the UCITS Directive was to create a unified funds market across
Europe. This goal was achieved by the provision that a UCITS can apply for authorization
in one member state, but upon approval, it can be marketed across all EU countries
(only upon prior notification). This is generally expressed as UCITS having a “European
passport”. UCITS I mainly contains rules concerning investment policies, investment
restrictions, as well as supervision of investment funds. In line with the definition of U.S.
mutual funds, UCITS are also required to be open-end investment funds intended for
sale to the general public. However, in contrast to the U.S. Investment Company Act
of 1940, the EU Directive does not stipulate any threshold for the minimum number of
independent directors (i.e. not affiliated with the management company, currently 50%
in the U.S.) that have to be on the mutual fund board. In effect, European investment
funds are free to decide on their governance choices without hardly any external regulation
imposed on them.
The last amendment to UCITS I took place in 2001 by Directives 2001/107/EC
(often called the “Management Companies Directive”) and 2001/108/EC (often termed
the “Products Directive”). These new Directives (“UCITS III ”) were implemented in
Luxembourg in 2002 (Law of 20 December 2002, henceforth simply “the Law”). In line
with UCITS I, UCITS III is also separated into two parts whereby Part I refers to
UCITS with a European passport, and Part II defines other investment funds. Besides
the Law which regulates funds sold to the general public, there is also the 1991 Law on
Institutional UCIs.
7 In order to clarify terminology, what the U.S. calls mutual funds is conceptually equal in Europe
to UCIs (sold domestically), UCITS (sold across Europe) and on a pan-country level to what the
IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) calls CIS (“Collective Investment
Schemes”).
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4.1.2 Legal Fund Structures
Generally, funds can be established under three different legal structures in Luxembourg.
First, funds can be set up as Common Funds (“Fonds Commun de Placement”, FCPs).
They are usually referred to as the “contractual model” as they are initiated by a con-
tract between the management company and the investors. This means that these funds
are not granted a separate legal identity, but they can only coexist with their manage-
ment company. Furthermore, this implies that they do not have a board of directors.
Importantly, this structure does not exist in the U.S., where mutual funds have to be
incorporated. Apart from Luxembourg, the contractual model is the common form in
Europe and it is also called FCP in Belgium, and France and it is denoted “Kapitalan-
lagefonds” in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (refer also to OECD, 2001; IOSCO,
2006). U.S. mutual funds find their European equivalents in the next legal structure.
Investment companies with variable capital (“Socie´te´ d’Investissement a` Capital Vari-
able, SICAVs) are investment funds that are proper legal entities. They have a board of
directors and mutual fund investors are directly shareholders of these investment compa-
nies. Under the Law, SICAVs have the option to either appoint an eligible management
company (has to fulfill certain minimum capital requirements) or to designate several
directors of the board (self-managed investment company) as managers. The important
feature of SICAVs is that their share capital is variable and fluctuates with the number
of subscriptions or redemptions in the fund as shareholders are allowed to redeem their
shares any time at NAV (net asset value, i.e. total assets minus liabilities divided by
shares outstanding).
The final legal structure that is provided for in Luxembourg are investment companies
with fixed capital (“Socie´te´ d’Investissement a` Capital Fixe”, SICAFs). SICAFs are also
investment companies but their capital is fixed and they are traded on stock exchanges,
hence their share price is determined by supply and demand of fund shares. But as
UCITS have to be open-ended, they cannot be set up as SICAFs and in general the role
of SICAFs is limited.
After deciding on the legal structure, UCITS can either be set up as a fund family
consisting of different funds with the legal entity being defined at the fund family level,
or they can be incorporated as single funds. Figure 4.2 depicts the legal choice being
offered in Luxembourg.
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Figure 4.2: Legal Structures in Luxembourg
Table 4.2 shows the number of UCIs (Panel A) as well as net assets (Panel B) of
UCIs registered in Luxembourg as of end August 2007. The total number amounts to
2,460 different funds8 whereby the majority of those funds are set up as UCITS (1,538).
Out of the 1,538 UCITS, 62.7% are established under the contractual model (FCPs) and
37.3% in the form of investment companies (SICAVs). According to net assets depicted
in Panel B, about 65% of UCITS are SICAVs and only 35% belong to the FCP group.
This means that SICAVs are generally larger in terms of size (net assets) than FCPs.
8 Of those 2,460 different funds 1,518 are fund families containing 9,394 different funds and 942 are
single funds. This means that altogether 10,336 (= 9,394 + 942) different funds are registered in
Luxembourg.
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Table 4.2: Breakdown of Luxembourg UCIs by Number and Net Assets
Panel A. Number of UCIs
Part I (UCITS) Part II Institutional UCIs Total
No. in % No. in % No. in % No. in %
FCPs 965 62.7 202 34.5 191 56.7 1,358 55.2
SICAVs 573 37.3 374 63.9 144 42.7 1,091 44.3
Others 0 0 9 1.5 2 0.6 11 0.4
Total 1,538 100 585 100 337 100 2,460 100
Panel B. Net Assets (in bn. EUR)
Part I (UCITS) Part II Institutional UCIs Total
Bn. EUR in % Bn. EUR in % Bn. EUR in % Bn. EUR in %
FCPs 574.3 34.8 108.8 37.7 61 63 744.1 36.6
SICAVs 1,075.5 65.2 177.4 61.4 35.7 36.9 1,288.6 63.3
Others 0 0 2.5 0.9 0.1 0.1 2.6 0.1
Total 1,649.8 100 288.7 100 96.8 100 2,035.3 100
This table shows the number of UCIs (Undertakings for Collective Investments) registered on the official list in Luxembourg
as of 30 August 2007. Panel A contains the number of UCIs and Panel B shows UCIs on basis of their net assets in EUR
billion. FCPs are contractual funds and SICAVs are incorporated investment funds with variable capital. Part I of the
2002 Law refers to UCITS (UCIs with European passport) and Part II refers to all other UCIs sold to the general public.
Institutional UCIs are only sold to institutional investors.
Source: Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Finance (CSSF) (2007), Statistiques mensuelles sous format Excel, Aouˆt
2007, http://www.cssf.lu/index.php?id=135.
The last paragraph introduced the choice set concerning legal structures that is avail-
able in Luxembourg. However, regardless of whether funds are set up as FCPs or SICAVs,
they are only legal shells and all the services are delivered by external agents. Generally,
the fund’s assets must be entrusted to a custodian (also called depositary bank or simply
depositary). By definition, FCPs must have a management company but SICAVs have
the option to either designate a management company (in the U.S. often called investment
adviser) or to be self-managed. Chapter 13 of the Law stipulates that the management
company requires at least two executives who must be of “sufficiently good repute”.9
In contrast to FCPs, SICAVs must have a board of directors as they constitute a
separate legal entity. The minimum number of directors serving on the board is three;
however, the Law does not contain any provisions concerning the number of independent
directors. Funds are initiated by a promoter/sponsor who selects the initial board. Gen-
erally, in turn, the board of directors appoints the promoter to assume the function of
the management company. Furthermore, if a management company has been designated,
9 Self-managed funds must also designate at least two executives from their board of directors. The
minimum initial capital of management companies amounts to EUR 125,000.
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then it can outsource investment management, administration, and distribution to exter-
nal parties. If no management company has been designated, then these three roles have
to be outsourced to other legal entities.
Figure 4.3 depicts the structure of FCPs under UCITS III, Figure 4.4 that of SICAVs
with a designated management company, and Figure 4.5 shows the organizational setup
of self-managed SICAVs.
Figure 4.3: Structure of FCP under UCITS III
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Figure 4.4: Structure of SICAV designating a Management Company under
UCITS III
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Figure 4.5: Structure of Self-Managed SICAV under UCITS III
4.1.3 Fund Governance under UCITS III Directive
In the U.S., all mutual funds are organized in the corporate form with a board of di-
rectors. Much of the effort to strengthen governance of U.S. mutual funds has focused
on independent directors.10 Currently the Investment Company Act of 1940 stipulates
that 50% of the directors have to be independent. The duty of independent directors
includes that they annually have to negotiate and approve the advisory and distribution
contracts.11 This means that by law independent directors in the U.S. have a key role in
the determination of fund expenses.
10 Most notably, the SEC has focused its regulatory activities on the role of independent directors.
In a recent speech, SEC Commissioner Annette Nazareth argued that funds do not compete on
fees as investors predominantly only consider past performance when deploying their funds (see
Nazareth, 2007). This view is also shared by Trzcinka (1998) who puts forward that competition is
imperfect in the mutual fund industry as many fees are hidden or charged in a complicated manner.
Furthermore, redemptions may not be an effective disciplining device as many funds charge load
fees which dissuade investors from redeeming their funds (see Chordia, 1996).
11 An overview of the duties of independent directors under the Investment Company Act of 1940 can
be found in Tate (2000).
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The governance environment in Luxembourg is different. As outlined in the last
section 4.1.2, funds can either be set up in the contractual form, FCPs, or in the form
of investment companies, SICAVs. This means that in order to analyze the governance
environment in Luxembourg, one has to distinguish between these two legal forms. In
the case of FCPs, Article 14 of the Law stipulates that the management company has to
manage the fund in the interest of the fund holders. Furthermore, Article 20 says that
the management company and the depositary “must act independently and solely in the
interest of the unitholders”. In the case of SICAVs, Article 38 of the Law requires that
the depositary “must act solely in the interest of the shareholders”. This means that in
the case of FCPs, the oversight role is generally assumed by the custodian as there is no
board of directors while in the case of SICAVs, the oversight role is deferred to the board
of directors as well as to the custodian. Yet in contrast to the U.S., the Law does not
contain any rules concerning independent directors.
4.1.4 Fee Structure
At the most general level, fees and expenses can be categorized into two broad groups:12
• Fees that are paid directly by investors (shareholder fees)
• Fees and expenses that are deducted from the assets of the fund (annual operating
expenses).
Table 4.3 groups the various fees by the above categorization and lists all different
fees and expenses that belong to these two groups. Further, it shows the fee payer, the
recipient, and the frequency of fee payment. Shareholder fees, the first category, can be
further divided into load charges and other charges. Loads (on purchases or redemptions)
are primarily used to reimburse brokers or financial advisers if fund shares are offered
through those service providers.13 Loads on purchases are often called “front-end sales
loads” and deferred loads are usually referred to as “back-end sales loads”. Aside from
load charges, there can also be redemption, exchange or purchase fees. These fees do not
represent loads as they are not used to reimburse brokers, but they are credited to the
fund for charges in association with redemption or purchases of fund shares.
The second broad category, annual operating expenses, can be further divided into
fees and expenses that are related to the management of fund assets and fees that are
12 The presented material follows closely the information provided on the SEC homepage: http:
//www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm.
13 Mahoney (2004) states that the fund usually determines the level of the load, but it is subsequently
credited to the broker for investment advice.
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paid to other service providers as well as general operating expenses, e.g. printing and
publication of annual reports or taxes. The structure of management fees and expenses
can best be explained by referring to Figure 4.3, 4.4, or 4.5, depending on the legal struc-
ture of the fund. If a management company has been designated (Figure 4.3 and 4.4),
then a management fee will be paid to that party. Then, if the management company
appoints further service providers for investment management, investment advisory or
distribution of fund assets, it directly reimburses those third party service providers out
of its own management fee. If the management company does not assume the role of the
distributor or administrator, then the fund also pays fees for the distribution or adminis-
tration of its assets. Furthermore, the investment manager, adviser or the management
company could be granted a performance fee that depends on some performance hurdles
to be met.14 If the fund has no designated management company, but has appointed at
least two managing directors from the board (Figure 4.5), then it usually appoints exter-
nal parties for providing investment management and/or investment advisory services,
distribution, and fund administration activities.
Service providers that have to be appointed and remunerated are custodian, auditor,
registrar, and transfer agent. Other expenses relate to, e.g. the printing and publication of
annual reports, bank expenses, or taxes (“taxe d’abonnement” in Luxembourg, currently
0.05% of total net assets, payable quarterly).
TERs (called “Total Expense Ratios” in Europe and “Expense Ratios” in the U.S.)
are calculated by summing up all expenses, except for transaction costs (charges incurred
for buying and selling fund securities) as they represent capital costs and not operating
expenses, and then dividing this sum by average net assets. It is important to stress that
TERs do not have to be reported in funds’ annual reports in Luxembourg. This means it is
rather difficult for fund investors to gather information about actual fund expenses. Fund
investors can only refer to a funds’ prospectus. Yet it is very cumbersome for investors
to estimate the fee level from this document. First, the prospectus only includes fees as a
percentage of net assets. Second, sometimes fees are even given as a step function of net
assets. Third, performance fees depend on many parameters that cannot be determined
ex ante. Fourth, fund expenses are not covered as they cannot be estimated ex ante.
A recent study by the ICI (Investment Company Institute) shows that U.S. mutual
fund fees have been steadily declining since the eighties and hit a new record low at
the end of 2006 (Investment Company Institute, 2007a). In 2006, U.S. investors paid
on average 107 basis points in fees and expenses for owning equity mutual funds. This
figure can be split in 19 basis points incurred on loads and 88 basis points incurred on
14 For more information on incentive fees in mutual funds refer to Das and Sundaram (1998).
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all other expenses (see above). The ICI reports that fees and expenses for stock mutual
funds have dropped by 50% since the eighties. Bond mutual funds incur costs of 83 basis
points and money market mutual funds charge on average 40 basis points. By analyzing
an international cross-section of 46,580 mutual fund share classes in 18 different countries
for the year 2002, Khorana et al. (2007) find that on average Canadian equity mutual
funds have the highest TER with 2.56%. The mean TER for all countries amounts to
1.29% and Luxembourg with a TER of 1.70% is situated in the upper range.15 At the
lower end of the spectrum is the U.S. with a TER of only 1.11%. In the U.S., distribution
expenses are called 12b-1 fees after SEC rule 12b-1 that permits mutual funds to cover
distribution and marketing expenses out of fund assets.16
Table 4.3: Fee Structure
Paid by
To whom?
Paid how
whom? often?
1. Shareholder Fees
Loads
Sales Charge (Load) Purchases Investor Broker one time
Deferred Sales Charge (Load) Investor Broker one time
Redemption Fee Investor Fund one time
Exchange Fee Investor Fund one time
Purchase Fee Investor Fund one time
2. Annual Operating Expenses
Management-Related
Management Fees Fund Assets Management Company Periodically
Investment Management Fees Fund Assets Investment Manager Periodically
Investment Adviser Fund Assets Investment Adviser Periodically
Performance Fee Fund Assets
Management Company
PeriodicallyInvestment Manager
Investment Adviser
Distribution Fees (U.S.: 12b-1 Fees) Fund Assets
Management Company
Periodically
Distributor
Administration Expenses Fund Assets
Management Company
Periodically
Administrative Agent
(continued)
15 This result runs counter to the authors’ presumption that offshore funds may have lower fees because
their centralized operation and their international distribution would allow them to benefit from
significant economies of scale.
16 Siggelkow (2004) writes that the reasoning behind the introduction of 12b-1 fees was that the mar-
keting and distribution costs would be equalized because of increased economies of scale. However,
in reality, many funds use 12b-1 fees in order to defray these costs on fund shareholders as they
usually do not decrease their non-marketing expenses. Mahoney (2004) considers two other hidden
mutual fund costs which are “direct brokerage” and “soft-dollar commissions”.
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Table 4.3: —Continued
Paid by
To whom?
Paid how
whom? often?
Custodian Fees Fund Assets Custodian Periodically
Transfer Agent Fees Fund Assets Transfer Agent Periodically
Registrar Fees Fund Assets Registrar Periodically
Auditor Expenses Fund Assets Auditor Periodically
Director Fees Fund Assets Directors Periodically
Other Expenses (Printing and
Fund Assets Various Periodically
Publication, Bank Expenses, Tax)
This table groups mutual fund fees in shareholder fees and annual operating expenses. It lists all different fees belonging
to these two categories. Furthermore, this table depicts the fee payer, the recipient, and the frequency of fee payments.
Source: Funds’annual reports.
4.2 Related Literature
Investors (principals) want managers (agents) to maximize expected returns on their in-
vestments. Yet this objective may not necessarily correspond to the managers’ interests
as managers, in fact, serve two masters. Apart from mutual fund investors, the manage-
ment company usually has its own shareholders who expects the management company
to generate as much profit as possible. This latter objective corresponds to maximizing
the management fee. Clearly, these two objectives are diametrically opposed to each
other as mutual fund investors are interested in net returns, i.e. gross returns minus fees.
This paper focuses on two very central issues arising from this agency problem. First,
if fund advisers sit on the mutual fund board, they are effectively able to negotiate their
own compensation package. From the discussion above, there is reason to suspect that
managers would try to set their advisory fee as high as possible. The remedy proposed in
the U.S. was to get independent oversight on boards by requiring that a certain percentage
of board seats have to be assumed by independent directors. However, such a rule is
absent in Europe where rule-makers focused on the role of the custodian, the independent
entity safeguarding the fund’s assets. In the U.S., the 1940 Investment Company Act
requires that at least 40% of the fund’s board of directors has to be independent and
that fund boards must approve advisers’ fees and expenses. In 2001, the SEC tightened
the rules and required that the majority of the fund board must be independent. Due
to the inherent conflict between advisers and investors, the SEC believed that fees are
too high. The SEC assumed that more stringent independence rules would enhance the
effectiveness of boards when it comes to negotiate fees with their advisers. Yet in 2004,
after the unraveling of scandals like “late trading” and “market-timing”, the SEC tried
to increase board independence even further to 75%. However, in 2004 the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce sued the SEC on the grounds that it does not have the necessary authority
to impose these amendments and in 2005, the new amendments were repealed by the
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court. However, the debate on this subject continues.17
Second, if the management company belongs to a financial complex, like Goldman
Sachs, they usually succumb to other interests. Vertical integration means that different
service providers belong to the same complex. Therefore, service fees are not negotiated at
arm’s length basis, but are rather determined within different entities of the same financial
complex. As they belong to a bigger financial institution with its own shareholders, there
is reason to believe that fees are not set at competitive levels but rather to maximize the
profits of the complex.
In the U.S., the exception to this rule is Vanguard. This fund is set up in such
a way that the fund itself owns all common shares of Vanguard Inc., the management
company. Fees are charged at cost-basis as no outside entity is involved in generating
profits. If Vanguard employs outside managers,18 it negotiates with them fiercely on
the management fee. The other well-known management company in the U.S. that is
privately held is Fidelity. Together, these two companies have the reputation of being
low-cost providers.19 More than fifty years ago, all management companies have been
privately held in the U.S.20 However, in 1958, the SEC lost a pivotal court case and since
then a trend towards organizing funds as public companies prevailed. Nowadays, 36 out
of the 50 largest fund advisers in the U.S. are owned by big financial groups.21
The most important empirical evidence on independent directors and vertical inte-
gration will be presented in the following two sections.
17 In 2006, the SEC invited public comment on two studies conducted by its Office of Economic
Analysis (OEA). The first is the “Literature Review” (Office of Economic Analysis, 2006a) and
the second is the “Power Study” (Office of Economic Analysis, 2006b). See also the response by
the ICI (2007) “A Review of the SEC Office of Economic Analysis Board Independence Studies”
(Investment Company Institute, 2007b) and Coates (2007) who was hired by Fidelity Investments
for responding to the SEC rules.
18 Freeman and Brown (2001) report that actual fees paid to Vanguard external managers amount to
13.2 basis points which is less than the value weighted average management fee.
19 For example, Edward C. Johnson 3d, the Chairman of Fidelity, describes the mission of Fidelity “to
always act in the best interests of shareholders and customers. It should govern our thinking in ev-
erything we do”, see http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/, ”A Letter
from the Chairman”.
20 Coates and Hubbard (2006) argue that internal managed funds have been less cost efficient and
therefore reorganized itself to external management.
21 See “Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors”, November 3, 2003, The
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing.
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4.2.1 Independent Directors and Fees
This section considers the literature on the structure of boards and mutual fund fees.22
Fee negotiations are among the most direct tasks that a board has to fulfill and hence their
effectiveness therein can easily be established.23 Carhart (1997) finds for his sample of
U.S. equity funds over the 1962 to 1993 period that expenses exert a one-to-one negative
drag on performance (see also, Jensen, 1968; Elton et al., 1993). He states that a 100
basis point increase in expense ratios has a negative impact of 154 basis points on annual
abnormal performance.
The literature on fees and the structure of the board24 is not as extensively researched
as the literature on mutual fund performance25 The paper by Tufano and Sevick (1997)
was one of the first in this vein. The authors focus on the effect of board structure
on the fee level in the U.S. Their sample consists of the 50 largest sponsors in 1992
and they restrict their sample to open-end mutual funds. The authors argue that fund
sponsors typically appoint the initial slate of board directors who are then supposed to
monitor their sponsors. Tufano and Sevick (1997) find that this organizational setup is
problematic for the following reasons: (i) why should the sponsor have an incentive to
appoint its own vigilant watchdog, (ii) if independent directors serve on many boards,
they, supposedly, compromise their independence and could become loyal to the sponsor,
(iii) Tufano and Sevick (1997) are only aware of three instances where the board appointed
another adviser than the initial sponsor.26 They find evidence that lower fee rates are
22 There is an ongoing debate on whether price competition is also an important factor for influencing
fee levels. While Sirri and Tufano (1998), Freeman and Brown (2001), as well as Barber et al. (2005)
find no evidence, Khorana et al. (2007) reveal that families gain a higher market share by charging
lower fees relative to other families. This means that investors take fee levels in consideration when
they deploy their funds.
23 The following papers study independent directors in connection with different aspects. Khorana
et al. (2006) focus on fund mergers. Zitzewitz (2005) considers market timing and late trading.
Ding and Wermers (2005) analyze mutual fund performance. For related papers, see: Cremers et al.
(2006) deals with incentives in the mutual fund industry. Stoughton et al. (2007) study the effects
of intermediation. Dangl et al. (2006) put forward a continuous-time model on market discipline
and internal governance in mutual funds. Ippolito (1992), Brown et al. (1996), Gruber (1996),
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Busse (2001),
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Nanda et al. (2004) focus on the performance-flow relation. Berk
and Green (2004) develop a model on mutual fund flows and performance. Kacperczyk et al. (2005)
study the portfolio concentration versus fund performance.
24 For the related discussion of companies’ boards, see Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Lipton and
Lorsch (1992), Weisbach (1988), or Yermack (1996).
25 For papers on mutual fund performance, see, for example, Sharpe (1966), Treynor (1966), Jensen
(1968), Sharpe (1992), Hendricks et al. (1993), Grinblatt et al. (1995), Brown and Goetzmann
(1995), Malkiel (1995), Elton et al. (1996), Gruber (1996), Wermers (2000).
26 Similarly Kuhnen (2005) shows that funds rarely renegotiate their contracts or change their adviser.
This is despite the fact that the author also shows that contractual rearrangements would be in the
interest of shareholders as changing the adviser leads to a positive impact on performance.
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set by funds having the following characteristics: a smaller board, more independent
directors serving on the board, and if board members sit on multiple boards for the same
sponsor. Moreover, they could detect a positive relation between director remuneration
and the advisory fee.
Del Guercio et al. (2003) also focus on the effectiveness of boards as monitors. How-
ever, Del Guercio et al. (2003) focus on closed-end investment companies in contrast to
open-end funds.27 Their sample consists of a cross-section of 476 closed-end funds in
1996. As measure of board effectiveness, Del Guercio et al. (2003) employ the fund ex-
pense ratio and they find that boards with low expense ratios have smaller boards, more
independent directors, and lower director compensation. The first two results are in line
with the evidence retrieved for the open-end fund universe by Tufano and Sevick (1997)
but this is not the case for the last result.
In contrast to the previous two studies, Ferris and Yan (2007) do not find any evi-
dence for their cross-section of 448 fund families in 2002 that board independence and
an independent chairman are related to lower fees:28 However, their analysis reveals that
board size and the number of funds overseen by each independent director have a positive
impact on expense ratios.
In contrast to the previous authors, Meschke (2007) uses a panel data set of 91 spon-
sors for the period 1994 to 2005. He argues that the time dimension is important in order
to ascertain whether independent directors take decisions because of their independence
or because the derived relationship is an outcome of optimal contracting.29 He finds that
independent chairs are associated with lower fees, but the relation between independent
directors and fees varies with the time period. In the 1995 to 2001 period, the fraction of
independent directors is positively related to fees and from 2002 onwards this relationship
is reversed.
From the discussion above, it is not clear how independent directors relate to the level
of fees as, first, only the earlier studies, i.e. Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Del Guercio
et al. (2003), find a negative relationship between fees and independent directors and
the more recent studies, i.e. Ferris and Yan (2007) and Meschke (2007), do not find any
27 The important governance difference between closed-end funds and open-end funds is that the latter
are continuously obliged to redeem shares at NAV (net asset value). Accordingly, Fama and Jensen
(1983) argue that open-end fund shareholders have an effective disciplining device as they can
withdraw assets from managers and therefore punish them.
28 However, Ferris and Yan (2007) note that they may fail to find a significant relationship between
board independence and fees as the median fund in their sample employed already 76% independent
directors and the cross-sectional variation was rather low.
29 This is in line with Deli (2002). For the same reasoning on corporate ownership refer to Demsetz
and Lehn (1985).
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conclusive evidence. Second, the legal environment in Luxembourg is completely different
from the U.S. as there is no stipulated threshold for the minimum number of independent
directors in Luxembourg as well as the role of independent directors in fee negotiations is
not as emphasized in the European context as it is in the U.S. It is left to the empirical
part to shed more light on this issue.
4.2.2 Effects of Vertical Integration
Coates and Hubbard (2006) state that mutual funds can either be externally managed,
being the base case in the U.S., or they could be internally managed with investment
management being carried out by internal officers. They argue that in a vertically in-
tegrated organization, fee levels (internal transfer prices) should be set competitively as
otherwise resources within the entity would get misallocated.
This paper focuses on two dimensions of this aspect. First, it considers the degree
of vertical integration of different external service providers to the fund. To be specific,
I investigate to which extent sponsor, management company, and custodian are related
at the financial group level. The particular structure of the legal system in Luxembourg
also allows analyzing vertical integration in the original proposed sense, i.e. it is possible
to shed light on the extent that funds are internally managed and what the consequences
on fee rates are. This is the case as Luxembourg allows self-managed funds under UCITS
III (section 4.1.3) which are structured like vertically integrated funds. The following
discussion presents papers that also focus on the affiliation of different entities at the
complex level.
In this vein, Massa and Rehman (2005) analyze whether the information generated
by the lending branch of a financial institution is provided to the asset management arm
of the same institution. This behavior would clearly violate Chinese walls. To put this
into perspective, Massa and Rehman (2005) do not analyze the family affiliation,30 but
they focus on the complex level. They argue that many mutual funds not only belong to
families of funds, but also to broader financial conglomerates that also engage in other
activities, such as banking and insurance. Between 1990 and 2004 approximately 40%
of mutual funds belonged to financial conglomerates in the U.S. This means that the
fund manager is employed by a broader financial institution, having potentially differing
interests from those of fund shareholders. Massa and Rehman (2005) test two opposing
hypotheses: (i) mutual funds are used in support of the overall policy of the financial
30 This was very prominent before in respect to cross-subsidization (see, for example, Massa, 2003;
Gaspar et al., 2006).
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group (“group support”); (ii) group affiliation helps funds that belong to the group be-
cause they receive inside information (“fund support”). Only the latter hypothesis is in
line with shareholders’ interests but both are beneficial for the group as a whole. Their
results corroborate the second hypothesis, i.e. that funds benefit from the use of infor-
mation from affiliated banks. They show that a bank-affiliated fund achieves a superior
performance of about 1.8% per year. Taken together, the results reveal that funds affil-
iated to banks can benefit from their informational advantage by better discriminating
among investment opportunities.
Another recent paper by Ritter and Zhang (2007) is conceptually related to the
present subject. Ritter and Zhang (2007) investigate the relation between initial public
offerings (IPOs) and mutual funds that are related to the lead underwriter that is also
a large investment bank (i.e. Goldman Sachs). In line with Massa and Rehman (2005),
they study two contradictory hypotheses. The “dumping ground hypothesis” says that
IPOs are allocated to affiliated mutual funds in order to complete the deals if demand
is not up to expectations. The “nepotism hypothesis” predicts a positive motive of
investment banks in that they allocate hot IPOs to affiliated mutual funds in order to
support the funds’ performance. Their evidence predominantly supports the nepotism
hypothesis, especially during the internet bubble. Taken together, Ritter and Zhang
(2007) and Massa and Rehman (2005) find positive effects of mutual fund affiliation to
large financial complexes.
Kuhnen (2007) also focuses on the conflicts of interest inherent in the mutual fund
industry. Although her scope is different as she studies the connections between firm
advisers and directors, her hypotheses can be applied to the current context. The author
argues that business ties could either lead to efficient information transfer or they could
also lead to unduly favoritism between agents. Accordingly, advisory contracts will not be
determined at an arm’s length basis and the board will abstain from intensive monitoring.
Kuhnen (2007) finds evidence for the favoritism hypothesis. Her results show that funds
where the board is more related to the adviser also have higher expense ratios as well as
they compensate their advisers more handsomely.
To sum up, the extant literature does not allow to form any explicit expectations
on vertical integration. In line with the authors above, I assume that the relationship
between vertical integration and fund expenses can go in either two directions. Either
the fund is nurtured with better information from the affiliated financial institution, and
hence it can economize on its own research expenses. Alternatively, the fund could also
be used by the affiliated institution in ways that are not congruent with maximizing the
funds’ returns.
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4.3 Empirical Methodology
4.3.1 Database Construction
CCLux is the electronic reporting system of the Luxembourg stock exchange and the
Luxembourg fund industry. More than 99% of UCITS domiciled in Luxembourg and
registered with the Luxembourg Securities Regulator (CSSF) comply with their initial
and ongoing disclosure obligations by filing electronically with CCLux. The bulk of the
information in the database is contained in portable document format files (pdf), but a
number of variables have been coded and can be retrieved in tabulated form. I analyze
both types of data for the population of equity funds reporting through CCLux in the
first half of 2007.
I analyze the CCLux database looking at different promoters, fund families and indi-
vidual funds within the family. The analysis is limited to equity funds. I initially collect
data on the geographical origin of the fund promoter, the geographical composition of
the fund portfolio, the strategy, the launch date of the fund as well as the organizational
type (SICAV or FCP).
Concerning the governance variables, I measure the degree of vertical integration by
looking at five different dimensions. Generally, integration is determined by considering
the owners of the concerned entity. For example, if the sponsor owns the management
company, then this would be referred to as vertical integration. First, the fund is labeled
“Fully Integrated Fund” (FIF ) if the fund manager, the depository bank and the promoter
belong to the same financial complex. Second, the fund is called “Partially Integrated
1” or “2” if either the fund manager and the promoter belong to the same group (PI1 )
or the depository bank and the promoter are related at the complex level (PI2 ). The
fund is referred to as “Standalone Fund” (SF ) if these three entities are not related at
the complex level. These four different levels only pertain to funds with one sponsor. If a
fund is launched by more than one promoter, then this group forms a separate category
called ”Funds with Multiple Promoters” (MP) versus “Funds with Single Promoters”
(SP). As a second governance dimension, I also measure the proximity between the fund
and the management company by investigating the composition of the fund’s board. If a
majority of the directors are directly affiliated with the management company, I consider
the fund board and the management company as closely related.31 For the definition of
all governance variables refer to Table 4.4.
31 I do not intend to measure director “independence”.
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Table 4.4: Fund Governance Variable Definitions
Fund Governance Acronym Definition
Organizational Type
Investment Company SICAV Fund organized as an investment company
Contract Form FCP Fund organized via a contract
Vertical Integration
Fully Integrated Fund FIF The fund manager and the depository bank
belong to the same business group as the fund
promoter typically a large international uni-
versal bank.
Partially Integrated 1 PI1 The fund manager belongs to the same group
as the fund promoter, but not the depository
bank.
Partially Integrated 2 PI2 The depository bank belongs to the same
group as the fund promoter, but not the fund
managers.
Standalone Fund SF The fund manager and the depository bank
do not belong to the same group as the fund
promoter. This includes cases where the fund
manager and the depository bank belong to
the same group.
Funds with Multiple Promoters MP Funds which are launched by more than one
promoter form a distinct group
Proximity of Fund Board and Manager
Management Company Majority MCM=Yes The majority of directors on the board of
the fund are employees of the management
company.
This table contains a brief description of the governance variables used in this study as well as the variables on the
organizational type.
At the outset, I gather information on all equity funds registered with CCLux as of the
first quarter of 2007. The initial number of funds comprises 2,670 equity funds. However,
as the intention is to study UCITS, I have to clear the data from non-UCITS funds. This
means that I have to exclude 63 specialized investment funds and 121 other equity funds
that do not qualify as UCITS. Accordingly, the final sample of equity UCITS consists of
2,486 individual funds. Table 4.5 characterizes the 2,486 equity UCITS. Panel A shows
that the overall number of UCITS can be grouped into 527 fund families and on average
a fund family contains five UCITS. There are 338 different fund promoters offering at
least one equity UCITS and the number of promoter fund family combinations amounts
to 614 as promoters can offer more than one fund family as well as some fund families are
offered by multiple promoters. Panel B contains descriptive statistics for the structure
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of the fund’s board. The overall number of directors ranges from a minimum number
of three, corresponding to the legal minimum, to a maximum number of 21 directors.
Fund boards have on average eight board members (the median is six). Panel C reports
statistics for the universe of non-affiliated directors (i.e. not related to the management
company). In total, 4,296 board seats are assumed by non-affiliated directors. However,
only 531 different persons fill that total number of non-affiliated board seats. On average,
one non-affiliated director sits on eight boards.
Table 4.5: Sample Characteristics
Summary Statistics
Panel A. Equity UCITS Population
Number of individual equity UCITS 2486*
Number of fund families containing at least one UCITS equity fund 527
Average number of UCITS equity fund per family 5
Number of UCITS equity fund promoters 338
Number of Promoter fund family combinations 614
Panel B. Board Structure**
Minimum number of directors 3
Median number of directors 6
Mean number of directors 7.3
Maximum number of directors 21
Panel C. Non-affiliated Directors**
Total number of non-affiliated directors’ seats 4,296
Number of persons filling seats 531
Seats per person
Mean 8.1
Std. Dev. 12.6
Minimum 1
Median 4
Maximum 118
This table shows summary statistics for the population of Luxembourg registered equity funds that reported through the
CCLux database in the first half of 2007. The total number of equity UCITS is 2,486. In Panel A, funds with multiple
promoters are counted more than once. Panel B describes the board structure in Luxembourg for the 2,230 unique equity
UCITS. Panel C contains an analysis of the non-affiliated directors (i.e. are not affiliated to the management company)
represented on equity UCITS boards of the 2,230 unique UCITS.
*funds with more than one promoter are counted multiple times, once per promoter
**the analysis is only conducted for the 2,230 unique funds
Table 4.6 ranks the 338 different promoters according to their country of domicile.
The majority of fund promoters are from Switzerland (70%), followed by Luxembourg
itself, and Germany. Yet among the rank of the ten most represented promoter countries,
there are not only European countries, the U.S. is also present with rank eight (6% of all
promoters come from the U.S.).
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Table 4.6: Breakdown of Promoters by Country of Incorporation
Rank Promoter Country No Promoters Percent
1 Switzerland 70 20.71
2 Luxembourg 67 19.82
3 Germany 34 10.06
4 Italy 31 9.17
5 France 25 7.40
6 Belgium 22 6.51
7 Great Britain 21 6.21
8 U.S. 20 5.92
9 Spain 12 3.55
10 Sweden 8 2.37
Sub Total 310 91.72
Sum All Promoters 338 100
This table shows the breakdown of the 338 different equity UCITS promoters by their country of incorporation. Countries
are ranked according to the number of promoters and only the 10 most popular countries are shown.
Table 4.7 shows the number of funds by their central governance characteristics. It
shows the data for the entire equity UCITS population as well as for the 20% random
sample that will be considered for analyzing the fee levels. Panel A reports the degree of
vertical integration. The vast majority of funds are integrated at the management level,
with the fund manager and the fund promoter belonging to the same group. 40% of the
funds are fully integrated (random sample: 42%) and in another 47% of all cases (random
sample: 45%) only the depository bank does not belong to the same group. Only 10% of
Luxembourg equity UCITS are standalone funds.32 If one also considers the 179 funds
with multiple promoters, the number of all unique equity UCITS amounts to 2,230.
Panel B reports the proximity of the fund and its manager at the board level. In 74%
(random sample: 75%) of all cases, the majority of fund board members are affiliated to
the management company. This result is consistent with the evidence reported in Panel
A.
32 Note that even this might be an overestimate, because in some cases I might have failed to trace the
ownership or control link between the fund promoter’s business group and the fund management
company.
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Table 4.7: Number of Funds by Integration and Board Structure
Panel A. Degree of Vertical Integration
UCITS Population 20% Random Sample
No. Obs. Percent No. Obs. Percent
Funds with Single Promoter
Fully Integrated Fund FIF 815 40% 177 42%
Partially Integrated 1 PI1 971 47% 187 45%
Partially Integrated 2 PI2 55 3% 11 3%
Standalone Fund SF 210 10% 41 10%
Subtotal 2,051 92% 416 85%
Funds with Multiple Promoters MP 179 8% 74 15%
Total 2,230* 100% 490* 100%
Panel B. Proximity of Fund Board and Manager
UCITS Population 20% Random Sample
No. Obs. Percent No. Obs. Percent
Yes 1,645 74% 367 75%
No 585 26% 123 25%
Total 2,230* 100% 490* 100%
Panel A shows the frequency distribution of Luxembourg registered UCITS by the different degrees of vertical integration.
Panel B reports the proximity of the fund board and the manager. All categories are defined in Table 4.4. The number of
standalone funds is likely to be an overestimate as I might have failed to identify a parent-subsidiary relationship between
the fund promoter and the management company or depository bank, especially when they have different names.
*funds with multiple promoters are included once
Apart from the unique dataset on the governance of UCITS, I also manually collected
information on actual fund expenses. This was done by drawing a 20% random sample
resulting in a final data set of 490 funds. For these funds, the annual reports closest to
the financial year 2006 were retrieved. I collected information on the actual expenses of
the various funds from their income statement contained in their annual report. Hence
the data comprises all actual expense items (in the respective currency) that the fund
reported. Furthermore, data on net assets (assets minus liabilities) for the current and
the previous financial year was also taken from the annual statements.
108 CHAPTER 4: GOVERNANCE AND FEE SETTING IN THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY
4.3.2 Estimation Methodology
The regression analysis estimates the following cross-sectional model:33
Fee = f(governance, fund size, fund family size, fund age, number of funds per promoter,
performance, legal choice, portfolio region dummies, investment style dummies)
The variables are explained in the following sections. Concerning the estimation tech-
nique, the coefficient estimates are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) but with
fixed effects for the legal choice. The reason is that the Law treats each fund as a separate
legal entity, but many fund variables are determined at the fund family level inducing
cross-sectional correlation between the funds. Therefore, pooled regression is likely to
understate the standard errors and accordingly overstate the statistical significance of
the model. Accordingly, the statistical significance will be determined on the basis of
robust standard errors that are clustered at the fund family-level. This method takes
into account that individual funds within a fund family may not be independent. In
untabulated results, I also used two other estimation specifications that are not reported
for the sake of brevity.34
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variables
As one of the primary responsibilities of the board is to negotiate fee levels, I use expense
ratios as a measure of board effectiveness and consequently as an indicator for the gover-
nance conflict inherent in the mutual fund industry (see, also, Tufano and Sevick, 1997;
Del Guercio et al., 2003; Ferris and Yan, 2007). Specifically, I use four different measures
33 One of the main conclusions of the two OEA Memorandums “Literature Review on Independent
Mutual Fund Chairs and Directors” and “Power Study as Related to Independent Mutual Fund
Chairs” was that there is a lack of a sound structural model to isolate a given effect in this area.
However, I try to do the next best thing and base my model on empirical models that have been
established in the literature so far (see, for example, Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Del Guercio et al.,
2003; Ferris and Yan, 2007; Khorana et al., 2007; Meschke, 2007). Furthermore, the SEC proposed
in 2000 an empirical model for estimating fund fees (”Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses“)
from which I also draw on.
34 Furthermore, I estimated a variation of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach. I first estimate
cross-sectional regressions for each legal choice (FCP, SICAV with management company, SICAV
self-managed) and then average over those cross-sectional estimates. This is done in order to control
for differences across different legal organizational forms and it represents an alternative to including
dummies for fixed effects. As a last estimation method, I ran regressions based on averages for
sponsors. This means that the dependent and independent variables represent averages based on
fund-level variables. This estimation methodology corrects for the overstated statistical significance
that is potentially present in the pooled regressions. The qualitative results are similar.
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of expense ratios. The first is the fund’s total expense ratio (TER) which is calculated
as the sum of all fees and expenses divided by average net assets.
TER =
Sum(fund expenses)
Average net assets
The second, MER, is the management expense ratio. It is calculated as the sum all fees
for the management of fund assets divided by average net assets. It is important to stress
that this figure is not available in any database and only the nature of the self-collected
data allowed me to compute this variable. In order to make this figure comparable across
funds, I calculate it as the sum of fees for the management company, investment adviser,
investment manager, and also fees for central administration and distribution. These
latter two items have to be included in order to arrive at a common denominator as some
funds provide these services in-house and some contract it to external providers.
MER =
Sum(management expenses)
Average net assets
The third, TER(Nw.), is very similar to the first measure except that it does not
include a potential fee waiver that the management company may have granted. This
means that this variable actually depicts all the fees and expenses incurred by the fund
over the reporting period.35
TER(Nw.) =
Sum(fund expenses− fee waiver)
Average net assets
The last expense ratio measures total shareholder costs as it not only includes the
fund expenses, but also direct expenses that shareholders have to pay when entering and
exiting a fund. This means that TSC also includes loads that are amortized over five
years as a five year holding period is commonly assumed (see, Khorana et al., 2007).
TSC = TER +
Initial load
5
+
Back-end load at five years
5
4.3.2.2 Control Variables
In addition to the governance variables that have been presented in section 4.3.1., I also
control for a number of other variables that might influence fee levels. The entire popula-
35 TER (Nw.) is calculated for showing the effect of the fee waiver on reducing fund fees and hence it
is only included in the summary statistics part. For the sake of brevity, it will not be considered as
dependent variable in the regression analysis.
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tion of control variables is calculated similarly to Tufano and Sevick (1997), Del Guercio
et al. (2003), Ferris and Yan (2007), and Meschke (2007).
First of all, fund and fund family size are computed as the logarithm of total net
assets in euros. These two variables control for economies of scale in fund management.
Fund age is also included as a control variable as there might arguably be significant fee
differences between young start-up funds or well established funds (see, also, Tufano and
Sevick, 1997; Del Guercio et al., 2003; Meschke, 2007). Furthermore, fund performance,
calculated as the change in fund NAV (asset-weighted share classes) over the period, is
also controlled for in the regressions. The reason is that higher fees might have their
justification if they are coupled with higher performance. As there also might be positive
spill-over effects between funds of the same sponsor, the number of funds offered by a
sponsor is also included. In terms of dummies, the analysis controls for the primary
region where the fund invests and for the style of the fund (income, growth, blend).
Furthermore, the regressions contain dummies for the legal choice (FCP, SICAV with
management company, SICAV self-managed).
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.8 groups net assets in quintile and shows for each quintiles how much of total
fees and expenses is spent on management, fees, and expenses. The table reveals that
the majority of expenses is credited to the management company and that the manage-
ment fee rate increases with assets under management. This relationship is reversed for
fees (e.g. for custodian, transfer agent, and registrar) and expenses (e.g. printing and
publication expenses) which decrease with increasing assets. Fees and expenses together
consume only 12% of total fund expenses whereas the management fee rate constitutes
88% of fund expenses.
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Table 4.8: Split of Fund Expenses by Net Assets
Net Assets Net Assets Range
No. Obs.
Management Fees Expenses
Quintile (in EUR 000) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
1 0 - 13 98 65.20 6.74 28.07
2 14 - 34 98 71.61 12.59 15.80
3 35 - 92 98 77.99 10.20 11.81
4 93 - 236 98 80.57 6.29 13.58
5 237 - 90,300 98 88.89 5.98 5.40
Total 0 - 90,300 490 87.59 6.15 6.38
This table is grouped into quintiles of net assets. It shows how much of the total fees and expenses is spent on the
management of the fund, on various fees, and on general expenses. “Management” encompasses the management company
fee/advisory fee/investment management fee and central administration and distribution. “Fees” contains the payments
to various service providers, like the custodian, transfer agent, registrar. “Expenses” encompasses bank expenses, expenses
for the auditor, tax payments, printing and publication expenses.
Table 4.9 contains summary statistics as well as pair-wise correlations on key fund
characteristics to profile the sample. Panel A shows that the average fund is seven years
old and has a TER of 2.04%. The fund total net assets (in thousands) amount on
average to EUR 433 while the fund family total net assets (in thousands) are equal to
EUR 9,776. Furthermore, on average 27% of the board seats are taken by non-affiliated
directors. Panel B presents correlations for the variables considered in Panel A. It reveals
that TER and family TNA are significantly negatively correlated. This result points to
economies of scale at the fund-family level. It also shows that fund TNA and family TNA
are significantly positively correlated as one would expect. This table also reveals that
there is a significant positive correlation between performance perf. (%) and family TNA.
Furthermore, family TNA and perf. (%) are negatively and TER positively correlated
with the percentage of non-affiliated directors (% NA).
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics and Correlations
Panel A. Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Median
Standard 10th 90th
Deviation Percentile Percentile
TER (%) 489 2.04 1.87 1.14 0.98 3.01
Fund TNA 490 433 55 4117 6 604
Family TNA 490 9,776 2,475 16,700 75 26,600
Perf. (%) 483 18.80 17.10 16.00 1.65 39.00
Fund Age 490 6.99 6.25 4.98 1.59 13.20
% NA 490 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.67
(continued)
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Table 4.9: —Continued
Panel B. Correlations
TER Fund Family Perf. Fund Age
% NA
(%) TNA TNA (%) (Years)
TER (%)
1.00
Fund TNA
-0.02 1.00
(0.697)
Family TNA
-0.12* 0.17*** 1.00
(0.009) (0.000)
Perf. (%)
-0.07 -0.02 0.20*** 1.00
(0.131) (0.698) (0.000)
Fund Age -0.04 -0.01 0.12* 0.07 1.00
(Years) (0.337) (0.771) (0.009) (0.145)
% NA
0.30*** -0.02 -0.19*** -0.09** -0.03 1.00
(0.000) (0.596) (0.000) (0.046) (0.569)
This table presents summary statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) for selected variables. TER means Total
Expense Ratio and is defined as the sum of all expenses divided by average net assets for that year. Fund TNA refers to
fund total net assets (assets minus liabilities) taken from the annual reports of 2006 and converted to Euros (in thousands).
Family TNA is the sum of all total net assets of the respective family where the fund belongs to. It is also calculated in
thousand Euros. Perf. stands for Performance and is calculated as the percentage change in NAV (net asset value) over
the reporting period. Fund Age covers the period from inception of the fund until the end of the reporting period. % NA
is the percentage of non-affiliated directors and it is calculated by investigating which directors of the fund’s board are not
affiliated to the management company. Panel A shows the summary statistics for those variables. Panel B shows pairwise
correlations. P-values are reported in parentheses below the various coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance levels
of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 4.10 considers the same set of variables as Table 4.9; however, it shows their
means grouped by the two governance dimensions. Several relations are noteworthy. It
reveals that FIF and SF funds are relatively comparable concerning fund size as well
as fund family size. Also there is not much performance difference between FIF and
SF funds. However, SF funds have a higher percentage of non-affiliated directors. On
average, SF fund boards contain 63% of non-affiliated directors while only 13% of the
directors on boards of FIF funds can be considered as non-affiliated. This means that
vertical integration also leads to greater management affiliation at the board level. Panel
B considers board proximity. The following interesting facts emerge. Boards that are
dominated by the management company are bigger in size at the fund as well as the
fund family level. The average performance as well as age are relatively similar for funds
where the management company dominates the board against their counterparts.
4.3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 113
Table 4.10: Summary Statistics by Degree of Vertical Integration and Board
Proximity
Panel A. Summary Statistics by Degree of Vertical Integration
FIF PI1 PI2 SF SP MP Total
TER (%) 1.87 1.83 2.71 2.45 1.93 2.67 2.04
Fund TNA 325 743 33 218 494 90 434
Family TNA 11,700 11,900 284 10,900 11,400 596 9,776
Perf. (%) 19.10 20.50 13.90 17.40 19.40 15.30 18.80
Fund Age (Years) 6.93 7.26 4.35 6.80 7.00 6.94 6.99
% NA 0.13 0.21 0.71 0.63 0.23 0.5 0.27
Panel B. Summary Statistics by Board Proximity
MCM MCM Total
Yes No
TER (%) 1.93 2.37 2.04
Fund TNA 508 212 434
Family TNA 11,000 6,109 9,776
Perf. (%) 18.70 19.30 18.80
Fund Age (Years) 6.98 7.03 6.99
% NA 0.14 0.65 0.27
This table shows means for selected variables. Panel A reports means by degree of vertical integration (abbreviations are
described in Table 3). Panel B shows means by board proximity (see Table 4.4). TER means Total Expense Ratio and is
defined as the sum of all expenses divided by average net assets for that year. Fund TNA refers to fund total net assets
(assets minus liabilities) taken from the annual reports of 2006 and converted to Euros (in thousands). Family TNA is the
sum of all total net assets of the respective family where the fund belongs to. It is also calculated in thousand Euros. Perf.
stands for Performance and is calculated as the percentage change in NAV (net asset value) over the reporting period.
Fund Age covers the period from inception of the fund until the end of the reporting period. % NA is the percentage of
non-affiliated directors and it is calculated by investigating which directors of the fund’s board are not affiliated to the
management company.
Table 4.11 summarizes mean fees on the basis of the governance variables. Panel
A shows that among funds with single promoters, PI1 funds have the lowest expense
ratios in terms of TER, followed by FIF funds and PI2 funds. SF funds have on average
the highest expense ratios with 2.45%, compared to 1.83% for PI1 funds. Yet multiple
promoters represent the most expensive group with TERs of 2.67%. On average, Luxem-
bourg equity UCITS have a TER of 2.04%. Panel B contains splits by proximity of the
fund board and the manager. Funds where the majority of board directors are affiliated
with the management company have lower TERs (1.93%) compared to their peer group
(2.37%).
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Table 4.11: Fee Structure by Vertical Integration and Proximity
Panel A. Degree of Vertical Integration
Obs. TER MER TER (Nw.) TSC
Funds with Single Promoter SP
Fully Integrated Fund FIF 177 1.87 1.26 1.88 2.79
Partially Integrated Fund I PI1 187 1.83 1.41 1.90 2.77
Partially Integrated Fund II PI2 11 2.71 1.65 2.71 3.44
Standalone Fund SF 41 2.45 1.58 2.47 3.20
Subtotal SP 416 1.93 1.37 1.97 2.84
Funds with Multiple Promoters MP 73 2.67 1.73 2.70 3.60
Total 489 2.04 1.42 2.08 2.95
Panel A. Degree of Vertical Integration
Obs. TER MER TER (Nw.) TSC
Management Company Majority Yes 367 1.93 1.35 1.97 2.83
Management Company Majority No 122 2.37 1.64 2.41 3.31
Total 489 2.04 1.42 2.08 2.95
This table shows means for the different fees by degree of vertical integration (Panel A) and proximity of fund board and
manager (Panel B). The governance variables are defined in Table 4.4. TER means Total Expense Ratio and is defined as
the sum of all expenses divided by average net assets for that year. MER refers to all expenses for management services
(adviser, investment manager, management company) divided by average net assets. TER (Nw.) is similar to TER but
the former variable does not include a fee waiver. TSC stands for Total Shareholder Costs and is calculated as TER plus
one fifth of the subscription or redemption fee.
Table 4.12 presents t-tests for the equality of means between TERs of different gov-
ernance groups. It further shows non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for dif-
ference in median fee levels. As can be seen from Panel B, there is a significant difference
in fees between PI2 funds and FIF funds with FIF funds having lower TERs than PI2
funds. Panel C also reveals that there exist significant fee differences between SF and
FIF funds. Like in Panel B, FIF funds have lower TERs than SF funds. Furthermore,
Table 4.13 contains the same set of tests as Table 4.12 but considers different groups.
Panel A analyzes the fee differences between funds with single promoters versus funds
with multiple promoters. Generally, the fees of those two groups are significantly different
from each other with TERs for single promoter funds being lower. In Panel B, the fee
difference between funds where the majority of the board directors is affiliated with the
management company and funds where this is not the case is considered. The results
show that there exist significant fee differences between those two groups with the latter
having lower TERs than the former.
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Table 4.12: Differences in Fee Structure by Degree of Integration
Panel A. Partially Integrated 1 vs. Fully Integrated Fund
Obs. Diff. T-Test Diff. Wilcoxon
Mean 2 Sample Test Median 2 Sample Test
(p-values) (p-values)
TER 364 -0.043 0.640 0.023 0.781
MER 364 0.144 0.102 0.210 0.041
TER (Nw.) 364 0.016 0.888 0.035 0.657
TSC 364 -0.018 0.863 0.015 0.586
Panel B. Partially Integrated 2 vs. Fully Integrated Fund
Obs. Diff. T-Test Diff. Wilcoxon
Mean 2 Sample Test Median 2 Sample Test
(p-values) (p-values)
TER 188 0.842 0.008 0.494 0.014
MER 188 0.389 0.133 0.535 0.021
TER (Nw.) 188 0.828 0.010 0.494 0.015
TSC 188 0.651 0.059 0.471 0.308
Panel C. Standalone vs. Fully Integrated Fund
Obs. Diff. T-Test Diff. Wilcoxon
Mean 2 Sample Test Median 2 Sample Test
(p-values) (p-values)
TER 218 0.583 0.001 0.222 0.002
MER 218 0.314 0.033 0.284 0.016
TER (Nw.) 218 0.581 0.001 0.279 0.002
TSC 218 0.409 0.020 -0.031 0.042
This table presents univariate results for the different fee categories: TER means Total Expense Ratio and is defined as
the sum of all expensed divided by average net assets for that year. MER refers to all expenses for management services
(adviser, investment manager, management company) divided by average net assets. TER (Nw.) is similar to TER but the
former variable does not include a fee waiver. TSC stands for Total Shareholder Costs and is calculated as TER plus one
fifth of the subscription or redemption fee. Panel A considers the differences in fees of Partially Integrated Funds 1 (the
management company belongs to the same group as the promoter) and Fully Integrated Funds (the management company,
promoter, and custodian belong to the same group). Panel B focuses on the differences between Partially Integrated 2
(the promoter and the custodian belong to the same group) versus Fully Integrated Funds. Panel C reports the results
for Standalone (custodian, promoter, and manager do not belong to the same business complex) versus Fully Integrated
Funds. Differences in Mean and Median are calculated. A two independent sample T-test for the equality of means as well
as a non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are performed. For both tests the p-values are reported.
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Table 4.13: Differences in Fee Structure by Number of Promoters and Manage-
ment Company Majority
Panel A. Funds with Multiple Promoters vs. Funds with Single Promoter
Obs. Diff. T-Test Diff. Wilcoxon
Mean 2 Sample Test Median 2 Sample Test
(p-values) (p-values)
TER 489 0.743 0.000 0.473 0.000
MER 489 0.360 0.001 0.114 0.015
TER (Nw.) 489 0.729 0.000 0.464 0.000
TSC 489 0.766 0.000 0.543 0.000
Panel B. Management Company Majority No vs. Yes
Obs. Diff. T-Test Diff. Wilcoxon
Mean 2 Sample Test Median 2 Sample Test
(p-values) (p-values)
TER 489 0.434 0.000 0.342 0.000
MER 489 0.287 0.002 0.247 0.000
TER (Nw.) 489 0.437 0.001 0.357 0.000
TSC 489 0.478 0.000 0.311 0.000
This table presents univariate results for the different fee categories: TER means Total Expense Ratio and is defined as
the sum of all expensed divided by average net assets for that year. MER refers to all expenses for management services
(adviser, investment manager, management company) divided by average net assets. TER (Nw.) is similar to TER but
the former variable does not include a fee waiver. TSC stands for Total Shareholder Costs and is calculated as TER plus
one fifth of the subscription or redemption fee. Panel A considers the differences in fees of funds with multiple promoters
versus funds that are only launched by one promoter. Panel B focuses on the differences of funds where the board is not
dominated by the management company (more than half of the board is not affiliated to the management company ) and
funds where the opposite is the case. Differences in Mean and Median are calculated. A two-independent-samples T-test
for the equality of means as well as a non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are performed. For both tests the
p-values are reported.
4.4 Empirical Results
Table 4.14 contains the regression results of fund expense ratios on measures of integra-
tion (1-2), board proximity (3-4), and the combined effects (5-7). All regressions are
OLS regressions including dummies for the legal structure. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the fund family-level. Panel A shows the results for TERs. Concerning
the evidence on the measures of vertical integration, model (1) shows that standalone
funds (SF ) and partially integrated 2 (PI2 ) funds are significantly, relatively more ex-
pensive than fully integrated funds (FIF ).36 However, there is no statistical evidence that
partially integrated 1 (PI1 ) funds charge relatively higher TERs. This latter result is
36 It is important to emphasize that since the dummy for fully integrated funds is excluded from the
regressions (to avoid the “dummy variable trap”, i.e. perfect multicollinearity), all results concerning
integration have to be interpreted by taking fully integrated funds as the base case.
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consistent with the univariate results presented in Table 4.11 that also showed minor
differences in fee levels between PI1 and FIF funds. Taken together, the results show
that funds that are not integrated with respect to their management company and the
fund promoter, i.e. SF and PI2, have significantly higher fund expense ratios than funds
that are fully integrated, i.e. FIF funds. Or to put it differently, as the results on the
level of integration have to be interpreted by taking the FIF funds as the base case, the
following implication can be drawn: Vertical integration with respect to the management
company is beneficial for fund holders as these funds exhibit lower expense ratios after
including a battery of control variables. This result is consistent with Massa and Rehman
(2005) and Ritter and Zhang (2007) who also find positive effects of mutual affiliation
to financial complexes. It could either result from the fact that management companies
that belong to a financial complex have access to better information or that these funds
can realize greater economies of scale because of positive spill-over effects from the group
affiliation.
This result also lends credence to another, yet more benign interpretation based on
competition. Vertically integrated funds tend to belong to big financial complexes that
that offer many standardized funds where in their respective category competition is
high. Yet SF funds are usually very peculiar funds with not as much competition in their
category as FIF funds. This argument is consistent with the theoretical and empirical
results by Luo (2002) that reveal that a significant portion of the fee is due to the mark-up
that funds add if they are offered in a less competitive market category.
The control variables are in line with expectations. Fund and fund family assets are
significantly, negatively related to fund expense ratios which is in line with economies of
scale (Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Meschke, 2007; Khorana et al., 2007; Del Guercio et al.,
2003). Yet there is no significant effect of fund age and fund performance. However,
Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Khorana et al. (2007) also find no consistent evidence
that these variables should matter and Del Guercio et al. (2003) do not even control for
performance. One other interesting result to point out is that the legal choice seems not
to be related to fund expenses. Model (2) does not control for the degree of vertical
integration per se but controls for fee differentials arising from the existence of multiple
promoters. This model clearly shows that multiple promoters significantly increase fund
expense ratios. One possible explanation is that funds with more than one promoter have
to serve differing interests and there could be coordination and communication problems
between these promoters.
Model (3) and (4) present the results for the second governance mechanism, board
proximity. According to model (3), funds that are dominated by their management com-
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pany tend to have lower expense ratios. The flip side of this result is exemplified by model
(4) which shows that non-affiliated directors are strongly associated with higher expense
ratios. This result is in stark contrast to U.S. evidence and seems to be particularly
surprising in light of the discussion in the U.S. which focuses on the role of independent
directors as watchdogs for funds. However, in the context of Luxembourg, this result is
not as startling for the following reasons. In the U.S., at least 50% of the directors have
to be independent by law, while in the present sample of Luxembourg funds (see Table
4.9) on average only 27% of the directors are not affiliated to the management company.
This means that independent directors of Luxembourg funds do not have a casting vote
and hence their governance role is limited. Furthermore, the Investment Company Act
of 1940 explicitly stipulates that independent directors have to renegotiate annually the
advisory and distribution contracts. This legal duty is not given in Luxembourg. Yet this
reasoning would be in line with independent directors having no influence on fund ex-
penses, but the significantly positive correlation between independent directors and fees
is an unresolved issue and future research is necessary to investigate this effect further.
With all the the necessary caveats in mind, one possible explanation of this results
could be related to the evidence by Tufano and Sevick (1997) that well-paid indepen-
dent directors approve higher fees. In the U.S., remuneration for independent directors
is disclosed in the “Statement of Additional Information”, however, in Luxembourg di-
rectors’ fees are not disclosed separately,37 but are rather put in the expense item “Other
Expenses“. Therefore, I am unable to test for this conjecture.
Importantly, Meschke (2007) also finds no consistent evidence of board independence
and fund fees for the U.S. and Ferris and Yan (2007) also do not find evidence that
funds with more independent directors charge lower fees. Only the earlier studies on
this subject, i.e. Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Del Guercio et al. (2003) find a relation
between independent directors and lower fees. Taken together, According to model (3)
fund managers who also serve on the board are not prone to any conflicts of interest and
consequently strive for lower fund expenses. This result is in line with the Law as it
states that management companies have to act in the best interest of the fund holders.
The results contained in the last three columns of Table 4.14 combine the effects of
vertical integration and board proximity in one model. According to model (5), if the
two governance aspects are combined in one regression, only the positive effect of SF
remains marginally significant. As the results change by combining the single governance
aspects in one framework, this present model shows that the effects of board proximity
and vertical integration are related. It could either be that they are complements or
37 Only one fund in the sample provided information on directors’ fees in its annual report.
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substitutes. Yet this is the first preliminary evidence that the discussion in the U.S. is only
applicable to a limited extent in Europe. The ongoing debate in the U.S. focuses on the
microstructure of the funds. It deals with issues such as the optimal board composition
of investment companies. But according to the present evidence, it is important to
take a wider view and incorporate additional dimensions such as the affiliation of the
management company and the custodian.
In order to disentangle the complementarity versus substitutability of the two gover-
nance aspects, model (6) and (7) present splits based on management company majority
and additionally contain the variables on vertical integration. Model (6) is estimated
for the subsample where the management company does not represent the majority on
the board, i.e. MCM is equal to zero. In this case, no significant evidence for any fee
effect of integration can be found. Model (7) restricts the population to funds where
the management company dominates the board, i.e. MCM is equal to one, and in this
instance, vertical integration is significantly and positively related to expense ratios. In
line with model (1) for the entire population, model (7) reveals that standalone funds
(SF ) and funds that are partially integrated 2 (PI2 ) have significantly higher expense
ratios than fully integrated funds. Taken together, strong management representation on
the board goes hand in hand with tight relations between the management company and
the promoter, and this combined effect leads to lower expense ratios. This means that
it is crucial to take an integrated approach when studying the governance environment
of mutual funds and the restriction to study only one dimension does not reveal the full
picture. But it also means that the results so far do not lend credence to any conflicts-
of-interest story, but rather to optimal contracting (for the same argument in the U.S.
context refer to Almazan et al., 2004).
Panel B reports the results for the management expense ratio (MER). For the degree
of vertical integration, a similar picture emerges as for TER from before. Partially inte-
grated 2 (PI2 ) funds are more expensive (after controlling for various factors) than fully
integrated funds (FIF ) while for standalone funds (SF ) no significant evidence can be
found. Although management expenses are the most direct evidence on how the potential
conflict of interest between funds and the management company can be measured, affili-
ation of the management company to the creator of the fund, the sponsor, does not seem
to have any adverse effects on fund expenses. Put differently, large financial complexes
do not seem to exploit their affiliated mutual funds by setting advisory rates as high
as possible in order to maximize the income of the financial complex, rather the results
suggest that affiliation to a large complex is beneficial for funds. Vertically integrated
funds are comparable to family firms as they are set up and owned by the ones who also
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manage them and this “family effect” seems to be advantageous for funds. In line with
Panel A, multiple promoters increase fund expense ratios. Concerning the evidence on
board proximity, the dominance of the management company is related to lower fees, but
this evidence is not statistically significant. Again this result does not give any credence
to potential agency conflicts embroiled in the mutual fund industry, since in that case
we would have expected to find that board control of the management company leads
to higher, not lower fees. Yet as before, non-affiliated directors are related to higher
management fees. This evidence runs counter to any discussion on the effectiveness of
independent directors in negotiating lower fees. Models (5) to (7) combine the two gov-
ernance dimensions into one framework and are in line with the evidence presented for
Panel A.
Panel C contains the results for total shareholder costs (TSC ) representing all costs
that a shareholder has to bear when investing in the fund. Several interesting observations
can be made. Affiliation to a complex is again value-enhancing and board dominance of
the management company is related to lower fees. Interestingly, according to model (6), if
the management company does not dominate the board, then affiliation of the custodian
to the promoter lowers total shareholder costs. This result reveals that there is a strong
role for the custodian if the management company is weak. Model (7) sheds more light on
the effects of integration and shows that standalone funds (SF ) are significantly positively
related to total shareholder costs for the subsample where the management company
controls the board. Furthermore, a fund organized in the form of the contract model
charges significantly higher fees than a fund with its own legal personality. This fact has
to be emphasized. A contract form is closely related to the structure of, e.g., Vanguard,
meaning that the fund is associated to the management company and not separated from
the management company through the fund’s own legal identity. Critics of the U.S. fund
industry have put forward that the very structure of mutual funds, i.e. contracting out
services, leads to agency conflicts and that it could be resolved if funds were internally
managed. A recently published book by Wallison and Litan (2007) proposes a new legal
structure for mutual funds called “managed investment trust” (MIT).38 This structure
would allow investors to buy units in a trust that are held by a bank and the portfolio
is managed by an investment adviser. Yet this structure would not allow for a board of
directors. This “new” legal structure is equivalent to FCPs in Luxembourg. And from the
results of this study, no comparative advantage vis-a-vis existing investment companies
(i.e. SICAVs) emerges.
38 The authors argue that in the present organizational form of mutual funds, fee setting is done
like in regulated industries and that this new MIT structure would allow advisers to set their own
compensation and drive down costs.
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Table 4.14: Regressions of Fund Expense Ratios on Measures of Integration and
Board Proximity
Panel A. TER
Integration Board Combined
MCM=0 MCM=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PI1 -0.004 0.002 -0.532 0.051
(-0.03) (0.01) (-1.15) (0.33)
PI2 0.721* 0.627 -0.901 2.001***
(1.66) (1.37) (-1.64) (5.61)
SF 0.473** 0.395* -0.440 0.586*
(2.18) (1.70) (-0.84) (1.73)
Multiple promoters 0.563*
(1.94)
MCM -0.342** -0.183
(-2.17) (-1.03)
Independent directors 1.223***
(4.46)
Board size -0.011
(-0.66)
Log of fund assets -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.104*** -0.128*** -0.101 -0.121***
(-4.46) (-4.53) (-4.40) (-3.74) (-4.46) (-1.19) (-4.11)
Log of family assets -0.123*** -0.110** -0.125*** -0.137*** -0.122*** -0.448*** -0.090**
(-2.68) (-2.38) (-2.61) (-2.98) (-2.66) (-2.79) (-2.04)
Log of fund age 0.026 0.018 0.036 0.020 0.026 -0.040 0.046
(0.35) (0.24) (0.47) (0.28) (0.35) (-0.23) (0.55)
Log of number of funds 0.112 0.087 0.097 0.151* 0.113 0.514* -0.006
(1.17) (0.92) (1.04) (1.65) (1.18) (1.96) (-0.06)
Performance -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.015** 0.005
(-0.13) (-0.25) (-0.33) (0.21) (-0.18) (-2.49) (1.56)
FCP 0.113 0.163 0.170 0.156 0.129 0.395**
(0.63) (0.92) (0.93) (0.84) (0.24) (2.06)
Sicav self-managed -0.229 0.064
(-1.22) (0.14)
Sicav management-company -0.175 -0.165 -0.155 -0.301 -0.158 -0.022
(-1.08) (-1.02) (-0.90) (-1.64) (-0.94) (-0.13)
Distributor dummy 0.102 0.090 0.010 0.143 0.103 -0.069 0.338
(0.54) (0.50) (0.05) (0.85) (0.55) (-0.22) (1.54)
Constant 5.082*** 5.058*** 5.540*** 4.765*** 5.163*** 9.325*** 4.293***
(6.82) (7.58) (7.53) (7.17) (6.85) (4.41) (6.24)
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.159 0.150 0.206 0.161 0.271 0.144
N 483 483 483 483 483 119 364
(continued)
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Table 4.14–Continued
Panel B. MER
Integration Board Combined
MCM=0 MCM=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PI1 0.106 0.111 -0.247 0.154
(0.81) (0.85) (-0.74) (1.03)
PI2 0.597** 0.527* -0.525 1.742***
(2.59) (1.93) (-1.36) (4.56)
SF 0.272 0.214 -0.379 0.475*
(1.52) (1.14) (-0.91) (1.89)
Multiple promoters 0.376*
(1.80)
MCM -0.207 -0.137
(-1.62) (-0.93)
Independent directors 0.834***
(3.88)
Board size -0.010
(-0.67)
Log of fund assets -0.042 -0.044 -0.044 -0.025 -0.041 0.037 -0.061
(-1.28) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-0.76) (-1.24) (0.68) (-1.60)
Log of family assets -0.034 -0.023 -0.033 -0.040 -0.033 -0.176** -0.033
(-1.08) (-0.74) (-1.06) (-1.29) (-1.05) (-2.33) (-0.91)
Log of fund age -0.014 -0.026 -0.014 -0.025 -0.014 0.064 -0.025
(-0.21) (-0.38) (-0.21) (-0.39) (-0.22) (0.51) (-0.32)
Log of number of funds -0.042 -0.060 -0.054 -0.016 -0.041 0.211* -0.088
(-0.55) (-0.82) (-0.73) (-0.22) (-0.54) (1.73) (-0.92)
Performance 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.009** 0.006
(0.55) (0.43) (0.38) (0.76) (0.51) (-2.28) (1.61)
FCP -0.080 -0.085 -0.086 -0.048 0.176 0.000
(-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.28) (0.52) (0.00)
Sicav self-managed 0.044 -0.192
(0.27) (-0.61)
Sicav management-company 0.024 -0.001 0.004 0.114 0.036 0.025
(0.17) (-0.01) (0.02) (0.73) (0.25) (0.16)
Distributor dummy 0.044 0.025 -0.031 0.063 0.045 -0.034 0.219
(0.28) (0.16) (-0.20) (0.43) (0.28) (-0.18) (0.98)
Constant 2.534*** 2.586*** 2.905*** 2.183*** 2.595*** 3.591*** 2.849***
(4.52) (5.04) (5.43) (3.83) (4.66) (2.73) (4.44)
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.050 0.042 0.087 0.047 -0.004 0.090
N 483 483 483 483 483 119 364
(continued)
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Table 4.14–Continued
Panel C. TSC
Integration Board Combined
MCM=0 MCM=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PI1 0.025 0.036 -0.591 0.120
(0.15) (0.22) (-1.31) (0.67)
PI2 0.713 0.553 -1.229** 2.389***
(1.33) (0.97) (-2.06) (4.25)
SF 0.422* 0.290 -0.649 0.560*
(1.97) (1.24) (-1.29) (1.89)
Multiple promoters 0.682**
(2.15)
MCM -0.425** -0.311
(-2.39) (-1.54)
Independent directors 1.322***
(4.13)
Board size -0.013
(-0.68)
Log of fund assets -0.122*** -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.094*** -0.120*** -0.108 -0.104***
(-3.83) (-3.89) (-3.81) (-3.05) (-3.81) (-1.08) (-3.28)
Log of family assets -0.116** -0.099** -0.117** -0.130*** -0.114** -0.482*** -0.080
(-2.34) (-2.02) (-2.32) (-2.71) (-2.31) (-2.78) (-1.63)
Log of fund age 0.000 -0.016 0.005 -0.011 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (-0.18) (0.06) (-0.13) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01)
Log of number of funds 0.143 0.119 0.132 0.189* 0.144 0.698** -0.027
(1.21) (1.07) (1.19) (1.79) (1.24) (2.61) (-0.21)
Performance 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.014** 0.006*
(0.09) (-0.02) (-0.11) (0.43) (0.01) (-2.26) (1.72)
FCP 0.063 0.120 0.132 0.136 -0.008 0.454**
(0.31) (0.59) (0.61) (0.63) (-0.02) (2.03)
Sicav self-managed -0.181 0.033
(-0.82) (0.08)
Sicav management-company -0.286 -0.279 -0.266 -0.361* -0.257 -0.115
(-1.54) (-1.48) (-1.32) (-1.82) (-1.34) (-0.57)
Distributor dummy 0.109 0.129 0.034 0.171 0.111 -0.112 0.469**
(0.54) (0.68) (0.17) (0.94) (0.55) (-0.34) (2.11)
Constant 5.859*** 5.732*** 6.317*** 5.407*** 5.996*** 10.462*** 4.982***
(7.33) (8.02) (7.87) (7.57) (7.38) (4.73) (6.69)
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.137 0.127 0.180 0.129 0.282 0.140
N 483 483 483 483 483 119 364
This table reports results of fund expense ratios on measures of vertical integration and board proximity. All models are
ordinary least squares regressions including fixed-effects for the legal choice. The regressions use three sets of independent
variables: (1) total expense ratios - panel A; (2) management expense ratios - panel B; and (3) total shareholder costs,
i.e. total expense ratios plus annualized front- and/or back-end loads assuming a 5-year holding period. Standard errors
are clustered at the fund-family level. The variables for integration and board proximity are described in Table 3. Log of
fund assets is computed as the logarithm of fund total net assets (assets minus liabilities) taken from the annual reports of
2006 and converted to Euros. Log of family assets is calculated as the sum of all total net assets of the respective families
where the fund belongs to. Log of fund age is the logarithm of the number of years the funds has been in existence. Log of
number of funds is the logarithm of the number of funds per promoter. FCP, Sicav self-managed and Sicav management
company are dummy variables for whether the fund is set up as FCP or an investment company that is either self-managed
or has designated a management company. Performance is calculated as the percentage change in fund NAV (net asset
value) over the reporting period. The models further include dummies for style of the fund (blend, growth, value) and
dummies for the region where the fund mainly invests (Europe, Global, and Emerging Markets). Furthermore, dummies
for the distribution are included, i.e. whether the principal distributor belongs to the sponsor. Statistical inference is based
on robust standard errors clustered at the fund family-level. T-statistics are reported below the coefficients. ***, **, and
* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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4.5 Robustness Tests
Although the regressions contained in Table 4.14 control for the legal structure of the
mutual fund, i.e. whether the fund is set up as a contract (FCP) or an investment
company (SICAV) that is either self-managed or appoints a management company, the
choice to actually organize the mutual fund in any of these forms could be endogenous
with respect to fund expense ratios. For example, it could be that bigger funds are
generally organized as SICAVs and bigger funds have also lower total expense ratios.
Therefore, as a first robustness test, I examine the choice of the legal form by estimating
the following logit regression:
FCP ∗i = β0 + β1lnnai + β2lnfamnai + β3lnagei + β4perfi
+ β5disi + β6nofundi + β7msharesi + β8promcoi
+ β9goveri + β10areadumi + β11styledumi + νi
(4.5.1)
where lnnai refers to log of fund net assets; lnfamnai denotes log of family net
assets; lnagei is equal to log of fund age; perfi proxies for performance; goveri refers
to the governance variables PI1, PI2, SF, and MCM ; disi is the distributor dummy;
nofundi is equal to number of funds per promoter; areadumi refers to the portfolio area
dummies; styledumi is equal to the style dummies. All these variables were also contained
in the regressions in Table 4.14, but two additional variables are added as instrumental
variables. Msharesi is equal to one if the fund has multiple share classes and promcoi is
equal to one if the promoter is from European Union origin. FCP ∗i denotes a continuous
latent variable that proxies for the probability of organizing a fund in the contractual
form (FCP) versus an investment company (SICAV ). FCP is equal to one if FCP ∗i is
above zero and it is equal to zero in any other case. The results are contained in Table
4.15. As expected, the size of the fund significantly influences the choice of the legal
structure.
In order to correct for a potential self-selection bias and validate the results from the
previous section, it is important to model the choice of the legal form in a first step and
then relate it to fund expense ratios.39 This is done by applying a switching model with
endogenous switching.40 In general terms, the model is set up as follows:
39 Furthermore, in untabulated tests the second legal choice which is a self-managed SICAV versus
a SICAV that appoints a management company is studied under the same framework. The same
qualitative results apply. For the sake of brevity the results are not presented here.
40 For an overview of self-selection models, see Li and Prabhala (2006). For a detailed discussion of
this model, see Maddala (1983) and for more recent material, see Woolridge (2002) and Greene
(2008). For applications of this model in the financial context, see Dunbar (1995) and Fang (2005).
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FCP ∗i = γiZi + νi (4.5.2)
TERsicav,i = β0Xi + 0i (4.5.3)
TERfcp,i = β1Xi + 1i (4.5.4)
Equation (4.5.2) is usually referred to as the selection equation and Zi is defined by
the variables contained in equation (4.5.1) from before. This models controls for self-
selection as funds select the legal form based on private information. The latter concept
is absorbed in these models via the “Inverse Mills Ratio” (for more details, refer to the
Appendix). Consistent estimation of the expense equations requires the inclusion of this
private information as otherwise an omitted variable bias would arise. The selection
equation determines the regime (SICAV or FCP) to which the fund belongs. In the
second step, the outcome equation, the fund is put into the group based on the regime
determined in step one. To be specific, the two second stage regressions, (4.5.3) and
(4.5.4), are equal to:
TER∗i = β0 + β1lnnai + β2lnfamnai + β3lnagei + β4perfi + β5disi
+ β6nofundi + β7goveri + β8areadumi + β9styledumi + i
(4.5.5)
Equation (4.5.5) contains all the variables that were also used to estimate the results
in Table 4.14.41 Importantly, msharesi and promcoi are used as instrumental variables
(see equation 4.5.1) and the system is estimated by applying the full information method
to simultaneously estimate continuous and binary parts of the model.
The results are contained in Table 4.15 whereby columns (3) and (4) refer to vertical
integration and columns (5) and (6) to board proximity.42 Column (3) and (5) correspond
to equation (4.5.3) from above and column (4) and (6) to equation (4.5.4). The last line
in Table 4.15 present the p-values of the likelihood ratio test. It tests whether the errors
from the choice equation (4.5.2) are related to the errors of the outcome equation, the
equation determining fund expenses (4.5.3 and 4.5.4). The values are insignificant for all
models which means self-selection bias arising from the legal choice does not pose any
problems in this study. Generally speaking, after controlling for a potential self-selection
bias, the results for the governance variables, the degree of vertical integration and board
proximity, are still significant and in line with the results presented in Table 4.14.43
41 Baum (2006) writes that set of explanatory variables, Zi, contained in the selection equation must
be a superset of the variables in the outcome equation, Xi.
42 For the sake of brevity, the remaining governance variables, multiple promoters and independent
directors are not included in the present model. Yet the same qualitative results apply.
43 Although in this instance, the inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio is not necessary, it does not pose
any problems in the sense that the estimates do not become biased, but it increases the standard
errors. However, as all the variables are still in line with the results from previous section 4.4, this
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Table 4.15: Robustness Tests
Integration Board Integration Board
FCP=0 FCP=1 FCP=0 FCP=1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PI1 -0.971*** 0.032 0.033
(-3.29) (0.25) (0.12)
PI2 -1.223* 1.088*** -0.562
(-1.66) (3.57) (-0.83)
SF -1.065*** 0.371* 0.582*
(-2.66) (1.86) (1.76)
MCM 1.351*** -0.368*** -0.180
(3.98) (-2.97) (-0.53)
Log of fund assets 0.216*** 0.195** -0.108*** -0.221*** -0.108*** -0.209***
(2.58) (2.36) (-2.84) (-3.48) (-2.83) (-3.23)
Log of family assets 0.015 -0.005 -0.139*** -0.049 -0.159*** -0.039
(0.21) (-0.07) (-3.71) (-0.86) (-4.27) (-0.68)
Log of fund age 0.067 0.115 0.071 -0.109 0.075 -0.124
(0.44) (0.76) (1.06) (-0.70) (1.13) (-0.79)
Log of number of funds 0.142 0.256* 0.055 0.072 0.070 0.053
(0.98) (1.86) (0.78) (0.54) (1.05) (0.42)
Multiple share classes -1.787*** -1.836***
(-6.26) (-6.44)
Performance -0.006 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003
(-0.74) (-0.58) (0.14) (-0.24) (-0.04) (-0.49)
Promoter country 1.677** 2.127***
(2.13) (2.64)
Constant -3.397** -5.416*** 4.981*** 5.897*** 5.633*** 6.018***
(-2.29) (-3.76) (8.63) (7.07) (10.22) (7.32)
N 477 477 350 130 350 130
Pseudo R2 0.168 0.178
LR-test 0.6945 0.695 0.755 0.755
This table shows robustness tests for the previous results. Models (1) and (2) are logit regressions and models (3) to (6)
are switching regressions with endogenous switching. The dependent variables in the first two columns is a dummy for
the legal choice which is equal to zero in the case of SICAV and equal to one if the fund is organized as FCP. The last
four columns use the TER as independent variable. The variables for integration and board proximity are described in
Table 3. Log of fund assets is computed as the logarithm of fund total net assets (assets minus liabilities) taken from the
annual reports of 2006 and converted into Euros. Log of family assets is calculated as the sum of all total net assets of the
respective families to which the fund belongs to. Log of fund age is the logarithm of the number of years the fund has been
in existence. Log of number of funds is the logarithm of the number of funds per promoter. FCP, Sicav self-manged and
Sicav management company are dummy variables for whether the fund is set up as FCP or an investment company that is
either self-managed or has designated a management company. Performance is calculated as the percentage change in fund
NAV (net asset value) over the reporting period. The models further include dummies for style of the fund (blend, growth,
value) and dummies for the region where the fund mainly invests (Europe, Global, Emerging Markets). Furthermore,
dummies for the distribution are included, i.e. whether the principal distributor belongs to the sponsor. Multiple share
classes is a dummy and equal one if the fund uses more than one share class. Promoter country is also a dummy and set
equal to one if the promoter is of European origin. P-values of the likelihood ratio test for joint independence is reported
in the last row. It tests the significance of the error terms in the selection and outcome equation. T-statistics are reported
below the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
lends additional credence to my results.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the governance environment of the Luxembourg fund industry, which
is the second largest fund domicile worldwide. I hand-collect unique data on a com-
prehensive sample of all equity UCITS (European equivalent of U.S. mutual funds) for
the first quarter of 2007. Overall this study comprises 2,230 equity UCITS for which
two key governance elements are investigated. First, the degree of vertical integration is
examined, i.e. to which degree are fund promoter, management company, and custodian
related at the fund complex level. This study finds that in the vast majority of all cases
(90%), at least the custodian or the management company belong to the promoter. Put
differently, only 10% of all funds in the sample are not vertically integrated. Second, I
also investigate the board structure of equity UCITS and find that in 74% of all funds
the management company is dominating the board, i.e. the majority of directors are
affiliated to the management company.
Furthermore, I draw a 20% random sample and collect unique data on all dimensions
of actual fees from the funds’ annual reports. This data allows me, among other things,
to compute expense ratios that are permanently the battle ground of regulators in the
U.S. and are considered by scholars to represent a measure of governance effectiveness.
Concerning univariate evidence, I find that the average equity UCITS charges a total
expense ratio of approximately 2% and that funds that exhibit some degree of integration
with their management company charge lower fees. On average, the most expensive funds
are those with multiple promoters with a TER of 2.67%. Moreover, if more than half of
the board is affiliated to the management company, expense ratios are lower.
I further investigate the relation between governance characteristics and expense ra-
tios by applying a multivariate setting and controlling for a host of other fund character-
istics. By applying three different expense ratio measures, I find consistent evidence that
standalone funds, i.e. funds that are not integrated, are more expensive than funds that
are fully integrated. Furthermore, the evidence reveals that expense ratios are lower for
funds where the management company dominates the board.
As a robustness test, I examine the choice of the legal structure. Funds in Luxembourg
can choose to organize themselves in the contract model (FCP) or as an investment
company (SICAV). First, I examine the variables that determine that choice and then
argue that that choice could be endogenous to the fee levels. In order to correct for this
self-selection bias, I apply a switching model with endogenous switching. In this setting,
most of the results hold and I cannot find any evidence for a self-selection bias.
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Taken together, these results point to a value-increasing role of the management
company in Luxembourg and do not corroborate any form of a conflicts-of-interest hy-
pothesis. Rather the results point to an optimal contracting environment in Luxembourg.
This result is interesting in light of the fact that there is hardly any governance regula-
tion imposed on Luxembourg funds. Therefore, there is reason to assume that the legal
freedom that Luxembourg funds enjoy leads to optimal contracting in the mutual fund
industry.
As a fruitful extension to this work, it would be interesting to examine the role of
competition in the present context. Future research could be directed at shedding some
more light on the importance of competition and governance in the fee setting process.
Luxembourg is the ideal place for this kind of study as the governance environment is
fixed for one country (i.e. Luxembourg), but funds are generally distributed to many
different countries within Europe having different levels of competition.
4.6. CONCLUSION 129
Appendix
This appendix outlines the endogenous switching model in more detail.44 One problem
with the model contained in 4.3.2 is that TER depends on the choice made by the firm,
i.e. whether to organize the fund as FCP or SICAV. Arguably, this choice is not done
randomly, but in respect to variables that also determine fund expenses, like size of the
fund. This means that the error terms, i.e. νi, 0i, 1i in equations (4.5.2) to (4.5.4) are
correlated. In order to correct for this bias, the following model is applied:
Regime 1: TERfcp,i = β1Xi + 1i iff FCPi = 1⇐⇒ γiZi + νi > 0 (A.1)
Regime 2: TERsicav,i = β0Xi + 0i iff FCPi = 0⇐⇒ γiZi + νi ≤ 0 (A.2)
Under the following assumptions:
• (1i,νi), (0i,νi) are independent of (Xi,Zi) with a zero mean
• νi ∼ N(0, 1)
• E(1i|νi)=θ1νi, E(0i|νi)=θ0νi
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) can be written in expected terms as:
E[TERfcp,i|Xi, γiZi + νi > 0] = β1Xi + E[1i|γiZi + νi > 0]
= β1Xi + θ1E[νi|γiZi + νi > 0]
= β1Xi + θ1
(
φ(γiZi)
Θ(γiZi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inverse Mills Ratio
(A.3)
And
E[TERsicav,i|Xi, γiZi + νi ≤ 0] = β0Xi + E[0i|γiZi + νi ≤ 0]
= β0Xi + θ0E[νi|γiZi + νi ≤ 0]
= β0Xi + θ0E[νi|νi ≤ −γiZi]
= β0Xi − θ0E[νi|νi > γiZi]
= β0Xi − θ0
(
φ(γiZi)
1−Θ(γiZi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hazard Rate
(A.4)
44 This short description is based on lecture notes by Whited (2007) and the book by Maddala (1983).
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In order to correct for the sample selection bias, the Inverse Mills Ratio
(
φ(γiZi)
Θ(γiZi)
)
and the Hazard Rate
(
(φγiZi)
1−Θ(γiZi)
)
are added to equations (4.5.4) and (4.5.3) as independent
variables:
TERfcp,i = β1Xi + θ1
(
φ(γiZi)
Θ(γiZi)
)
+ 1i
and
TERsicav,i = β0Xi + θ0
(
φ(γiZi)
1−Θ(γiZi)
)
+ 0i.
The estimations are estimated using the full information likelihood procedure.
Chapter 5
Summary
Broadly speaking, this thesis is about corporate governance. However, it is not confined
to the governance of firms, but it also integrates the governance of investment companies,
that is mutual funds. This study tries to contrast the existing literature on corporate
governance and finance by selecting issues that allow to exemplify the most important
concepts or that have hitherto not gained enough attention in the literature. Potential
corporate governance problems are studied empirically by using three different datasets
that have their own specific virtues. The first two chapters focus on corporate finance
issues and in this context on the firms’ cash holdings. The last chapter departs from the
pure corporate finance perspective and embarks on the governance of mutual funds.
The second chapter focuses on the value of cash holdings in connection with firm-
specific and time-varying information asymmetry. This topic was motivated by the fact
that extant studies only focused on the value of cash with respect to some governance
measure. This chapter employs an extensive dataset covering more than 40 countries over
10 years. As measure of firm-specific information asymmetry, it proposes the standard
deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The advantage of this metric is that it is avail-
able in a large cross-country context while most corporate governance measures are only
supported on a country-basis. It contrasts the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf
(1984) with the free-cash flow theory by Jensen (1986). It finds predominant support for
the latter theory in the sense that the value of liquidity is lower when information asym-
metry is higher. This result is reinforced when the sample is split according to measures
for financing constraints and governance measures. Furthermore, the evidence holds by
performing a host of robustness tests.
132 CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY
The third chapter also focuses on corporate cash holdings, but it approaches this
topic from a different angle. It contributes to the literature by clarifying an empirical ir-
regularity. Previously, studies either focused on the corporate governance environment of
one country and found that the level of cash holdings increases with governance. Another
strain of the literature concentrated on cash holdings in a cross-country context by em-
ploying shareholder protection measures and these studies usually documented that cash
holdings decrease with country governance. Importantly, this chapter integrates both
approaches into one empirical analysis and finds that the previous relationships can be
corroborated. Yet if the firm-score is properly adjusted by extrapolating the country influ-
ence, the influence of firm-level governance vanishes. This means that country-governance
dominates firm-governance, at least with respect to corporate cash holdings. The second
part of this chapter reveals that low governance firms incur a valuation discount.
The last chapter of this thesis focuses on the governance of mutual funds. It employs
a manually collected unique dataset that covers many aspects that are not available from
any public data vendor. This chapter essentially focuses on the governance of European
mutual funds, but draws many corollaries to the U.S. environment. The governance con-
flict in the mutual fund area arises as it is in the fund investors’ interest to minimize fund
expenses, yet fund expenses are mostly composed of the advisory fee which represents
the compensation for the management company. Clearly, it is in the management com-
pany’s interest to maximize its income, hence its management fee. In order to provide
a measure for this perceived conflict of interest, fund expenses are collected from funds’
annual reports. The analysis shows that standalone funds where the fund promoter,
management company, and custodian are not related at the financial complex level, are
more expensive than funds which are fully integrated. It furthermore reveals that funds
where the management company dominates the board have lower expense ratios than
their counterparts. These results even hold after controlling for a self-selection bias as
mutual funds can choose the legal form they want to incorporate as and the chosen type
might arguably influence fund expenses.
Taken together, this thesis provides a wide perspective on governance, in that it
covers the governance of corporations as well as the governance of mutual funds. For
future research, it would be potentially interesting to go further down this route and
provide additional evidence of the governance environment of fund companies as this
research area is so for mostly neglected, especially in the European context.
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Deutscher Abstract
Diese Dissertation behandelt die Unternehmensfu¨hrung (“Corporate Governance”) von
Unternehmen sowie von Investmentfonds. Das erste Kapitel dieser Arbeit entha¨lt eine
empirische Studie, die den Wert von Liquidita¨t unter Beru¨cksichtigung von Information-
sasymmetrie untersucht. Der Panel-Datensatz besteht aus 7.474 Firmen aus 45 La¨ndern
im Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2005 und die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Wert von Liquidita¨t
geringer ist wenn die Informationsasymmetrie zwischen Unternehmen und Kapitalgebern
ho¨her ist.
Das zweite Kapitel bescha¨ftigt sich auch mit Liquidita¨t, der Schwerpunkt der Unter-
suchung liegt aber darin zu ero¨rtern, wie firmenspezifische Corporate Governance und An-
legerschutz auf La¨nderebene den Liquidita¨tsbestand von Firmen beeinflussen. Die Ergeb-
nisse zeigen, dass Firmen weniger Liquidita¨t halten wenn der Anlegerschutz schlechter
ist, aber mehr Liquidita¨t halten wenn die firmenspezifische Corporate Governance besser
ist. Wird jedoch der Corporate Governance Score um den La¨nder-Einfluss bereinigt, ist
nur noch der Anlegerschutz auf La¨nderebene entscheidend fu¨r den Liquidita¨tsbestand
von Firmen. Weiters wird gezeigt, dass der Wert von Liquidita¨t geringer ist, wenn die
Governance schlechter ist.
Das letzte Kapitel dieser Arbeit behandelt die Governance-Strukturen von Invest-
mentfonds in Europa. Es wird die gesetzliche Umgebung vorgestellt, sowie viele Ver-
gleiche zu Investmentfonds in Amerika gezogen. Die Analyse beschra¨nkt sich auf alle
Aktienfonds, die in Luxemburg im ersten Quartal 2007 aktiv waren. Die Governance von
Fonds wird anhand des Ausmaßes der vertikalen Integration, das heißt inwiefern geho¨ren
der Promotor, die Kapitalanlagegesellschaft, und die Depotbank zur gleichen Finanz-
gruppe und anhand der Struktur des Aufsichtsrats gemessen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass
die meisten Fonds vertikal integriert sind, das heißt die Kapitalanlagegesellschaft, die
Depotbank und der Promotor geho¨ren zur gleichen Finanzgruppe. Weiters bestehen die
Aufsichtsra¨te fast ausschließlich aus exekutiven Direktoren. Es wird gezeigt, dass Fonds,
die nicht vertikal integriert sind, teurer sind als diejenigen, die vertikal integriert sind.
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